Happiness as an aim of education

Introduction

Happiness as an aim in education and schooling has occupied both a paradoxical and unusual position, and remains an important issue in academic debate and school practice. Schools have loyally followed the educational tradition of inculcating good behavior and good manners (Rothbard, 1947; Katz, 1976; Melton, 1988) and ensuring good student performances and grades (Noddings, 2012); but generally they have overlooked good feelings and a good mental state. A school education aimed at student happiness would clash with the main aims of educational practice, both historically and today. It is therefore essential to debate whether happiness should be an aim of education.

In order to ascertain how happiness and education are viewed in philosophy of education, the first section of the paper focuses on the writing of two classical scholars: Plato and Wilhelm von Humboldt. This section considers arguments made by the psychologist Jonathan Haidt which help to explain how the dominant notion of the division of the self has shaped conceptions of happiness as an aim of education in philosophy. The concept of the divided self is explored as a means of explaining why it is used to support reason in schooling today. The second section focuses mainly on the philosophy of the social critic Herbert Marcuse and philosophy of education of Nel Noddings. The latter critically examines modern social and pedagogical practice and the role of happiness within them. The final section deals with several aspects of Richard Stanley Peters’ concept of education which relate to happiness and whether it is an appropriate and valid aim of education.

Happiness in philosophy of education

The pursuit of happiness has been a relatively frequent concern in philosophy of education. This is partly because philosophers have a general overall interest in the problem of a quality life, a good life, flourishing, and how to achieve these. Philosophical teachings about how to live a moral life and adhere to the right rules inform the aims of education theories in philosophy, most of which strive for eudaimonia—living life according to the authentic self and deep moral principles (Huta, 2013). Happiness is also pursued in hedonism, which is still popular today, and is about maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. In both these accounts happiness can be classified as a positive mental state, but whereas eudaimonia is attained and experienced positively by following prescribed virtues, hedonism can be experienced as a positive mental state to which no objective standard applies.

This classification is not as clear cut as it may seem. First, two different accounts of happiness emerged: the eudaimonic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and the hedonistic philosophy of Epicurus. In antiquity these two ethical paradigms shared more similarities than differences insofar as virtue as the highest moral principle is concerned. Virtue, stressed by the eudaimonists—Plato and Aristotle—is the primary decision-making criterion in Epicurean hedonism, although pleasure is the main goal. In the hedonistic philosophy of antiquity, avoiding pain and experiencing pleasure involved qualitative decision-making. There are higher and lower pleasures, and individuals who wish to live a happy life should choose higher pleasures or virtues (Epicurus, 2013).

The second distinction between eudaimonia and hedonia became apparent when Jeremy Bentham developed another hedonistic moral system, in which happiness consists of feelings that are similar in nature and vary in quantity but not quality (Bentham, 2000). Bentham, who wished to define feelings in such a way as to avoid misleading words, claimed that happiness was the manifestation of physical occurrences within the human body (Davies, 2015). Happiness may therefore be explained using a purely descriptive statement about a positive mental state, without having to rely on normative descriptors in the sense of higher and lower pleasures.

Eudaimonia and the division of the self

In this subsection I will briefly introduce two eudaimonic philosophical theories of education, by Humboldt and Plato, that form the basis of my argument about the relationship between eudaimonic teachings and the culturally preferred intellectual faculty—human reason. I will argue that the relation of reason and happiness in philosophy explains happiness as an aim of education and schooling in the philosophy of education.

For the very first philosophers of education, happiness was one of the central aims of education. “According to Plato and the Greek philosophers, the purpose of education is directed toward the attainment of the person’s highest good, the development of virtues that lead to true happiness” (Murphy, 2018, p. 4). In the philosophy of Plato an educated person is a harmonious soul or eudaimon. Knowledge acquired during education improves the character, which is equivalent to the harmonized parts of the soul (Plato, 1992). Only a just character can achieve a just state and so education is essential to Plato’s system.

