Abstract
Isaac Newton did more than any other early modern figure to revolutionize natural philosophy, but he was often wary of other aspects of philosophy. He had an especially vexed relationship with metaphysics. As recent scholarship has highlighted, he often denounced metaphysical discussions, especially those in the Scholastic tradition (Levitin 2016). He insisted that he himself was not engaging with the aspect of philosophy that played such a prominent role in the work of his predecessors, especially Descartes, and his critics, especially Leibniz. However, in the Principia and the Opticks, along with correspondence and unpublished manuscripts, Newton expressed views about the gravity of bodies and the power of substances that place his thought squarely within the metaphysical tradition he sought to avoid. Alas, his famous reluctance to engage in disputes left even Newton’s supporters confused about his metaphysical ideas.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
No one has done more than George Smith to illuminate the way in which Newton marshaled evidence for his conclusions in the Principia. See, e.g., the now classic account in Smith (1999).
- 3.
Many thanks to George Smith for his expert guidance in translating Newton’s sentence.
- 4.
However, in the Motte translation, as modified by Cajori, Proposition Seven reads that “there is a power of gravity pertaining to all bodies,” which obviously raises other questions (Newton 1960, 414). In her translation, Du Châtelet has: “La gravité appartient à tous les corps” (Newton 1759, vol 2, 21).
- 5.
Many thanks to Marius Stan for several conversations on these points—his challenges helped me to sharpen my thinking in this area.
- 6.
For details on Newton’s skeptical attitude toward metaphysics, especially in the Scholastic tradition, see Levitin (2016). Indeed, Levitin goes so far as to say that “no major natural philosopher between 1500 and 1800 said more often than Newton that they were not doing metaphysics” (ibid., 68 note 57). See Koyré (1957, 159–60) for remarks on Newton’s relation to metaphysics.
- 7.
This is certainly true of that most important of readers, Leibniz, who took notes on the Definitions. See Bertoloni Meli (1993, 96–104, 306).
- 8.
The Cotes preface is of considerable historical importance. For instance, no less a figure than James Clerk Maxwell said in his lecture at the Royal Institution of Great Britain that Cotes was the driving force for “the doctrine of direct action at a distance” (48), rather than Newton himself (Maxwell, 1873–5: 48–9). Thanks to Margaret Maurer for this reference.
- 9.
The notions of a body, its powers, inherent features, actions, and so on, were central concepts in metaphysics for centuries—see the extensive treatment in Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, which tackles powers and dispositions (2011, 519–540) and much else besides.
- 10.
Euler chose to solve what he regarded as the problem of gravity by reducing its action to the presence of an ether with differential density. See especially the illuminating treatment in Wilson (1992).
- 11.
For his part, Clarke adopts yet another approach, explaining to Leibniz in his fifth and last letter: “It is very unreasonable to call (sec. 113) attraction a miracle and an unphilosophical term, after it has been so distinctly declared that by that term we do not mean to express the cause of bodies tending toward each other, but barely the effect or the phenomenon itself, and the laws or proportions of that tendency discovered by experience, what is or is not the cause of it … The phenomenon itself, the attraction, gravitation, or tendency of bodies toward each other (or whatever other name you please to call it by), and the laws or proportions of that tendency, are now sufficiently known by observations and experiments.” See C 5: 110–116 for the first quotation, before the ellipsis, and C 5: 124–130 for the second one, after it. So Clarke adopts a view that conflicts with the definition of impressed force in the Principia, but thereby recoups the notion that gravity is a property like mobility, a tendency toward a certain action. For a discussion of the seemingly significant distance between Newton’s understanding of universal gravity and Clarke’s rendering, see Janiak (2008, 58–74).
- 12.
In his anonymous review of the Royal Society’s report on the calculus priority dispute, the so-called Account of the Commercium Epistolicum, in 1715, Newton writes (2014, 166–167): “And yet the editors of the Acta Eruditorum: (a) have told the world that Mr. Newton denies that the cause of gravity is mechanical, and that if the spirit or agent by which electrical attraction is performed be not the aether or subtle matter of Descartes, it is less valuable than an hypothesis, and perhaps may be the hylarchic principle of Dr. Henry More; and Mr. Leibniz: (b) hath accused him of making gravity a natural or essential property of bodies, and an occult quality and miracle.”
- 13.
