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Three Concerns about the Origins of Content

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Abstract

In this paper I will present three reservations about the claims made by Hutto and Satnet. First of all, though TNOC is presented as drawing on teleological theories of mental content for a conception of Ur-Intentionaltiy, what is separated out after objectionable claims are removed from teleological accounts may not retain enough to give us directed intelligence. This problem raises a question about what we need in a naturalistic basis for an account of the mental. Secondly, I think that the authors’ objections to cognitive science’s supposed notion of a mental representation in fact attack a philosophers’ invention, one that sprung into vibrant being in the mid-1970’s. It is not employed in cognitive neuroscience to any significant extent and it isn’t needed by other disciplines involved in cognitive science. Finally, I worry that the account of the origin of content – namely, explanatory narrative - presents us with a too limited view of human discourse, particularly as it is needed for a social theory of mind.

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  1. Center for Neuro-Engineering and Cognitive Science, University of Houston, 4800 Calhoun St, Houston, 77204, TX, USA

    Anne Jaap Jacobson

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  1. Anne Jaap Jacobson
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Correspondence to Anne Jaap Jacobson.

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Jacobson, A.J. Three Concerns about the Origins of Content. Philosophia 43, 625–638 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9619-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9619-1

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