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Reconstructing Complex Pro/Con Argumentation

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Abstract

Wellman identified three types of conductive arguments, the third of which contains both pro and counter-considerations in the same piece of reasoning. This paper provides a pragma-dialectical analysis of this type of argumentation, with special focus on argumentation reconstruction. It argues that the account of pro/con argumentation in the framework of argument-as-product has problems solvable by a pragma-dialectical approach. The paper asserts that pro/con argumentation should be analyzed as a dialectical strategy of a protagonist, where acknowledgement of counter-considerations shows that the antagonist’s reasons have been taken into consideration, although the pro-considerations override them. Thus, the pro-considerations of pro/con argumentation should be interpreted as the protagonist’s overriding defeaters (in contrast to undermining defeaters) of the antagonist’s counter-arguments, the protagonist incorporating the latter as counter-considerations. The paper further argues that the pragma-dialectical framework needs an additional conceptual tool to properly reconstruct complex forms of pro/con argumentation. Finally, the (thus extended) pragma-dialectical approach to reconstruct pro/con argumentation has several advantages, especially to a more logical-structural (i.e. argument-as-product) approach to complex pro/con argumentation.

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Notes

  1. Translated from Björnsson et al. (1994, p. 29).

  2. Frans van Eemeren has claimed that the PD system incorporates both a process and product view, since it also considers the product produced in the process. However, for the sake of simplicity, the PD framework should, in comparison to a pure product view of argumentation, be categorized more as a "process view" of argumentation.

  3. There also exist divergent premise sets. This is not, however, relevant for the purposes of this paper.

  4. Hitchcock (2017, p. 22) references a number of cases. It should be noted that although the basic idea about the linked vs convergent distinction is that the premises in convergent premise sets are independently relevant to the conclusion and premises in linked premise sets are not, the exact details of this vary between different scholars (see Snoeck Henkemans 2000 for more details and sources, see especially pp. 459-460). In this paper, the linked-convergent distinction will be treated according to the basic idea.

  5. For a selection of examples where authors in the "product view" framework themselves make a distinction between "premise" and "reason", see (Freeman 2011, pp. xii–xiii; Govier 2010; Fischer 2012, pp. 4–5; Pinto 2011, pp. 104–106; Zenker 2007, p. 1). For where both are used in different senses in the very same paragraph see Freeman (2011, p. xi). Walton (2006, pp. 24, 40, 158, 167–168).

  6. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p. 72) states: "In the simplest case, a single argumentation, containing just one argument with usually, one explicit and one unexpressed premise…" (my emphasis).

  7. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, personal communication 2014-12-29. This is one problem with the PD system: its conceptual apparatus for displaying the analytical overview is not well able to handle single argumentation consisting of many premises. Snoeck Henkemans (2000, p. 468) states that: "In contrast with all informal logical approaches (and with Freeman’s dialectical approach), argument structures in pragma-dialectics are always analyzed as combinations of single arguments. As a result, a large category of linked arguments dealt with by informal logicians, i.e. those linked arguments that are equivalent to one single argument, falls outside the scope of the pragma-dialectical treatment of argument structures".

  8. It is difficult to see how those North American scholars who equate "premise" with "a reason" can do so consistently. If a premise is linked it appears not to be a reason by itself but rather a constituent of a reason, since if the "premise" is not even relevant to the conclusion, how can it accurately be labeled "a reason for the conclusion"? For instance, a syllogism is an argument (in the North American sense) but the "reason" for the conclusion consists strictly speaking not of the minor premise alone but of the minor and major premises in linked conjunction. My opinion is that we should use "premise" exclusively as signifying a constituent of an argument (if using "an argument" in the North American sense) or as a constituent of single argumentation (used in the PD sense). This would avoid confusion.

  9. For a selection, see, for instance, van Eemeren et al. (2002, pp. 57, 64); van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p. 72); Grootendorst and van Eemeren (2004, pp. 5, 13, 17, 148, 161) etc. It seems as the terminology in the PD sometimes uses "one single argument" synonymous with "single argumentation" whereas the expression "an argument" means the same as in the North American system, see van Eemeren et al. (2002, p. 64).