Bentley gave the first Boyle lectures concerning Christianity and the new science in 1692—they were endowed in Robert Boyle’s will—and asked Newton for his guidance in understanding some of the principal implications of his new science of nature. Although they were originally private, the letters were first published in the eighteenth century (Newton 1756) and have since become a major source for our understanding of Newton’s interpretation of his science—see Bentley (1976).
- 14.
The question of action at a distance in Newton’s physics has received a tremendous amount of scholarly attention. The best general account of the topic as it arises throughout the history of physics is Hesse (1961). In Janiak (2008), I argued that Newton dismissed the notion that material bodies could act on one another at a distance; that argument is questioned in Ducheyne (2011), and Schliesser (2011), although it is endorsed by Chomsky (2016, 34–35). For further details, see Kochiras (2009, 2011) and Janiak (2013).
- 15.
Lest one think that the Newtonians implicitly agreed on the meaning of terms like innate, inherent and essential, Cotes actually endorsed an especially strong notion of essential property. After Bentley, Clarke and Newton prevailed upon him to write the preface, Cotes sent Clarke a draft. Clarke’s objections to the draft are now lost, but we do have Cotes’s reply (25 June 1713): “I received Your very kind Letter, I return You my thanks for Your corrections of the Preface, & particularly for Your advice in relation to that place where I seem’d to assert Gravity to be Essential to Bodies. I am fully of Your mind that it would have furnish’d matter for Cavilling, & therefore I struck it out immediately upon Dr. Cannon’s mentioning Your objection to me, & so it never was printed. The impression of the whole Book was finished about a week ago. My design in that passage was not to assert Gravity to be essential to Matter, but rather to assert that we are ignorant of the Essential propertys of Matter & hat in respect of our Knowledge Gravity might possibly lay as fair a claim to that Title as the other Propertys which I mention’d. For I understand by Essential propertys such propertys without which no others belonging to the same substance can exist: and I would not undertake to prove that it were impossible for any of the other Properties of Bodies to exist without even Extension.” (Newton, 1959, Correspondence, V: 412–413; cf. ibid., V: 413, note 2.) For Cotes, then, an essential property P of X is such that X would lack all of its other properties if it lacked P. Leaving aside the vexed question of whether gravity should be thought of as essential in this sense, note that if Newton’s own spokesperson was operating with such a strong notion of essence, this illustrates how important it was to have Newton himself clarify how he understood essences.
- 16.
See Newton 1972, Vol. 2: 761, my translation; cf. Cohen and Whitman, Principia, 941.
- 17.
For recent discussions of the question of dating, see Ruffner (2012) and Levitin (2021), who argues forcefully that the text was written in 1671. Of course, until direct historical or archival evidence is found, the question of dating will remain speculative. The deep connections between the metaphysical claims of De Gravitatione and those of the General Scholium outlined in this chapter mitigate the importance of the dating issue.
- 18.
Sarah Hutton argues that More was probably the most influential figure in England concerning the reception of Cartesianism (Hutton 2015, 65), a view outlined in depth in Alan Gabbey’s near monograph-length piece on More and Cartesianism (Gabbey 1982, 171–72). More even coined the term “Cartesianism” in 1662 in A Collection of Philosophical Writings (preface, xvii). More was a famous and influential figure in Cambridge when Newton arrived there in 1660; indeed, Westfall (1980, 97 note 85) indicates that he may have been the foremost intellectual figure there at the time. Newton engaged substantially with More’s thought already as an undergraduate at Trinity College (see McGuire and Tamny 1983; Westfall 1980, 301). Later on, Newton became an “intimate associate” of More’s—as Turnbull puts it at Newton, Correspondence, Vol. I: 306—and in a letter of 1680, More himself reported that he and Newton had “a free converse and friendship” (More to John Sharp, August 16, 1680, in The Conway Letters, 479). The two clearly had a sense of mutual respect (Westfall 1980, 55, 97 note 85). While furiously writing what would become the Principia in 1685, Newton wrote to Francis Aston, a secretary of the Royal Society, explaining that he had invited More to join a “Philosophick Meeting” in Cambridge, and for his part, More had a funeral ring sent to Newton upon his death (Hall 1990, 103 and 169–70, respectively) as one of only fifteen people named in More’s will (Reid 2012, 2–3)—the will is reprinted in The Conway Letters (Nicholson 1992, 481–83, with Newton appearing on page 482). Newton had eleven of More’s works in his personal library (Harrison 1978, 195–96). Cassirer gives a detailed analysis of More’s “decisive” influence on Newton’s conception of space (1953, 147–50), which follows his famous account in Das Erkenntnisproblem (1999, Vol. 2: 372–76).
