This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
REFERENCES
Aumaun, R.: 1976, ‘Agreeing to Disagree’, Annals of Statistics 4(6), 1236–1239.
Aumaun, R.: 1995, ‘Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality’, Games and Economic Behavior 18, 6–19.
Aumann, R.: 1998, ‘A Note on the Centipede Game’, Games and Economic Behavior 23, 97–105.
Axelrod, R.: 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York.
Becker, N. C. and A. E. Cudd: 1990, ‘Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll’, Theory and Decision 28, 189–195.
Bicchieri, C.: 1989, ‘Backward Induction with Common Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2, 329–243.
Binmore, K.: 1987, ‘Modelling Rational Players: Part 1’, Economics and Philosophy 3, 179–213.
Broome, J. and W. Rabinowicz: 1999, ‘Backwards Induction in the Centipede’, Analysis 59, 237–242.
Carroll, J. W.: 1987, ‘Indefinite Terminating Points and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma’, Theory and Decision 22, 247–256.
Fudenberg, D. and F. Maskin: 1986, ‘The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information’, Econometrica 54, 533–554.
Kavka, G.: 1983, ‘Hobbes War of All Against All’, Ethics 93, 291–310.
Kavka, G.: 1986, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Luce, R. and H. Raiffa: 1957, Games and Decisions, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Pettit, P. and R. Sugden: 1989, ‘The Backward Induction Paradox’, Journal of Philisophy 86, 169–182
Rabinowicz, W.: 1998, ‘Grappling with the Centipede’, Economics and Philosphy 14, 95–126.
Rabinowicz,W. (ed.): 2000, Value and Choice: Some Common Themes in Decision Theory and Moral Philosophy, Lund Philosophy Reports 2000:1, Dept. of Philosophy, Lund University.
Raiffa, H.: 1968, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choice under Uncertainty, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Reny, P.: 1988, ‘Rationality, Common Knowledge and the Theory of Games’, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University.
Reny, P.: 1989, ‘Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information’, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2, 363–369.
Skyrms, B. and P. Vanderschraaf: XXXX, ‘Game Theory’, in Philippe Smets (ed.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, vol. 1 (Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision), 391-440.
Skyrms, B.: 1998, ‘The Shadow of the Future’, in J. L. Coleman and C. W. Morris (eds), Rational Commitment and Social Justice. Essays for Gregory Kavka, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Sobel, J. H.: 1993, ‘Backward Induction Arguments In Finitely Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas: A Paradox Regained’, Philosophy of Science 60, 114–133.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jiborn, M., Rabinowicz, W. Reconsidering the Foole's Rejoinder: Backward Induction in Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. Synthese 136, 135–157 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024731815957
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024731815957