Abstract
No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth’s hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hallucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering.
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Notes
Here I invite the reader to suppose that the fiction is fact but this is inessential as I use fictional cases only for simplicity of illustration. Corresponding case studies of both object-involving and object-independent hallucinations are readily available in the psychological literature. See e.g. Sachs (2012, Chapters 1 and 13), Vignal et al. (2007), and Carroll and Carroll (2005) for discussion. While the empirical literature does not generally focus on the importance of the distinction between object-involving and object-independent hallucinations, the literature is largely compatible with (and, in some cases, directly supports) the proposal I develop in Sect. 2.
Johnston (2004, pp. 129–132) provides the most sustained discussion of the phenomenon; Pryor (2004) and McLaughlin (1987, pp. 116–117) each dedicate roughly two paragraphs to object-involving hallucination; Dorsch (2010, p. 1) and Tye (2009, p. 2) mention it in footnotes to their discussion of hallucinatory experiences; and although Smith (2002, p. 266) appears to deny that such experiences are properly understood to be hallucinations at all (see also Tye (Ibid.) for a similar position), he does recognize the phenomena as a genuine psychological possibility and his discussion of it generally follows McLaughlin’s earlier approach.
Dorsch (2010) maintains that the relation is an epistemic one but says nothing else about the matter. I agree with him on this point, but I think more can, and should, be said about exactly what kind of epistemic relation object-involving hallucination provides.
It is important that one not confuse perceptual remembering, as I understand it here, with the more specific category of ‘episodic memory’ as it is defined in, e.g. Tulving (1972) or Martin (2001). Not all perceptual remembering is episodic. That is, not all perceptual remembering: (i) answers the retrieval query, “What did you do at time T in place P?” (cf. Hasselmo 2012, p. 2), (ii) is naturally reported using constructions of the form ‘\(S\) remembers [x] \(f\)—ing’ (cf. Martin 2001, p. 261), and (iii) involves “mental time travel” as characterized by Tulving (1983). See Tulving’s (2007) and Schacter and Tulving’s (1994) for discussions of the empirically recognized categories of memory and memory systems. It is also worth noting that my use of ‘perceptual remembering’ differs from Malcolm’s (1963) use of ‘perceptual memory’. The latter corresponds more closely to ‘episodic memory’ as it is generally described.
Though the proper characterization of hallucinatory experience is debatable (see Macpherson (2013) for discussion), I will understand perceptual hallucination to be an experiential state in which, contrary to internal appearances, there are no external world objects being perceived. This can be contrasted with other non-veridical perceptual states such as illusion in which there is an object perceived, but the perceiver experiences it as having properties it lacks (cf. Huemer 2001, p. 127, 2007; Johnston 2006, p. 269; Brain 1962, p. 828).
Two quick clarifications are appropriate here. First, this assumes a causal/acquaintance based understanding of singular thought/object-directedness as featured in, e.g. Bach (1987, 2010), Boer and Lycan (1986), Brewer (1999), Donnellan (1979), Evans (1982), Recanati (1993, 2010), Lewis (1979), Kaplan (1989a, b), Salmon (1986), Soames (2003, 2005), Pryor (2004), and Tye (2009, 2014). Second, I am not assuming that “singular” and “object-directed” are equivalent notions. I will, however, use them interchangeably to remain neutral on the relationship between singularity and object-directedness. See Hawthorne and Manley (2012), Crane (2011b), Armstrong and Stanley (2010), Jeshion (2010), Sainsbury (2005), and McKinsey (2009) for discussions of the relationship between object-directedness and singular thought/singular propositions.
To be fair to Johnston, he has offered this proposal up as a “first pass” at an account of object-involving hallucination. That said, even in such a cursory form, his discussion does seem to capture the general line of thinking about the matter in the philosophical literature to date.
