Abstract
Two coalition formation experiments were performed in which subjects played twenty 3-person games in characteristic function form. The experiments were identical except for whether or not the grand coalition of all three players was permitted to form. Within each experiment, two variations of the experimental games were played in which the 1-person coalition values varied either directly or inversely with the power of the players as reflected by the values of the 2-person coalitions. Results were tested against a bargaining set solution and a value solution. The variation in which the power relationships were congruent supported the bargaining set model; the inverse variation did not support either model. A new model is suggested which takes into account interpersonal comparisons of outcomes and accounts for the allocation of payoffs in both variations.
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This research was supported by Grant No. SOC74-15027 from the National Science Foundation. The authors wish to thank Sandra and Gary Davis for assistance in data collection, Abraham D. Horowitz and Steven Medlin for assistance in data analysis, Thomas S. Wallsten for a critical reading of the manuscript, and John W. Thibaut for his helpful discussion.
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Kahan, J.P., Rapoport, A. When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games. Theor Decis 8, 97–126 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133407
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133407