- 19.
Koyré (1968, 89–90) made a detailed textual and philosophical case for More’s influence, carefully outlining the relevance of his correspondence with Descartes in an extensive footnote discussion. For a helpful discussion of some relevant points, see also the excellent and detailed analysis in Gabbey, 1982, e.g., at 180, 187ff, 193. The correspondence is reprinted in More’s A Collection of Philosophical Writings in the original Latin. There is still no complete translation into English. For a helpful discussion of More’s reactions to Cartesianism, see Henry, “The Reception of Cartesianism,” 129–32. As for Newton, there is a complete copy of More’s correspondence with Descartes extant amongst his papers in Cambridge University Library (see Hutton 2020 for discussion), and the correspondence was printed already in 1657 in the Clerselier edition of Descartes’s correspondence and then reprinted by Henry More in A Collection in 1662 (Gabbey 1982, 206), a copy of which Trinity College obtained in 1664 (McGuire and Tamny 1983, 59).
- 20.
They include at least the following: to exist is to exist in space, even in God’s case; therefore, God occupies space; space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, i.e., of God; therefore, space exists just in case God exists; Descartes’s conception of the indefinite is confusing or even incoherent—space should instead be understood as infinite; and, Descartes’s view of motion is mistaken (More, A Collection, preface, xi), as is his view that the Earth remains within its vortex, and in that sense is at rest according to Descartes, even though he also claims that it moves through the heavens (Descartes 1982, AT V: 388–89, which alas isn’t included in the Lewis (Descartes 1953) edition, but which is included in A Collection, correspondence section, 93–94; the sections of this volume have separate pagination). Indeed, Newton brilliantly develops this last point in what amounts to his deepest criticism of Cartesian natural philosophy in De Gravitatione, one that leads him to rework the theory of motion that finds full flower in the Principia. Hence, far from being a text designed to criticize Henry More’s views (pace Levitin 2021), the manuscript in fact adopts and extends many of the central criticisms that More presents against Cartesianism in the course of articulating his own views of space, time, motion, and the divine.
- 21.
Despite the clear affinities between their views, More and Newton differ on whether to call space a substance: Newton rejects the label in De Gravitatione on the grounds that space is not active, a tacitly understood criterion for substance-hood in his view; for More’s part, he thinks that an item like space, which is an emanative effect of God, can still be considered a substance if it bears properties and would continue to exist even if all matter were expunged from the universe. Newton agrees with these two claims in the case of space, and yet denies that it’s a substance. So, this is partly semantics. For More, see the gloss on axiom xix in Book I, Chapter VI of Immortality and for Newton, see De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 35–36.
- 22.
Indeed, the connection between More’s views and Newton’s was made long before the General Scholium appeared: it was discussed in depth, e.g., by Joseph Raphson, F.R.S., in 1702, as Koyré emphasized long ago (1957, 190ff).
- 23.
For instance, it was the subject of an influential debate between Ted McGuire and John Carriero in 1990: see their contributions to Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian Science.
- 24.
For a helpful discussion of relevant issues in Newton interpretation, see Snobelen (2006). Locke (1975) cited the passage at Essay II.xiii.26 in the course of discussing the relation between space and body. Clarke cited the passage in his fifth and last letter to Leibniz (C 5: 33–35; Leibniz 1931, Vol. 7: 427). For his part, Berkeley apparently cited the phrase more than any other Scriptural passage; it occurs in both the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Three Dialogues (see Daniel 2021, 237 and note 1).
- 25.
In his classic paper “The idea of God,” Jean-Luc Marion discusses a number of English philosophers, including most prominently More, Locke, and Newton, who endorse the view that God is extended and perhaps ubiquitous in space (Marion 1998, 284–90). However, Locke seems to be a bit more cautious than the others. In the Essay (II.xv.3) he writes: “But yet every one easily admits, That though we make Duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. GOD, every one easily allows, fills Eternity; and ‘tis hard to find a Reason, why any one should doubt, that he likewise fills Immensity: His infinite Being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to Matter, to say, where there is no Body, there is nothing.” This does not seem to resolve the ambiguity because Locke may mean that God “fills” immensity with the divine power, and not the divine substance (and of course, Locke may have wished to avoid using the concept of substance anyway). Cf. also Essay, II.xvii.1 and II.xxiii.21. This connects, in turn, with Locke’s decision not to determine whether that “inspired Philosopher” St. Paul’s famous words in Acts 17:28 (which he cites at Essay II.xiii.26) “are to be understood in a literal sense.” The theological basis is sound, for Locke, as long as one does not wade into metaphysics to find a precise meaning. He even wisely avoids saying whether the “literal sense” of the scriptural passage involves the idea of substantial omnipresence. So, he is doubly neutral.