Humboldt’s thinking tended to be far more idealistic than Plato’s system. Wilhelm von Humboldt strongly disagreed with the instrumental use of education for the benefit or purposes of the state. Higher scientific institutions, he specified, should be disconnected in every way from the state because their purpose is the pursuit of pure science, which subsequently shapes a person’s character (Humboldt, 1810). In the Humboldtian understanding, universities exist independently of the professional needs of society (Hohendahl, 2011). The type of knowledge Humboldt valued and promoted and which is the key aim of institutionalized education leads to science and research.

Plato and Humboldt were representatives of the dominant Western philosophical and cultural view that reason was a human faculty that had to be nurtured through education. Reason, according to Plato, Humboldt and other eudaimonists, had to be trained so as to approximate ideal living and a mental state springing from the individual’s virtuous character.

Philosophers have divided the human mind into two parts. Jonathan Haidt (2006) refers to this phenomenon as the “divided self”. One part is the rational, or intellectual, conscious part and the other is variously referred to as emotional, sensual, instinctive, and animal. In this paper it is referred to as nonrational. Eudaimonic theories describe how one can develop a good, virtuous character. No matter how this is to be achieved, it is the intellectual faculty that has the capability of delivering virtue and the good life, that is, a happy life. The widespread philosophical worship of reason made many philosophers uncomfortable with locating virtue in habits and feelings... For Plato and many later thinkers, rationality was a gift from the gods, a tool to control our animal lusts. Rationality had to be in charge. These two seeds—the quest for parsimony and the worship of reason—lay dormant in the centuries after the fall of Rome, but they sprouted and bloomed in the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. As advances in technology and commerce began to create a new world, some people began to seek rationally justified social and political arrangements. (Haidt, 2006, p. 161)

The worship of reason has been connected to happiness—to its moral nature—and to eudaimonia. In philosophical writing reason has been given a dominant role because the two human parts sometimes conflict (Haidt, 2006) and lead to an unhappy life. Reason is considered an intelligent tool for avoiding or handling inner conflicts that lead to a loss of control over one’s life. For Plato, Humboldt, and other eudaimonists, reason brings not only knowledge, but also morality, virtue, and eudaimonia. That is why Plato’s and Humboldt’s educational initiatives sought ways to exercise the intellectual faculty. In their philosophy the aims of education and schooling were identical to the aim, the telos, of human striving in eudaemonist philosophical systems—the good life.

In philosophy of education happiness is an aim of education and schooling—mainly in the eudaimonic sense—as a mental state that develops on the ground of being good. Hedonism, the positive mental state of feeling good, was not important in either Plato’s or Humboldt’s philosophy of education, and nor did it attract much interest among other philosophers of education.

Happiness and the aims of public schooling today

The critics agree that happiness is not an aim of schooling today, but why is this the case? This question can be split into two: Why is hedonia not an aim of schooling today? and Why is eudaimonia not an aim of schooling today? The answer to these lies in the philosophical distinction between the mental faculties and the fact that reason has become an instrument of economic growth. ^[1] Hedonia is not an aim of schooling today because the nonrational faculty which experiences happiness (the emotional, sensual, instinctive, animal etc., part of the psyche) has been culturally suppressed in the West since antiquity. Eudaimonia is not an aim of schooling today because intellectual faculty, or reason, no longer functions as human morality, but has been transformed into a value-neutral economic phenomenon— instrumental reason—a means of achieving productivity.

Humboldt’s work can be regarded as symbolic of the revolt against contemporary trends in educational aims. “Humboldt was appropriated not only by conservatives who meant to defend existing structures but also by reformers who wanted to prevent the university from becoming a blind servant of industrial society” (Hohendahl, 2011, p. 159). Humboldt’s successors feared that general cultural and economic changes, leading to neoliberalism, and bringing about changes in society’s value system and the meaning of social utility would leave their mark on our understanding of the knowledge to be imparted in the educational process. The manifestation of these changes in schooling today is the subject of continual discussion and criticism.

