Abstract
This essay takes a critical look at Jonathan Berg’s theory of direct belief. Berg’s analysis of the concept of direct belief is considered insightful, but doubts are raised concerning his generalization of the purely extensional truth conditional semantics of direct belief ascription sentences to the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences. Difficulties are posed that Berg does not discuss, but that are implied by the proposal that the truth conditional semantics of belief ascription sentences generally are those of direct belief ascription sentences, and that once mentioned must enter into an evaluation of the proposition that by implication all beliefs are direct. Another line of objection concerns Berg’s second main thesis that the pragmatics as distinct from the semantics of belief ascription sentences can explain away apparent substitution failure validity breakdowns in belief ascription sentences as inappropriate utterances according to rules of roughly Gricean conversational implicature, rather than correspondence or non-correspondence with the facts about such things as what it is that people actually believe. These two parts of Berg’s argument, that the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences are those exclusively of direct belief ascription sentences, and that apparent substitution failure is effectively salva propria rather than salva veritate, are explored within the general framework of Berg’s thought experiment, eventually arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions, reflecting on what we believe comic book character Lois Lane believes and does not believe about Superman, and what she believes and does not believe about Clark Kent.
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Notes
We already know that something is amiss in the substitution salva veritate test for extensionality, and in all other cases where substitution salva veritate fails, in its application as a semantic criterion of intensionality or referential opacity, in what is properly a semantic concept of intensionality. Consider the following application that looks superficially as respectable as any other use of substitution failure salva veritate to test for referential semantic opacity or intensionality of linguistic context:
-
1.
F = ma is a law of kinematics equating Force with the product of mass times acceleration. (TRUE)
-
2.
F = ma ↔ E = mc2 (TRUE)
-
3.
E = mc2 is a law of kinematics equating Force with the product of mass times acceleration. (FALSE)
-
4.
‘
is a law of kinematics equating Force with the product of mass times acceleration’ is an intensional, not extensional linguistic context. (FALSE?)
It would be an unpopular solution to suggest, as in (4), that ‘
is a law of kinematics…etc.’ is an intensional rather than purely extensional context. The problem is that material equivalence does not seem strong enough to sustain intersubstitutability of (in some sense) equivalent sentences salva veritate or, for that matter, salva propria, while anything else appears too strong. The equivalence in (2) above is nevertheless not merely material, although expressed as such, because it is causally necessary that the two laws are true, assuming they are true at all. We can make the same point even more solidly by speaking of two mathematical theorems that have nothing to do with one another, but are equally supposed to be true in all logically possible worlds, in a description of one as an axiom of Euclidean geometry and the other as Kurt Gödel’s (first) incompleteness metatheorem of 1931. If the context is ‘
is an axiom of Euclidean geometry…etc.’, then a modally strengthened version of the same problem arises, even for stronger than material equivalence intersubstitutions. If, however, we retrench and reconfigure by restricting intersubstitution of coreferential terms and logically rather than materially equivalent sentences salva veritate or salve propria, then we incapacitate too many intuitively legitimate truth preserving intersubstitutions of sentences. It is true that fish swim if and only if birds fly, so that if someone says, ‘It is true that fish swim’, they ought to be able to substitute the materially but not logically equivalent proposition ‘birds fly’ in order to complete the context, ‘It is true [a fact of terrestrial biology, etc.] that
’ as ‘It is true that birds fly’, preserving propositional truth value, salva veritate. We must do justice to truth preserving intersubstitutions of equivalent sentence contexts, just as we must take note of truth preserving failures as signs of intensionality, referential opacity, and de dicto belief ascription sentences.-
1.
Berg (2012), Preface, p. v.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 3–4.
Ibid., pp. 1–2.
Ibid., p. 1.
Berg (2012), pp. 114–115: ‘But then how exactly is [Lois Lane’s] thinking of him as Superman (and not as Clark Kent) supposed to lead her to ascribe to the person who just greeted her the various properties belonging to her Superman conception of him — is called ‘Superman’, wears a cape, flies, etc. — as opposed to the properties belonging to her Clark Kent conception. And so, thinking that the person who just greeted her is called ‘Superman’ (not ‘Clark Kent’), wears a cape (not a suit), flies (is not earthbound), etc., she would naturally react with her Superman behavior rather than her Clark Kent behavior.’ The question is why Lois Lane should be able to explain her differential behavior toward Superman appearing as Superman (swoons) and as Clark Kent (no swoon) in fixed differences of belief about the associated clothing of Superman as Superman and as Clark Kent, if she cannot already ground her differential behavior in fixed differences of belief about Superman and Clark Kent, as the same directly intended object of belief appears in distinct guises.
Ibid.
is a law of kinematics equating Force with the product of mass times acceleration’ is an intensional, not extensional linguistic context. (FALSE?)
is a law of kinematics…etc.’ is an intensional rather than purely extensional context. The problem is that material equivalence does not seem strong enough to sustain intersubstitutability of (in some sense) equivalent sentences salva veritate or, for that matter, salva propria, while anything else appears too strong. The equivalence in (2) above is nevertheless not merely material, although expressed as such, because it is causally necessary that the two laws are true, assuming they are true at all. We can make the same point even more solidly by speaking of two mathematical theorems that have nothing to do with one another, but are equally supposed to be true in all logically possible worlds, in a description of one as an axiom of Euclidean geometry and the other as Kurt Gödel’s (first) incompleteness metatheorem of 1931. If the context is ‘
is an axiom of Euclidean geometry…etc.’, then a modally strengthened version of the same problem arises, even for stronger than material equivalence intersubstitutions. If, however, we retrench and reconfigure by restricting intersubstitution of coreferential terms and logically rather than materially equivalent sentences salva veritate or salve propria, then we incapacitate too many intuitively legitimate truth preserving intersubstitutions of sentences. It is true that fish swim if and only if birds fly, so that if someone says, ‘It is true that fish swim’, they ought to be able to substitute the materially but not logically equivalent proposition ‘birds fly’ in order to complete the context, ‘It is true [a fact of terrestrial biology, etc.] that
’ as ‘It is true that birds fly’, preserving propositional truth value, salva veritate. We must do justice to truth preserving intersubstitutions of equivalent sentence contexts, just as we must take note of truth preserving failures as signs of intensionality, referential opacity, and de dicto belief ascription sentences.References
Berg, J. (2012). Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief, Mouton Series in Pragmatics. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG.
Chisholm, R. M. (1996). A Realistic Theory of Categories: An Essay on Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Philosophical Investigations. In G. E. M. Anscombe (Ed.), The German text, with a revised English translation (3rd ed.). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
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Jacquette, D. Semantics and Pragmatics of Referentially Transparent and Referentially Opaque Belief Ascription Sentences. Philosophia 45, 49–71 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9604-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9604-8