  10. Freeman makes a very similar comment (Freeman 2011, p. 17, f8).

  11. The expression "critical reaction" here includes expressed doubt, critical questions, objections, or counter-arguments directed against the acceptability of the "first" argument. Subordinatively compound argumentation is displayed as 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.1.1, etc., which shows that each argument supports the acceptability of the preceding one.

  12. These are my definitions based on how the complex argumentation structures are described in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), Snoeck Henkemans (1997) and van Eemeren et al. (2002).

  13. In terms of a dialogue in a critical discussion, multiple argumentation occurs when the antagonist rejects (for whatever reason) the first argument and the protagonist responds by withdrawing their argument and advancing a new one (Snoeck Henkemans 1997, p. 92). Although each argument in multiple argumentation is separately sufficient there may be several reasons for advancing multiple argumentation: (a) an increased rhetorical effect; (b) a higher degree of confidence in the standpoint; (c) an increased likelihood that at least one of the single argumentations are accepted, which in turn increases the likelihood that the standpoint is accepted (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 87–88). Beside these reasons, one could add yet another: multiple argumentation can be a strategy directed at an audience of many individuals aiming to convince as many of them as possible. By providing several separately sufficient defenses, the protagonist has augmented the likelihood that the argumentation will succeed in convincing as many as possible. Multiple argumentation is displayed as 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, etc.

  14. There are also two versions of subordinatively compound argumentation. The second version defends the prior single argumentation against the charge of irrelevance. In this case, the subordinative argument does not support the "argument" but the unexpressed linking premise. See Snoeck Henkemans (1997, pp. 90–91). This can be defined as follows: a complex argumentation is subordinatively compound with respect to critical reactions of relevance if, and only if, the attempted dialectical function of the added single argumentation is to overcome a critical reaction against the acceptability of the linking premise of the prior single argumentation advanced by the protagonist.

  15. Coordinatively compound argumentation is displayed as 1.1a, 1.1b, 1.1c to show that they cooperate in order to be sufficient for the standpoint.

  16. I have seen this myself several times. For an example, see Finocchiaro (2005, p. 268). The cause of confusion is probably due to the fact that the terms "linked" and "convergent" have been given different meaning by different authors. For an overview of this, see Snoeck Henkemans (2000).

  17. For examples of where these are conflated, see Walton (1996a, b, pp. 114–115) and Yu and Zenker (2017).

  18. To simplify one could state that relevance is the leading criterion for the North American system while the leading criterion for the PD system is sufficiency (Jan Albert Van Laar, personal communication 2017-07-11).

  19. This even appears to have been stated in the PD literature: "there is much reason in analyzing every ‘one premise’ argument as a part of a single argumentation in which a premise has been left unexpressed." Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 89, n. 5).

  20. The argument scheme expressed by the linking premise is what makes the "argument" in a single argumentation relevant to the standpoint, so the argument and the linking premise must therefore constitute a linked premise set. If an argument scheme does not even make the "argument" relevant to the standpoint then the distinction between single argumentation and complex argumentation would collapse, because there would be nothing that separated single argumentation from the dialectical move of adding further single argumentations. No one would suggest that the "argument" or "linking premise" constituting single argumentation plays a dialectical role, rather, argument schemes in themselves have a purely inferential function.

  21. If the reader wants more information on the PD theory of argumentation, he or she may consult the following works of Frans van Eemeren (van Eemeren et al. 2002, 2014; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992; Grootendorst and van Eemeren 2004; van Eemeren 2010).

  22. It should be noted that evidence of the recognition of pro/con types of reasoning and argumentation goes back much earlier, to Benjamin Franklin's letter of September 19, 1772 to the chemist Joseph Priestly. Accessible at <http://www.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=001474> One of the first scholarly accounts I know of is Arne Naess's treatment of pro et contra and pro aut contra surveys of arguments in his Communication and Argument (1966). [1941] Another early source is Kurt Baier's concept of "good reasons" in his The Moral Point of View (1958).

  23. Some notable contributors to this discussion are: Adler (2013), Allen (1990), Bailin and Battersby (2015), Battersby and Bailin (2011), Blair (2011a, b, 2016), Finocchiaro (2011), Fischer (2012), Goorden (2011), Govier (1979, 1980, 1984, 1987, 2000, 2010, 2011a, b), Hitchcock (1994, 2013), Jin (2011), Johnson (2011), Kock 2011), Pinto (2011), Walton (2011), Wohlrapp (1998), Zenker (2007, 2011), Peldszus et al. (2015), van Laar (2014) and Xie (2017).