According to Nel Noddings the education debates at the beginning of the 21st century have been dominated by talk of standards, and the reason for that is almost always economic. “Today’s reformers say little about forms of personal wellbeing that are aimed at neither the country’s nor the individual’s economic status” (Noddings, 2004, p. 336).

This goes hand in hand with the declared aims of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), a leading global institution on education policy. The OECD’s aims include improving the global economy, promoting world trade, and raising productivity (OECD—Overview, Mission and Objectives, Functions). Similarly, in the United States, the Common Core of education refers to developing critical thinking, problem solving, and analytical skills to ensure students are successful, and equates happiness with being career-ready (Murphy, 2018).

In Herbert Marcuse’s opinion this state of affairs began surfacing once we entered the era of postindustrialism. From then on, he claimed, technical progress would be the ultimate goal of society (Marcuse, 1970). Technical progress leads to growth in social wealth (Marcuse, 1970) and “the highest value is productivity, not only in the sense of increased production of material and intellectual goods, but also in the sense of the universal domination of nature” (p. 30). He proposed progress should take another direction as well, one not valued in advanced industrial society, a humanitarian direction, the pursuit of happiness and gratification, which “…consists in the realization of human freedom, of morality” (Marcuse, 1970, p. 28).

Marcuse captured the extent to which the postindustrial transition quantifies and materializes society (Marcuse, 1964), with changes to the value system and the hierarchy of mental faculties being a projection of this. To this value hierarchy, which sees individual gratification and happiness only a subordinate element, corresponds a hierarchy of human faculties that is characteristic of the concept of progress: the division of human nature into higher (intellectual) and lower (sensual) faculties”. (Marcuse, 1970, pp. 30–31)

Reason appears to be the most appropriate instrument for pursuing the goal of advanced industrial society—technical progress—according to Marcuse’s philosophy. The legacy of the antiquities—the philosophical and cultural preference for reason—has, following its reemergence during the Enlightenment, taken on exactly the form Humboldt feared it would: with the end of the industrial revolution and its widespread consequences; and with societies turning to reason in a materialist guise—as a means of economic growth and production. Society’s aims and needs are perceived differently in postindustrial society, as is the use of human faculties and the role of schooling in achieving them. In postindustrial society, reason, worshiped by philosophers for its association with a good virtuous life, has become a means of achieving higher rates of productivity, and schooling is a social instrument for pursuing— and enabling—society’s new aim. In Spring’s (1947) words, those who control the schools control the character-producing institutions. If technical progress is the highest social goal and human reason is the best means of achieving it, then schools can be used to “produce” the members of this new system.

Consequently the intellectual philosophical movement of the Enlightenment, school, and modern society as a whole, are deemed a rational purposive project. The philosophical worship of reason, I argue, also takes place in schools. Just as philosophers locate responsibility in human reason to enable us to better navigate life, the cultural preference for the intellectual part of the mind is cultivated in schools, so, according to Boli, Ramirez and Meyer (1985), people learn to navigate their way through life in the industrial system. These days schools are tasked with shaping individuals to become rational, purposeful, and empowered to act with autonomy and competence in the new universalistic system (Boli, Ramirez, & Meyer, 1985).

Public schools do not teach pupils to lead rational virtuous lives—to eudaimonia— because the role of reason has changed to reflect structural changes in society that have led to a different highest goal (as in the goals of influential global organizations such as the OECD). Neither is education directed at a pleasant life—at hedonia—because, as we have seen, nonrational faculty has been culturally assessed as a lower-ranking human faculty. In her writing Noddings expresses the concern that in education today the academic side is being prioritized over the emotional, social, moral, physical, spiritual, and aesthetic sides, which are part of the overall development of the person or development of the “whole child” (Noddings, 2005b). Hence we can conclude that nonrational human faculty is being suppressed, or at least neglected in public schooling.

