Abstract
David Lewis’ modal counterpart theory falls prey to the famous Saul Kripke’s objection, and this is mostly due to his ‘static’ ontology (divergence) of possible worlds. This paper examines a genuinely realist but different, branching ontology of possible worlds and a new definition of the counterpart relation, which attempts to provide us with a better account of de remodality, and to meet satisfactorily Kripke’s claim, while being also ontologically more ‘parsimonious’.
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