Abstract
Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble. I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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Notes
Of course, there are in fact no such artworks, and no such microscopes. But I take it that proponents of the view in question do not want to rely on such accidental facts—or on how impressive our eyesight is.
I am ignoring four-dimensionalism here. A four-dimensionalist could describe the case as follows: the artwork is a spatial simple which is a proper temporal part of the spatial simple that used to belong to the original lump. Of course, a defender of the view I am attacking cannot say this, because constitutionalism is a three-dimensionalist view. (Moreover, I suspect that most four-dimensionalists would deny that the artwork is essentially an artwork.)
I make no claim here about what Burke would say about the present case.
It would hardly be a good idea to respond that simples are impossible. Constitutionalists often emphasize that their view has the clear advantage (over, in particular, mereological nihilism, according to which there are no composite objects) of being compatible with both the existence and the non-existence of simples.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very useful comments
References
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Markosian, N. (2004). Simples, stuff, and simple people. The Monist, 87, 405–428.
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Johansson, J. Constituted Simples?. Philosophia 37, 87–89 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9134-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9134-8