- 26.
See Descartes, Oeuvres, AT 5: 238–39; my translation.
- 27.
See Newton, Principia Mathematica, vol. 2: 762; my translation. This exact phrase appears in all extant draft copies of the General Scholium. In two such copies, Newton then added the following phrase (more precisely, in one copy it’s a phrase, in the other a full sentence), “Quod fingitur sine substantia subsistere, jam fingitur esse substantia,” which we might render as “What is supposed to subsist without substance is already supposed to be substance.” However, this line did not appear in any published version of the text.
- 28.
See C 3: 12; Leibniz 1931, Vol. 7: 370. This characterization of Newton’s view leaves out the specific claim that God’s presence could not manifest itself through its operation unless God was there on the general grounds that a power cannot subsist (or exist) without a substance.
- 29.
See C 5: 33–35; Leibniz 1931, Vol. 7: 427, where Clarke calls his understanding of God’s immensity “the express assertion of Saint Paul.” Intriguingly, in the very next sentence after the one last quoted in the text above, Newton paraphrases Paul’s famous line in Acts, without quoting it: “In him all things are contained and move, but he does not act on them nor they on him.” But even if Newton thought his view was precisely the one found in Paul, as Clarke did, he decided not to rely on it, preferring instead to use the concept of a substance and its power. That may have been wise, since philosophers with disparate attitudes toward God and space cited the passage from Paul approvingly, thereby undermining Clarke’s contention.
- 30.
See L 5: 44, which corresponds to Leibniz 1931, Vol. 7: 399; my translation.
- 31.
See L 5: 37, which corresponds to Leibniz 1931, Vol. 7: 398; my translation.
- 32.
For instance, both Jean-Luc Marion in his piece “The idea of God” (1998) and Robert Pasnau in his Metaphysical Themes (2011) discuss Newton’s view of God’s omnipresence in the course of discussing late seventeenth century metaphysics.
- 33.
Indeed, we find Suarez, perhaps the most famous of the late Scholastic metaphysicians, taking the same view that Newton endorses in the General Scholium. As Suarez argues in his Disputationes Metaphysicae (51.2.8), God is present to the universe not just by power or action, but also by essence or substance. As Pasnau argues, right after quoting at length from Suarez (2011, 330), Newton endorses this view of God’s relation to space (see also Pasnau 2011, 352–355, including the long note appended to page 355, which quotes Newton). Thus, Newton’s general point about powers and substances in the General Scholium is not part of an “anti-Scholastic” move, as Levitin (2016, 71–73) claims.
- 34.
In his answer to the seventh letter of Daniel Waterland, the English theologian critical of Clarke’s views, Clarke writes: “In like manner, the Infinity, the Immensity, or the Omnipresence of God, can no otherwise be proved, than by considering a priori the nature of a Necessary or Self-Existent cause. The Finite phaenomena of nature, prove indeed demonstrably a posteriori, that there is a Being which has Extent of Power and Wisdom sufficient, to produce and preserve all these phaenomena. But that This Author of Nature is Himself absolutely Immense or Infinite, cannot be proved from these finite Phaenomena; but must be demonstrated from the intrinsick nature of Necessary Existence.” See Clarke, 1738, Works, Vol. 2: 756.
- 35.
- 36.
As Levitin says (2016, 68), Newton had little time for metaphysics as a discipline. That is surely correct, for Newton not only uses “Metaphysicks” and its cognates pejoratively, but also narrowly. As Levitin notes, he means a philosophy that embraces “innate ideas,” which captures rationalist views of the seventeenth century, but which leaves out Aristotle. Obviously, this usage reflects a rhetorical move on Newton’s part.
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Janiak, A. (2023). A Tale of Two Forces: Metaphysics and its Avoidance in Newton’s Principia. In: Stan, M., Smeenk, C. (eds) Theory, Evidence, Data: Themes from George E. Smith. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 343. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41041-3_11
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