Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Why We Need A-Intensions

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I think recent discussions of content and reference have not paid enough attention to the role of language as a convention-governed system of communication. With this as a background theme, I explain the role of A-intensions in elucidating one important notion of content and correlative notions of reference.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Bennett, J. (1976): Linguistic Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Castañeda, H-N. (1966): ‘He*: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness’, Ratio 8, 130–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D.J. (1996): The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D.J. (2002): “The Components of Content”, in DJ. Chalmers (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind (pp. 608–633), New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G. (1979): ‘Reference and Contingency’, The Monist, 62, 161–189. Reprinted in his Collected Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 178–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grice, H.P. (1957): ‘Meaning’, Philosophical Review 66, 377–388.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. (1998): ‘Reference and Description Revisited’, in J.E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12 (pp. 201–218), Language, Mind, and Ontology, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1969): Convention, Cambridge, M: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1979): ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, Philosophical Review, 88, 513–543.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (2002): ‘Tharp's Third Theorem’, Analysis 62.2, 95–97.

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke, J. (1690): An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

  • Perry, J. (1982): ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs 13, 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1975): ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in Language, Mind and Reality (pp. 215–271), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R.C. (2001): ‘On Considering a Possible World as Actual’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75(suppl.), 141–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanley, J. (1997): ‘Rigidity and Content’, in R.G. Heck Jr (ed.), Language, Thought, and Content: Essays in Honor of Michael Dummett (pp. 131–156), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, S.L. (1982): ‘Partial Character and the Language of Thought’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63, 347–365.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia

    Frank Jackson

Authors
  1. Frank Jackson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Jackson, F. Why We Need A-Intensions. Philosophical Studies 118, 257–277 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019548.04704.69

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019548.04704.69

Keywords

Search

Navigation