To summarize, happiness—a positive state of mind, achieved by living a virtuous life or experiencing pleasure—is not deemed necessary for the main goal of education today which is also the main goal of society. This instrumental understanding of reason and the underestimation of the importance of the nonrational faculty in schooling can be contrasted with happiness in all its meanings.

One has to look carefully to find happiness among the aims and objectives of classroom teaching today, but attempts at reform have emerged in protest at the narrowing focus of education, and the (economic) tapering of aims, following the example set by Marcuse and other social critics who seek the return of the humanitarian aims of progress and schooling. Noddings (2003) for example offers a number of arguments for fostering happiness and against its neglect in education. She would like to see the nonrational part of the psyche being developed, the eudaemonist account of happiness in education, and a holistic education that corresponds to the dialectical mode of existence (of society and thought) as an ontological category elaborated by Marcuse (1964). To avoid creating “one-dimensional” ^[2] individuals, Noddings suggests that schools should be concerned with the overall development of the child (2005b). After all “there is more to individual life and the life of a nation than economic superiority” (2004, p. 338). Noddings (2012) also thinks more attention should be paid to the curriculum as a whole than to test subjects.

Why not do careful, patient diagnostic work that will address social and emotional problems as well as academic problems? In doing this, we would not use a nose-to-the-grindstone approach; we would not deprivate these students of art, music, drama, physical education, and field trips. Rather, we would provide the sort of rich experience every good teacher and parent prefers. We would teach the whole child. (Noddings, 2012, p. 211)

Aim of the concept of education and its link to happiness

What is education and what does the concept of education reveal about happiness’s place among educational aims? Relating the concept of education to the concept of learning I will conceptualize education as a process and activity leading to a productive and constructive change. While I see learning as the active process of acquiring new abilities and characteristics, I see education as intentionally induced learning. Education is intentionally aimed at the product of learning and a constructive change that achieves anything worthwhile, desired, or valued (Barrow & Woods, 2006). Moreover, if we take Richard Stanley Peters’ definition of education (1996, 2010), then logically for the aim of education to be valid it must be justified and transmitted in a morally unobjectionable manner. Happiness, I argue, is what is obtained once these conceptual criteria are met, and is therefore an appropriate aim of education.

Learning is logically tied to some kind of goal or an end or successful outcome (Wilson, 2010). Education is no different. Both concepts, learning and education, are inseparably tied to their result or product, broadly construed. Learning and education, intentionally or unintentionally, lead to the resulting attribute of the agent undergoing or carrying out the activity (learning subject or educatee). If these activities succeed, the agent learns something or has been educated. That is to say: education and learning are productive ^[3] activities.

Another key conceptual criterion of education and learning is the change they generate. Education and learning are processes that begin and end with change. Both processes or activities lead to a change in the attributes of a congruent person. If, and only if, the agent achieves the desired state and hence the desired outcome, is he or she qualified as educated. If the agent acquires new attributes which are not desired or are transferred unintentionally, the agent has learned something.

Although learning can terminate in a negative output (one can learn bad or disadvantageous habits and attitudes (Wilson, 2010)), education leads solely to a valuable outcome. “It would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better” (Barrow & Woods, 2006). Hence, education is a constructive process. We cannot talk about education without noting what is worthwhile about it, but we should also note that it is intentionally transmitted in a morally unobjectionable manner (Peters, 2010; Barrow & Woods, 2006).

What exactly then should an educated person, possessing knowledge, skills, habits, control, and the like, acquired through education, know? It must be worthwhile, desired, or considered valuable. There is a vast array of types of knowledge and underlying uses of the epithet “desired”, argue Barrow and Woods (2006), so different people tend to employ different criteria. “It is at this point that a value element—and hence a dimension of evaluative/emotive meaning—enters in” (Barrow & Woods, 2006).

