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The Mess We Make: On the Metaphysics of Artifact Kinds

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Abstract

According to natural kind essentialism, there are certain properties essential to natural kinds. A similar view, artifact kind essentialism, is commonly held for artifactual kinds. According to artifact kind essentialism, artifactual kinds have essential properties that determine their conditions of membership. In this paper, I explore and defend the possibility of a nonessentialist alternative for artifactual kind membership.

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Notes

  1. This specific formulation of kind essentialism is common in metaphysics and debates on natural kinds. See, for instance, Koslicki (2008), Ellis (2008), Bird and Tobin (2017), Hawley and Bird (2011), and Ereshefsky (2022), among others. However, one might instead argue that whatever plays the role of explaining similarities between members of a kind and of induction constitutes the essence of a kind. See, for instance, Griffiths (1999). This approach requires extending our notion of essence or essential properties beyond its typical characterization. For the purpose of this paper, I will use the more traditional or narrow formulation of essence, as I believe it serves better for characterizing the existing views on the nature of artifacts in the literature. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this alternative possibility to my attention.

  2. See, for instance, Schwartz (1978), Thomasson (2003, 2007), and for a more recent discussion, see, Olivero (2019).

  3. Boyd himself, for instance, argued that certain social kinds are HPC kinds (Boyd, 1991). See Reydon (2014) for a recent attempt.

  4. See, for instance, Elder (2014, pp. 28–33), Baker (2007, pp. 52–53), Houkes and Vermaas (2014), Kornblith (2007).

  5. See, for instance, how Boyd compares his view to the Species as Individuals (SAI) thesis: “In the first place, I conclude that individual species have (homeostatic property cluster) essences, so that a form of “essentialism” is true for species, albeit a form of essentialism quite different from that anticipated by Mayr and others who have discussed essentialism in biology” (Boyd, 1999, p. 42).

  6. Most take the HPC view as an alternative to essentialism about kinds. See, for instance, Khalidi (2016, p. 408). Ereshefsky (2010), on the other hand, treats the HPC view as a new form essentialism. However, in his later work, Ereshefsky takes a more cautious approach regarding Boyd’s HPC view and its relation to kind essentialism, whether in its traditional or new forms (Ereshefsky, 2022).

  7. See Nanay (2011, p. 175), Mackie (2006, pp. 173–174), and Bird and Tobin (2017).

  8. See, for instance, LaPorte (2004, pp. 11–12).

  9. Bird and Tobin (2017), for instance, cannot think of any.

  10. See, Khalidi (2016), for a discussion.

  11. See Baker (2007, pp. 52–53), Neander (1991, p. 462), Dipert (1993).

  12. Elder, like many others in this debate, relies on the notion of proper function as developed by Millikan (1984).

  13. See also Hilpinen (1992) and Bloom (1996) for a defense of a similar view on the nature of artifact kinds.

  14. One of those views is Millikan’s theory of historical kinds (Millikan, 2000, 2017). Although Millikan’s account of proper functions plays an important role in debates about artifact essences, less attention has been paid to her account of artifacts as historical kinds. I find Millikan’s discussion on artifacts interesting and insightful. However, a proper elaboration and a critical assessment of her account of historical kinds require a paper of its own.

  15. See Juvshik (2021) for a recent discussion.

  16. They might, of course, recognize individual works of art as artifacts but deny that ‘sculpture’ or ‘classical music’ constitute artifactual kinds. I would like to thank […] for raising this point.

  17. See, for instance, Baker (2007), and Houkes and Vermaas (2014).

  18. See, for example, Hilpinen (2011), Preston (2013, p. 5), Koslicki (2018, p. 219).

  19. Thomasson disagrees that terms like “path” and “village” correspond to artifactual kinds. Her disagreement relies on her distinction between terms that are “essentially artifactual” and terms that have artifacts in their extension but not so necessarily. Thomasson, therefore, limits her account to apply only to essentially artifactual terms and their referents: “I will limit my discussion here to those artifactual kinds corresponding to what may be called “essentially artifactual” terms—that is, terms that necessarily have in their extension all and only artifacts, considered as such (as intended products of human action). Thus terms such as “village” may have many artifacts in their extension without being essentially artifactual, since non-artifacts are also in the extension; other terms such as “seven inch aluminum cylinder” may have only artifacts in their extension, but as long as that is not necessarily the case, these are not essentially artifactual terms” (Thomasson, 2003, p. 593).

  20. See Thomasson (2007, p. 58) for a discussion and a defense of intentional creation of artifacts.

  21. The example belongs to Amie Thomasson.

  22. See Preston (2013) for a discussion of both of problems.

  23. As I argued in Sect. 1, Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is arguably a non-essentialist alternative along these lines (Boyd, 1991, 1999).

  24. Notice that according to AKNE, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions or a set of properties that must be instantiated for something to belong to a particular artifact kind. One might, however, deny essentialism about the general kind artifact and argue that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for something or some kind to be an artifact or an artifact kind. Yet, one could still accept that specific artifact kinds do impose necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this distinction.

  25. This assumes, of course, that artifactual kinds are not what Millikan calls eternal kinds (Millikan, 1999, p. 50).

  26. It is controversial whether Bell is, in fact, the inventor of the first telephone. See, for instance, Shulman (2009).

  27. Thomasson’s non-functionalist intentionalism also allows a gradual change in properties relevant to artifactual kind membership (Thomasson, 2007, p. 63).

  28. See Irmak (2012, 2019).

  29. See, for instance, Thomasson (2003, 2007), Baker (2007), and Goswick (2021) for a discussion.

  30. See Thomasson (2007), Juvshik (2021).

  31. I believe constructivism is a better term to describe the position he targets. See Goswick (2021) for a very comprehensive discussion on different kinds of constructivism.

  32. See Elder (2004, ch.1) for a detailed discussion of his arguments against general constructivism.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Boğaziçi University, Bebek, Istanbul, 34342, Turkey

    Nurbay Irmak

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Irmak, N. The Mess We Make: On the Metaphysics of Artifact Kinds. Erkenn (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00789-5

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