The notion of a “visual profile” is perhaps best paired with the “direct realist” account of perception that Johnston (2004, 2006) and Sosa (1996, 2007, 2011) have developed. As a result, it may be rejected by those favoring other approaches to perception. Otherwise, the proposal is a natural, and the most worked out, development of McLaughlin’s (1987, p. 116) earlier idea that one can hallucinate an object if one can form a thought about it (see also Pryor 2004). And it is a reasonable development of Smith’s (2002, p. 266) thought that such experiences depend crucially on memory.
It should be no surprise that the visual profile in an hallucination of an object \(o\) might strike the hallucinating subject as being \(o. \)Hallucinations, as philosophers understand them, can be indistinguishable from veridical perceptions from the inside. So, if one is hallucinating \(o\), it is likely that the visual experience will strike the hallucinator as being of \(o\), just as would likely (but not necessarily) be the case for an instantiated visual profile experienced while veridically perceiving \(o\).
Johnston (2004, p. 232). There is an interesting question as to whether dreams are akin to visual hallucinations (cf.Macpherson 2013; Móró 2010). For present purposes, I will assume with Johnston that these phenomena are similar enough to be discussed together in this context (see also Macpherson (Ibid), Casey (1976) and Freud (1959) in support of this position).
Thanks to Bryan Pickel for drawing my attention to this kind of example.
This is not to say that Johnston’s overall proposal cannot make room for some sense in which misidentifications of apparent objects of perception are possible. This is only a consequence of the first anchoring relation considered alone. Johnston himself recognizes that misidentification errors are possible (p. 133 and n. 15) when the proposed anchoring relations are in tension with one another, as would be the case if, e.g. an uninstantiated visual profile caused by a prior thought/perception of \(o\), struck the hallucinating subject as being \(s\). Unfortunately, without further resources this puts the proposal in the undesirable position of having no principled means for determining whether the hallucination in such cases is of \(o\) or \(s,\) or both, or neither. In addition to the considerations I offer in the text, I think this consequence also warrants pursuit of a more substantive proposal.
An anonymous referee observed the following complication. Suppose that S’s dream ended before she came to recognize the ‘misidentification’. We might wonder whether undiscovered identities would infect every object-involving dream because, in principle, any dream might have lasted longer and included a phase in which it is revealed that the objects of the dream are not the ones we take them to be. This appears to imply radical skepticism about our knowledge of the object-involving content of our dreams. There are a few things to say in response to this observation. First, radical skepticism about the objects of our dreams is not obviously inevitable. More must be said about both the individuation conditions, and content determination conditions of dreams. This is an interesting and difficult issue that I cannot properly pursue here but I will mention two options. First, one could hold that dreams have their duration essentially, and so a dream that has less or greater duration than the actual dream would simply be a different dream. In the alternative case envisioned, one would maintain that there simply was no misidentification at all, and so no threat of skepticism. A second (and I think preferable) option would be to maintain that, like memory content, (some) dream content is determined by informational chains running back to prior experience. Which objects one’s dreams are about will depend on the informational connections to prior experiences, and while it may not always be clear to the dreamer whether or not she is mistaken about the objects of her dreams, this would present no greater skeptical challenge than we face in other memory contexts. Finally, I’ll offer a comment on the dialectical situation. I have been arguing that Johnston’s proposed anchoring relation has the unacceptable consequence that misidentifications of objects in dreams are impossible. While of considerable independent interest, the referee’s observation does not clearly help Johnston’s proposal on this point. It is difficult to see how mistakes that are possible while waking (i.e. misidentifying the object-involving content of one’s experience) should become impossible while asleep. Given this, (assuming skepticism were to somehow be inevitable) it isn’t obvious that skepticism about the object-involving contents of one’s dreams is somehow less plausible than an alternative infallibility about the object-involving contents of one’s dreams.
Johnston himself recognizes a tension in his proposal and hedges by admitting that there are plausibly some qualitative constraints on hallucinations of particulars (p. 132). However, nothing on these lines will save the account, given that a hallucinator may come to appreciate that she has misidentified an object of hallucination even though it has undergone no qualitative change.