  24. For instance, Possin argues that conductive arguments can be classified as either inductive arguments or as subsets of "a position paper" and not as a unique category of argumentation. Adler argues that conductive arguments, in which a conclusion is drawn non-conclusively from both positive and negative considerations, are impossible. A conclusion that is justified by its premises is supposed to be accepted in detachment from its justification (i.e. what is accepted is the conclusion by itself, not jointly with the reasons for it). However, the conclusion of pro/con argumentation is reached without ever eliminating the counter-considerations that contradict the idea of detachment. Hence, no genuine pro/con argumentation is possible. Blair (2016) provides a defense against Adler’s criticism. Botting argues that Wellman’s notion of conductive reasoning has confused epistemic particularism with "a type of inference" and that "conduction" in fact can be reduced to deduction. Wohlrapp provides a novel approach to argumentation as a whole, involving the conceptual tools of subjective, structural, objective, and procedural "dimensions", as well as "frame theory". This provides a new perspective from which to criticize Wellman's notion of "conductive arguments". It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with these objections against Wellman’s notion of pro/con argumentation. It will, rather, provide tools for analyzing and reconstructing argumentation that has the typical features of pro/con argumentation.

  25. Wellman himself did not deal with the concept of abduction.

  26. It falls outside the scope of this paper to discuss these various proposals: the reader may consult the chapters in the anthology by (Blair and Johnson 2011).

  27. I have chosen Hansen as the main protagonist for the logical-structural approach because I think that his work is the most reasonable and plausible account of pro/con argumentation from an argument-as-a-product perspective.

  28. Several answers have been offered. One suggestion is that we understand counter-considerations as premises. However, premises are by their very definition something whose function it is to support a conclusion, not something negatively relevant to the conclusion (Hansen 2011, pp. 35–36). Another possibility is to view counter-considerations as background knowledge. However, counter-considerations cannot be background knowledge since they are explicitly identified and fill an explicit function in the argument (Hansen 2011, p. 36). A third possibility is that counter-considerations function as qualifiers, expressing various reservations about the conclusion. Trudy Govier has identified a number of indicators—such as "although"; "even though", "despite the fact that" (Govier 2010, p. 356)—that introduce and signal counter-considerations. However, what is qualified is the argumentation for the conclusion, rather than the conclusion itself (Hansen 2011, p. 36). In pro/con argumentation we reason from the premises to the conclusion, meanwhile considering the counter-considerations; we do not move towards counter-considerations as part of the conclusion. A fourth suggestion is that counter-considerations are the premises of a counterargument. However, that would mean that a pro/con conductive argument would consist of two opposing arguments, rather than a single one with one conclusion, which contradicts strong intuitions of the concrete examples.

  29. I accept this claim: a linked premise structure does not entail non-defeasibility per se; it could still leave room for additional premises that increase or decrease the support for the conclusion.

  30. One possible defense would be to say that the on-balance premise in itself represents the "weighing", and this is also represented in qualifications of the conclusion (e.g. the phrase: even though) but this feels weak in comparison to the real "weighing" of a convergent premise-structure.

  31. This is true also of all examples of the second type of conductive reasoning where several reasons are given for the conclusion, for instance: "you ought to take your son to the movie because you promised to do so, it is a good movie, and you have nothing better to do this afternoon" (Wellman 1971, p. 55). All these reasons are independently relevant to the conclusion. The same holds for: "this is not a good book because it fails to hold one's interest, is full of vague description, and has a very implausible plot." (Wellman 1971, p. 55).

  32. Notice that I am not claiming that their degree of relevance to the conclusion is the same, only that they are equal in that they are, independently of each other, relevant to the conclusion.

  33. According to Freeman's criterion, an argument (in the North American sense) with a linked premise structure is a multi-premise single-inference argument whose rule of inference has a "mediating element", that is, a variable that occurs in more than one premise but not in the conclusion (Freeman 2011, see especially p. 139). None of the examples given by Wellman or Hansen contain such a mediating element. For a critical evaluation of Freeman’s work, see Hitchcock (2015a, b).

