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Color: A Functionalist Proposal

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Abstract

In this paper I propose and defend an account of color that I call color functionalism. I argue that functionalism is a non-traditional species of primary quality theory, and that it accommodates our intuitions about color and the facts of color science better than more widely discussed alternatives.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, Dept. 0119, La Jolla, CA, 92093-0119, USA, E-mail

    Jonathan Cohen

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Cohen, J. Color: A Functionalist Proposal. Philosophical Studies 113, 1–42 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023074316190

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