Two things are worth mentioning here. First, these problems would not be avoided with a more refined counterfactual account of causal connections (cf.Lewis 2000) for requiring a chain of stepwise influence from an experience or thought of \(o\) to the awareness of an uninstantiated visual profile \(p\) would do no better than the simple counterfactual account in distinguishing the hallucinations of interest from the others states discussed here. Second, one might worry that, while seeing \(o\) is an extensional relation, visually representing \(o\) is not, and so it is really plausible that this is simultaneously an experience of a particular blowfish and Clinton because the subject takes the blowfish to be identical to Clinton. Thanks to Mark Sainsbury for pressing this issue. I’m not convinced. Suppose that you mistakenly think that the George Harrison that designed pipe organs was also the Beatle. Now suppose, you call to mind a visual image of Harrison on the cover of the “Let it Be” album. You have visually represented the Beatle but it is not clear that you have also visually represented the organ designer.
There is some precedent for something like this suggestion in the psychological literature. For example, Penfield and Perot (1963) suggested that all hallucinations are reactivated memories. This is implausible (cf. Collerton et al. 2005). However, if I’m right, this idea is not entirely wrong; it was just overextended. The proposal I make here is supported by neurophysiological evidence as well: see e.g. Collerton et al. (Ibid), Ingle (2005), Mast (2005), Squire (2004), Noda et al. (1993), Levine and Finklestein (1982), Sacks (1970) and especially Vignal et al. (2007) who make the case for concluding that certain hallucinatory states at least have the same content as certain episodic memories.
According to Martin (2001, p. 267) the relation at issue is one that preserves apprehension of events involving those objects; according to Byrne (2010) and Campbell (2002), it preserves “cognitive contact” with external particulars. While there are significant challenges to developing such proposals, I need take no stand on the particular nature of this intimate relationship at this juncture.
An anonymous referee raised the following objection. If Macbeth takes himself to know facts about Banquo on the basis of perception, but in fact does not do so but rather believes the facts on the basis of remembering, doesn’t this undermine his knowledge? Isn’t the misconstrual of his route to knowledge sufficiently severe so as to threaten the claim to know? While I have been focused on first-order knowledge, this objection raises interesting issues about the relationship between first order and higher order knowledge. Though I cannot address this topic properly here, it is clear that subjects’ confusion in such cases would undermine some of their self-knowledge. It is not obvious, however, that such errors would impact first-order knowledge as well. One’s take on this may depend on one’s background epistemological commitments and those endorsing certain externalist theories of justification e.g. Williamson (2000), could arguably deny that failures of higher order knowledge (of this sort) would infect one’s first order knowledge. Whether one knows that \(p\) depends largely on e.g. the reliability of the process by which one’s belief that \(p\) is formed. What one believes about how one came to any particular belief is simply another matter.
It is worth noting explicitly that there is precedent for treating PTSD flashbacks as a species of remembering in the psychological literature (cf.Carroll and Carroll 2005).
So far, I have suggested that preservation of a perceptual information channel between objects and current mental states is one necessary condition on perceptual remembering. This issue certainly deserves further treatment but that is a project best suited for a general discussion of perceptual memory and space precludes any proper attempt here. See, e.g. Fish (2009), Bernecker (2010), Michaelian (2011), Martin (2001), and Martin and Deutscher (1966) for some preliminary discussion of this issue.
See e.g. Currie (2000, pp. 197–181), Sass (1994, p. 19) citing Howard Searles’s earlier research), Bentall (1990) who proposes that hallucinations are the product of mistaking an internally generated representation for one received from an external reality, and Morrison (2001) and Morrison et al. (2002, 2003) who hypothesize that the problem is related to source monitoring impairments in the episodic memory system.
To stave off some potential confusion, committing to the claim that object-involving hallucinations and object-involving imaginative states are both species of perceptual remembering does not commit one to the further claim that there are no differences between imagining, hallucinating, and other species of perceptual remembering (e.g. episodic memory). One obvious difference is that hallucination is the only one that need involve some kind of delusion.
