Abstract
Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that confidence and conservatism promoted aggression in our ancestral past, and that this may have been an adaptive strategy given the prevailing costs and benefits of conflict. However, in modern environments, where the costs and benefits of conflict can be very different owing to the involvement of mass armies, sophisticated technology, and remote leadership, evolved tendencies toward high levels of confidence and conservatism may continue to be a contributory cause of aggression despite leading to greater costs and fewer benefits. The purpose of this paper is to test whether confidence and conservatism are indeed associated with greater levels of aggression—in an explicitly political domain. We present the results of an experiment examining people’s levels of aggression in response to hypothetical international crises (a hostage crisis, a counter-insurgency campaign, and a coup). Levels of aggression (which range from concession to negotiation to military attack) were significantly predicted by subjects’ (1) confidence that their chosen policy would succeed, (2) score on a liberal-conservative scale, (3) political party affiliation, and (4) preference for the use of military force in real-world U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran. We discuss the possible adaptive and maladaptive implications of confidence and conservatism for the prospects of war and peace in the modern world.
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Notes
Following previous work (Johnson 2004; Johnson and Tierney 2011), we define confidence as the perceived probability that a specified outcome will occur. For example, low confidence may equate with a belief that one has a 25% chance of victory, while high confidence may equate with a belief that one has a 75% chance of victory. Overconfidence is defined as a level of confidence that exceeds the true likelihood of an outcome. For example, if a tennis player expects to win 75% of their matches but loses them all, this would imply overconfidence.
Locus of control is a measure of how much control people perceive they have over the world. People with a relatively “internal” locus of control believe that they and their actions can influence events, whereas people with a relatively “external” locus of control tend to be more fatalist and to believe they cannot influence events, which are instead seen to be controlled by the environment, other people, or some higher power.
Here, comparing the four-level preference for bombing Iran across the seven-level liberal-conservative scale might be better tested using a chi-square test, but the result is the same: χ 2 = 51.2, df = 18, p < 0.0001.
Note that since Republicans/conservatives were more aggressive in the crisis scenarios, it may seem unsurprising that aggression should also correlate with preferences in Iraq and Iran—given that both were associated with President George W. Bush’s presidency. While certainly a plausible explanation for these specific results, it further highlights the central finding that conservatives were more aggressive in the crisis scenarios.
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Acknowledgments
We thank David Carrier and three anonymous referees for their help in improving the manuscript. DJ thanks the Branco Weiss Society In Science Fellowship for funding. Finally, we especially thank Elizabeth Cashdan for her encouragement and advice on the manuscript.
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Appendix
Appendix
International Crises Scenarios
For each of the following scenarios, please read the description carefully. Then please make a decision about what you would do in this situation. As much as possible, try to really imagine being the leader confronted with this decision. Do not act as if you were any particular leader, but rather act as yourself in the role of leader. In each decision, you will be asked to mark your most preferred decision option. There is no right answer to any of these crisis scenarios.
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Hostage Scenario
A commercial airliner en route from New York to Tel Aviv, Israel, is hijacked and forced to land at the Riyadh International Airport in Saudi Arabia. The passengers are predominantly Israeli, but a number of Americans and other nationals are on board as well.
You know that the hijackers are Palestinians, but their specific affiliation is not clear at this point. They are demanding the release of a number of Palestinians held in Israeli jails. They also want safe passage for themselves to an undisclosed location.
The relevant parties are Israel, the Palestinian hijackers, the Saudis, and the Americans. Each group has a set of objectives. The Israelis primarily want the safe return of the passengers. They also want to maintain the credibility of their deterrent against terrorism and to make sure that their strategic interests remain unchanged. The Palestinian hijackers primarily want the release of their nationals from Israeli prisons. They also want to damage Israel’s image internationally and to assure their own safe passage out of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis primarily want to demonstrate their control of the situation and to maintain control among their own people. They would also like to maintain the status quo in their relations with other Arab nations. The Americans would like to assure the safety of their passengers, deter similar terrorist actions in the future, and broker this situation to a successful conclusion to demonstrate international leadership.
QUESTION A
As the president of the United States, faced with this situation, what is your most preferred option for action?
__ 1. Encourage a Special Forces assault in an attempt to rescue the hostages.
__ 2. Act as a broker between Israel and the Palestinian hijackers to arrange a trade, in which passengers are released in small groups, in return for the release of a few Palestinian prisoners.