  34.  There are many ways to understand logic, and many types of logic, e.g. intuitionist, relevance, free, modal, classical, paraconsistent etc. Some argumentation scholars, like van Laar, analyze the dialectical function in terms of dialogical logic—expounded by Barth and Krabbe 2010; Lorenz 2010; Rückert and Rahman 2001; Walton 1985, and others—which means that logical relations are given a dialectical reading, meaning that the logical and dialectical function of the premises/argument coincide because logic is itself a dialectical issue. My distinction is not, however, based on dialogical logic but on classical logic, which means that an argumentation structure has either a logical or a dialectical function determining the structure of the argumentation. "Determine" is here defined as that which (at least mainly) explains why and how it is true that a certain proposition is related to another proposition the way it is, in the structure it is a part of. Thus, if a proposition has a logical function, this means that the reason that the proposition is related to another proposition is logical, while a dialectical function of a proposition means that there is a dialectical reason for the proposition being related to another proposition.

  35. One of the anonymous reviewers made this objection.

  36. I assume that linkage entails conjunction. I cannot see how the notion of a linked premise set (i.e. a set where all members are needed to constitute a reason for the conclusion) could avoid each member being conjunctively connected.

  37. Has my critique perhaps been uncharitable to Hansen’s proposal? Could there be some other way to avoid my counterarguments against the logical-structural solution? Perhaps there is another way to approach Hansen’s proposal of an on-balance premise? Perhaps one could assert that Hansen’s position is not committed to the on-balance premise as being on a par with the pro-premises? If so, there would be no linking premise structure; the pros in Hansen’s reconstruction would also converge on the conclusion, and his on-balance premise could be interpreted as a kind of meta-comment on how these pros relate to some acknowledged cons. If that is an acceptable way of reading Hansen, then the present thesis can be understood more as a dialectical reading and transformation of Hansen, with special emphasis on the meta-level and dialectical aspects, as well as an extended account on the pro/con argumentation structure with a PD approach. However, even if that might be possible, that means loosening the idea that the on-balance premise is strictly logically linked with the other premises, which means loosening a strict logical-structural approach. Furthermore, it makes the relation between the "on-balance premise" and the other premises more unclear.

  38. The on-balance premise would be the "linking premise" if taken as a part of a single argumentation in a pragma-dialectical framework.

  39. Even if it would be a single argumentation with a deductive scheme, it is hard to see what kind of deductive scheme it would be.

  40. Which, if you accept the reality of argument schemes, is also a bite against the logical-structural solution.

  41. This refers to the main argumentation. The subargumentation of the main argumentation can, of course, have a different structure (as long as the subargumentation itself is not pro/con argumentation).

  42. Although the pro-considerations should always be taken as coordinatively compound, the counter-considerations could be reconstructed as multiple since the antagonist may have advanced them as separately sufficient, which the protagonist therefore incorporates as such in his pro/con argumentation.

  43. Trudy Govier might be an exception.

  44. My suggested PD interpretation takes ‘The movie will be gone tomorrow’ to be a refutation of the anticipated objection that he can take his son to see the movie some other day. This makes much sense from a dialogue perspective. If one would instead interpret 1.1c as working together with the first pro-argument 1.1a to overcome doubts of sufficiency of 1.1a, the dialogue becomes incongruent:

    1. 1.

      Protagonist: You ought to take your son to the movies

    2. 2.

      Antagonist: But my lawn needs cutting

    3. 3.

      Protagonist: Okay. But though your lawn might need cutting, you ought to go

    4. 4.

      Antagonist: Why?

    5. 5.

      Proponent: Because the picture is ideal for children

    6. 6.

      Antagonist: I doubt that

    7. 7.

      Protagonist: the movie will be gone tomorrow

    Obviously, reply 6 and counter-reply 7 do not make much sense in the dialogue. However, I think that an equally good reconstruction could hold that the 1.1b states “Your son seeing a picture that is ideal for children and the fact that it cannot be seen any other day outweighs the consideration that your lawn today gets the mowing it needs”.