Tulving (1972) introduced the slightly problematic metaphor of “mental time travel” to capture this aspect of remembering. However, the idea that some remembering involves an awareness of objects of memory as in the past is much older—see, e.g. Russell (1921, Chapters 9 and 12), James (1890), Locke (1690), and Aristotle (1984). See also Sutton (2010), Bernecker (2010, pp. 13, 14), Squire and Kandel (1999, p. 106); Brewer (1996); Tulving (2002, p. 2); Hoerl (1999, p. 235); Campbell (1994, 1997); Martin (2001) and Schacter et al. (2000, p. 628) for further discussion.
Martin (personal correspondence, and 2001, p. 261).
Although Martin himself does not defend this kind of view, I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to the role his discussion could play in motivating such a view.
Martin (2001, p. 281) does accept that the phenomenological features described above play this role, when present. It is worth noting that, though the phenomenology of memory and its epistemic transparency are generally treated together, they are logically distinct and one could maintain that there are two objections here I thank Mark Sainsbury for pressing this issue. This possibility will not matter here, as my responses address both dimensions of the issue.
There is, of course, a sense in which this expression of knowledge is peculiar. This arises from the fact that, though the painter clearly had knowledge of a past visual scene (such knowledge is necessary for his painting as he did), he did not obviously have doxastic propositional knowledge about the scene. Among other things, he failed to know (or remember) that there was a certain colored and shaped house in a farmyard.
One might try to get at the same objection by claiming that while all perceptual remembering is of things that are not present, object-involving hallucinations are hallucinations of the presence of some entity. From this, my opponent might be tempted to conclude that hallucinations cannot be instances of perceptual remembering. (I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing this line of objection). The problem with this formulation of the objection is that the hallucination of the presence of an entity doesn’t entail the presence of an entity, at least on most treatments of hallucination. So it is perfectly plausible that while one hallucinates the presence of an entity when undergoing an object-involving hallucination, her hallucination is still of something that is not present, just as are cases of perceptual remembering.
Failures of recognition can come in several varieties. Some are relatively mundane, as when you might simply fail to recognize someone on a particular occasion. Others are more pathological as when, e.g. some subjects suffering from Capgras Syndrome seem to, in some sense, recognize familiar individuals but see them as unfamiliar (see, e.g. Davies and Coltheart (2000) for some discussion).
This was arguably demonstrated in a research setting by Perky (1910). That subjects can make such mistakes does not necessarily entail that, in such cases, there is no phenomenological difference between perceiving and imagining (see Hopkins (2012) for some discussion). However, it does demonstrate that perceiving does not entail realizing that one perceives.
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing this objection.
For example, while this kind of error provides no challenge to remembering the talk, it does preclude you from remembering that the talk was at the Eastern.
To avoid a possible misunderstanding, it is worth pointing out that the fact-recognition tasks and free recall tasks can be dissociated is not obviously evidence that recognizing does not involve perceptual remembering. At the very least, recognition seems to be mediated by the processing of perceptual features (e.g. colors and borders) cf. Hasselmo (2012, p. 140). See also Dopkins et al. (2013) for some empirical support for the claim that perceptual information is (sometimes) involved with recognition that is based “only” on the distinctive feeling of familiarity.
I accept that there are certain Banquo-related things that Macbeth could not remember in a Manchurian Candidate scenario. For example, he could not remember seeing Banquo, going to battle with Banquo, or so forth, for such events did not happen. In contrast, Banquo did exist as an external particular, and so unlike these fictional events, can be the object of a remembering state (similar points apply to my remembering of Dr. King).
See Bernecker (2010, Chapter 1) for some discussion of the spectra of phenomenology and imagery in memory.
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Acknowledgments
My thanks to Ray Buchanan, Josh Dever, Jeremy Evans, Alex Grzankowski, Hans Kamp, Melissa Painz, Adam Pautz, Bryan Pickel, Kate Ritchie, Mark Sainsbury, David Sosa, Michael Tye, Tamar Weber, and audiences at USC, UT-Austin, and Virginia Tech for valuable discussion of earlier versions of this material.
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James, S.P. Hallucinating real things. Synthese 191, 3711–3732 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4