Summary
The article argues thatceteris paribus clauses have to be separated from another type of clauses called closure clauses. The former are associated with laws and theories, the latter with test situations of a particular kind. It is also argued that closure clauses, but notceteris paribus clauses, make Popper's falsifiability principle untenable. In that way, it also resolves the quarrel between Popper and Lakatos aboutceteris paribus clauses and falsifiability by saying that both are partly wrong and partly right.
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LiteraturReferences
Lakatos, I. and A. Musgrave (eds.):Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge 1970).
Schilpp, P. A. (ed.):The Philosophy of Karl Popper (La Salle, Illinois 1974).
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Johansson, I. Ceteris paribus clauses, closure clauses and falsifiability. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11, 16–22 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801276
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801276