    • (1.1a′ Typically, children should watch moves which are ideal for them) [symptomatic scheme]

    • (1.1b′ One should always do what is most important) [symptomatic scheme with a strong symptomatic relation]

    • (1.1c′ When the movies is gone you cannot watch it) [causal scheme—it leads to the fact that you cannot watch it].

    That we can easily assign an argument scheme to each “premise” supports the view that the premises may instead be interpreted as “arguments” (in the PD sense), where each “argument” is part of a single argumentation instantiating its own scheme. Hence, the argumentation in question is not a single inference composed of a linked premise set, but is rather composed of many single argumentations, each with its own argument scheme.

  46. My argumentation for interpreting pro/con argumentation as a variant of coordinatively compound argumentation is simply a disjunctive syllogism with three disjuncts. If there are only three types of basic complex argumentation—multiple, subordinative, and coordinative—and pro/con argumentation is neither multiple nor subordinative, then it follows that it is necessarily coordinative compound argumentation.

  47. Pinto (2009, p. 275, f10) defines the difference in this way: "where R is a defeasible reason for Q, D is a overriding defeater which cancels the force of R if and only if (i) D is consistent with R and (ii) the conjunction of R and D is a reason for holding not-Q. D is an undermining defeater if and only if (i) D is consistent with R and (ii) the conjunction of D and R is not a reason for holding Q and is not a reason for holding not-Q".

  48. It may be tempting to think that an undermining defeater does attack the linking premise of the argumentation, since the defeater works by undermining what can be labeled the "inference link" between the argument and the standpoint. However, notions of defeasibility and undermining defeater are intimately related. I accept Pinto’s definition of "defeasible", which is that "an argument is defeasible if and only if its conclusion and or its force can be called into question by considerations that are consistent with its premises and that do not call those premises into question" (Pinto 2011, p. 104). A defeasible argumentation is an argumentation whose argument scheme allows for it to be defeated—by additional information—i.e., to be undermined by a defeater. Take this single argumentation with the symptomatic argument scheme:

    1. 1.

      The truck is red

    2. 1.1

      The truck looks red

    3. 1.1′

      Objects that look red typically are red [symptomatic relation]

    This inference would be undermined by information that another truck shines its red lights on the truck in question, and we know that red lights can make objects look red when they are not even though both 1.1 and 1.1′ are true. In contrast, an overriding defeater could be that “five other workers standing much closer to the truck state that the truck is brown”, providing a reason that overrides the reason in favor of the standpoint that the truck is red and thus serving as a reason for the opposite standpoint.

  49. Pinto does not claim that counter-considerations are always undermining defeaters, rather, this is an open question for him. Pinto also discusses an example of pro/con argumentation where it prima facie appears that the pro-considerations undermines, rather than overrides the counter-considerations (Pinto 2011, p. 109). My point is not that a pro/con argumentation cannot also contain an undermining defeater against a counter-consideration. My point is that this undermining defeater would not be part of what makes the argumentation into a overall pro/con argumentation.

  50. To be precise it would be an example of ordinary "complementary coordinatively compound argumentation" which is explained in Sect. 5.3.

  51. In the extended PD theory, every instance of strategic maneuvering is categorized into one of four types, based on what stage of the critical discussion it takes place at: confrontational maneuvering; opening maneuvering; argumentational maneuvering, and concluding maneuvering (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 43–50).

  52. Relevance criticism is (in normal cases) a special subtype of sufficiency criticism.

  53. There are strictly three differences: (1) the meta-comment in complementary coordinative argumentation, which defeats a specific counterargument, is an undermining defeater while the meta-comment of pro/con argumentation is an overriding defeater; (2) the former targets one specific counterargument while the meta-comment in pro/con argumentation targets all counter-considerations in general, stating that they are overridden; (3) the former has always a subordinative argument support it which explains why the specific counterargument is not sufficient, while the meta-comment of pro/con argumentation has no support from a subordinative argument but is justified by the workings of the coordinately active pro-considerations.