__ 3. Put pressure on the Israelis to release the Palestinian prisoners in order to secure the release of the passengers unharmed.
QUESTION B
On a scale of 0 to 10, how likely do you think it is that your chosen course of action will succeed? Please circle your response, where 0 is very unlikely and 10 is very likely.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Central Asian Scenario
The newly established democratic government of Afghanistan has become increasingly unpopular due to the continuing strength of Islamic fundamentalism, economic decline, internal political dissension and violence, and their crackdown on the highly profitable heroin trade. An armed rebellion by millennia-old clan-based [groups led by] warlords has been continuing in the southern and eastern regions. When government troops encircle some of these rebel forces, the resurgent Taliban, in concert with the local warlords, intervene with a sizeable military force. On the third day of the operation, it seems possible from the size and direction of these attacks, that these Taliban forces will once again take over the capital city of Kabul. The resurgent Taliban are calling for an “international brotherhood of Islamic states,” while the Russians warn that “Islamic fundamentalism will not be allowed to set up positions of strength along the Russian border.”
U.S. pentagon military strategists are pessimistic about the ability of the United States to successfully control this military action given the number of American troops that are currently pinned down in Iraq. They see a slim hope for success only if the United States seizes a window of opportunity to interdict key mountain passes and to forestall the resurgent Taliban from setting up air defenses and logistics to support their further operations. Renewed major U.S. military intervention might require the insertion of special mountain forces, conventional bombing, and the possible use of 15,000-ton “daisy cutter” bombs. The U.S. dominates in aerial forces, but is in an unfavorable position in the local military balance on the ground. The latest intelligence data suggests that the mountainous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan continues to shelter most of the top leaders of Al Queda, including Osama bin Laden. Many Taliban leaders support these terrorists in their campaign against American forces in the region.
The Russians’ main goal is to prevent an unstable situation on its border, but the Russian government would not mind extending its influence throughout the region as well. The United States is reluctant to let the Russians do all the work, in case they take over the territory entirely and move into nearby areas that control important oil pipelines necessary to both the U.S. and Western Europe.
QUESTION A
As the president of the United States, faced with this situation, what is your most preferred option for action?
__ 1. Withdraw American forces from the increasing difficulties in Afghanistan and concede the area to the local Taliban forces, concentrating your military effort on Iraq.
__ 2. Use special mountain forces, conventional bombing, and the possible use of 15,000-ton “daisy cutter” bombs to block the key mountain passes in Afghanistan.
__ 3. Stress diplomatic solutions to the crisis and act to sponsor ceasefire negotiations between the local government, important warlords, and the Russian and Pakistani governments.
QUESTION B
On a scale of 0 to 10, how likely do you think it is that your chosen course of action will succeed? Please circle your response, where 0 is very unlikely and 10 is very likely.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Latin American Scenario
A country in Latin America recently elected a socialist leader who has just socialized the nation’s industries, including a number of important American corporate concerns. This country is the leading exporter of coffee, cocoa, and bananas to the United States. In addition, it is an important supplier of certain raw materials, including copper. As a result, American companies stand to lose billions of dollars, and adequate supplies of these goods into the United States could be disrupted, likely leading to critical shortages of coffee, chocolate, fruit, and plumbing material in America. A strong military leader who is quite sympathetic to American interests is waiting in the wings, eager to take power from the elected socialist leader, but he needs outside help in order to accomplish this goal. As president of the United States, you have been under a great deal of pressure from major corporate businesspeople and important political donors to do something about this situation, and to roll back the government takeover of these American companies. These leaders have threatened to back your opponent in the next election unless you do something to reverse this seizure of American property.
QUESTION A
As the president of the United States, faced with this situation, what is your most preferred option for action?
__ 1. Attempt to negotiate fair restitution for American companies.
__ 2. Let this leader nationalize American interests, but cut diplomatic ties.
__ 3. Allow US special forces and the CIA to assist the local military leader in staging a coup.
QUESTION B
On a scale of 0 to 10, how likely do you think it is that your chosen course of action will succeed? Please circle your response, where 0 is very unlikely and 10 is very likely.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Johnson, D.D.P., McDermott, R., Cowden, J. et al. Dead Certain. Hum Nat 23, 98–126 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-012-9134-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-012-9134-z