Abstract
In Simple Minds, Dan Lloyd presents a reductive account of naturally representing machines. The theory entails that a system represents an event by virtue of potentially misrepresenting it whenever the machine satisfies a multiple information channel, convergence, and uptake condition. I argue that Lloyd's conditions are insufficient for systems intrinsically naturally to misrepresent, and hence insufficient for them intrinsically naturally to represent. The appearance of potential misrepresentation in such machines is achieved only by reference to the extrinsic design or extrinsic interpretation or attribution of an intrinsically nonexistent or underdetermined purpose, end, or goal to such devices in identifying an intended object of representation in the system's salient behavior under the uptake condition. The implication is that Lloyd-representation is not intrinsic natural representation in a cognitively relevant sense, and Lloyd's simple ‘minds’ are not minds but mere machines.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
BraitenbergValentino (1986). Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology, Cambridge MIT (Bradford Books).
DennettDaniel C. (1978). ‘Intentional Systems’, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Montgomery, Bradford Books.
DennettDaniel C. (1987). The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MIT (Bradford Books).
DretskeFred (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MIT (Bradford Books).
FodorJerry A. (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MIT (Bradford Books).
LloydDan (1989). Simple Minds, Cambridge, MIT (Bradford Books).
MillikanRuth Garrett (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MIT (Bradford Books).
MillikanRuth Garrett (1993). White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, Cambridge MIT (Bradford Books).
PollockJohn (1989). How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon, Cambridge, MIT (Bradford Books).
SearleJohn (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, University Press.
WittgensteinLudwig (1968). Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., G.E.M. Anscombe, trans., New York, Macmillan Publishing Co.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jacquette, D. Lloyd on intrinsic natural representation in simple mechanical minds. Minds and Machines 6, 47–60 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00388917
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00388917