Moral Action, Ignorance of Fact, and Inability

Abstract

I TRY TO SHOW THAT CONTRARY TO PRICHARD IN "DUTY ANDIGNORANCE OF FACT" THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR MAINTAININGTHAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS AT LEAST WE MAY BE UNAVOIDABLYIGNORANT OF OUR DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS, AND OF WHAT ISRIGHT AND WRONG GENERALLY. WHY DID PRICHARD STAND SO FIRMLYAGAINST UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE OF OUR DUTY? I SUGGEST THATHE IS REALLY THINKING ABOUT ONE OF THE CONDITIONS FOR BEINGBLAMEWORTHY, FOR CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TOSPEAK OF SOMEONE'S BEING BLAMEWORTHY BY VIRTUE OFUNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE. I ALSO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THECONNECTION BETWEEN MORAL ACTION AND ABILITY, AND I TRY TOSHOW THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID AGAINST THE USUAL VIEWTHAT "DUTY TO," "WRONG NOT TO," ETC., ENTAIL "ABLE TO."