Conclusion
Indefinite probability statements can be analysed in terms of statements which attribute probability to propositions. Therefore, there is no need to find a special place in probability theory for them; once we have an adequate account of statements that straightforwardly attribute probability to propositions, we will automatically have an adequate account of indefinite probability statements.
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Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. Indefinite probability statements. Synthese 26, 205–217 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00873263
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00873263