  54. Translated from Björnsson et al. (1994, p. 29).

  55. This reconstruction was developed in discussion with Francisca Snoeck Henkemans.

  56. A reconstruction of pro/con argumentation is done from the perspective of the protagonist (as in the example above). One may disagree with the protagonist that the pro-considerations are sufficient/relevant or true, or hold that the protagonist has inaccurately presented the antagonist’s arguments (i.e. the counter-considerations). Still, an evaluation of pro/con argumentation must first consider the protagonist’s claims. That is, the reconstruction must take the perspective of the protagonist, while the evaluation takes the analyst’s perspective. The analyst of the protagonist’s argumentation may think that the counter-considerations are not acceptable precisely because the sub-arguments supporting them are unacceptable, fallacious, or whatever. Hence, it would not matter whether the pro-considerations override them or not. Likewise, the analyst may disagree with the pro-considerations as such or the counter-considerations as such. However, to properly assess the protagonist’s argumentation as a whole, one must have access to the full structure of how the protagonist has interpreted the antagonist’s counter-argumentation. Furthermore, it may be important to know whether the antagonist’s counter-considerations are coordinatively compound or multiple since, for instance, the analyst may think that the pro-considerations have equal weight with the counter-considerations, while also having a counterargument that refutes one of the counter-considerations. In such a situation, whether the standpoint has adequate support is settled by whether the structure of counter-considerations is multiple or coordinatively compound (assuming that the analyst agrees with the protagonist’s interpretation of the antagonist’s argumentation structure).

  57. The question is if C1.1.1a and C1.1.1b should in fact be understood as multiple argumentation (i.e., C1.1.1 and C1.1.2)? I think that it should not. The issue is not—as some believe—whether the two are different from each other (with different argument schemes etc.) but whether the arguer is committed to them being sufficient on their own. The interpretation as coordinatively compound argumentation is justified given the strong modality of the standpoint: "there are serious risks with this development". It is clear that the most charitable interpretation would be to combine these two reasons. Further, the term "also" is a stronger indicator of coordinatively compound, than of multiple, argumentation.

  58. That is, the pro-considerations are positively convergent, and the counter-considerations are negatively convergent. "Negatively convergent" simply means that the arguments/premises are independently negatively relevant to the conclusion. Even though the argumentation structure of pro/con argumentation is different from being just logically convergent (as the genetic-research argumentation above demonstrates) they often contain two or more arguments that are logically convergent to the conclusion.

  59. For sake of simplicity I will hereafter use only the first alternative of meta-comment usage. The second alternative should be clear to the reader.

  60. Van Laar makes this dialogical interpretation:

    • Proponent: You ought to take your son to the movies. (T)

    • Opponent: Why? For all you’ve shown, my lawn needs cutting! (C)

    • Proponent: Okay. But though your lawn might need cutting, you ought to go. (¬(C ⇒ ¬T))

    • Opponent: Why?

    • Proponent: Because the picture is ideal for children. (S)

    • Opponent: How would that support that I ought to go even if my lawn needs cutting? (Why S ⇒ (¬(C ⇒ ¬T))?)

    • Proponent: The movie will be gone by tomorrow. (V)

      This, I think, would give this argumentation structure:

      1. 1.

        You ought to take your son to the movies

      2. 1.1

        Though your lawn might need cutting, you ought to go

      3. 1.1.1a

        The picture is ideal for children

      4. 1.1.1b

        That the picture is ideal for children is a sufficient reason for thinking that you ought to go

      5. 1.1.1b′.1

        It will be gone by tomorrow

    Thus, van Laar’s interpretation takes “It will be gone by tomorrow” as the subordinative defense in support of the complementary defense for 1.1.1a. I find my imagined dialogue a bit more plausible on the face of it, and it also displays the plausible idea that “I can take him some other day” implicitly plays an argumentative role in the dialogue.

  61. Here we see that the actual dialogue in fact supports the view that the protagonist makes an implicit claim that his argument overrides that of the antagonist.

  62. This objection was raised by one of the reviewers.

  63. What is the difference (with respect to logical function) between contributing to the case that when one takes all the relevant counter-considerations into account, the conclusion drawn has sufficient support, and supporting the on-balance premise: "The pro-arguments (i)… n outweigh the counter-considerations (i)… n"?

  64. Björnsson et al. (1994, p. 152), provide this reconstruction.

  65. A special thanks to Jan Albert van Laar for commenting on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Juthe, A. Reconstructing Complex Pro/Con Argumentation. Argumentation 33, 413–454 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9467-9

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