Abstract
I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (“self-quotation”) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting for the account of infallible belief ascription.
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Jacobsen, R. Self-Quotation and Self-Knowledge. Synthese 110, 419–445 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004905327777
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004905327777