People differ in their estimates of desirability. They therefore differ in the emphasis which they place on achievement and states of mind that can be thought of as desirable. This diversity is what makes talk of ‘aims of education’ apposite ... They are enunciating their priorities in giving content to the notion of an ‘educated man.’ (Peters, 2010, p. 4)

Moreover, the desired outcome has to be a desirable and valuable outcome of this specific activity and not any other; it has to be a worthwhile result of the education process. Likewise, the aim of the process of education is to impart valuable content but there must be justification as to why it is considered valuable.

This is a purely conceptual point. Such a connection between ‘education’ and what is valuable does not imply any particular commitment to content. It is a further question what the particular standards are in virtue of which activities are thought to be of value and what grounds there might be for claiming that these are correct ones. All that is implied is a commitment to what is thought valuable. (Peters, 1966, p. 25)

We are left with the argument concerning the logical relationship between education and happiness. What does the concept of education reveal about how happiness fits in with the aims of education? Anything that is desired/valued, justified, and intentionally transmitted in a morally unobjectionable manner is an appropriate and valid aim of education. Conceptually education not only allows this, but elevates it. Happiness, then, regardless of its hedonistic or eudaimonic implications can legitimately be considered part of education’s aim because it is both universally desired and valued.

Conclusion

Everyone seeks happiness (Rousseau, 1979). Happiness is therefore universally valued, desired, and serves the purposes of a public good, education, and schooling. Economic productivity and developing academic skills are, I believe, merely secondary aims to the pursuit of happiness. If education is to nurture things that we value (Barrow & Woods, 2006), it has to nurture happiness; there is no other value that is so generally accepted. Therefore, the advocated outcome of education and schooling is to produce individuals who not only behave and think in a certain manner, but also feel a certain way—positive and ethical.

As someone could oppose this point with legitimacy and propose another aim or set of goals of education, I will respond briefly to possible counter-arguments. Similar to prioritizing academic skills, which have been frequently mentioned in the text, goals such as building social, civic, personal and other competencies can be viewed as central. Such thinking is something that, apart from the other numerous possible plausible arguments, is also made possible by the definition of education used (Peters, 1966, 2010), and in fact does not stand in opposition to the premises of the article.

The task of the article was to mount a defense of happiness, not to ascribe exclusivity to it, something that is often completely excluded from the discussion on educational aims and thus deserves attention. It is also of the utmost importance to note that even if we consider happiness to be the primary goal, there is a general consensus among philosophers that it cannot be achieved directly. Happiness can be considered a “by-product” or a consequence of other phenomena provided by complex education.

Nel Noddings (2003, 2005b) is also convinced that in order for education to lead to happiness, a holistic and comprehensive education is needed which does not omit emotional, social, moral, physical, spiritual, and aesthetic aims. Finally, happiness is above all a humanistic value, which is conditioned by education cultivating humanity, i.e. ethical, liberal or democratic education (Nussbaum, 2003). Based on the empirical literature, there is a number of diverse factors contributing to the increased level of happiness, prosocial orientation being the most significant of them (Diener & Seligman, 2002). Education for happiness also brings with it the achievement of many other goals.

In this article I have explored happiness as an aim of education, particularly school education. I stated that, in many philosophical systems, philosophy of education is a source in which happiness is considered an aim of education and schooling. I briefly described the philosophies of Plato and Humboldt to illustrate this. Philosophers of education usually stress one of two fundamental accounts of happiness—eudaimonia. The other account, hedonia, has not received much attention because, since antiquity, the human faculties that experience this phenomenon—the nonrational part of the psyche—have been considered a stumbling block in the West to those seeking to fulfill their potential. In this culture, a predominantly intellectual one, the “irrational” aspects of human beings are neglected.

The industrial revolution changed the way we think about human reason so critics now agree that it is nurtured through schooling in a primarily economic sense. For these reasons, eudaimonia—the notion of a good, virtuous life lived in accordance with reason—is not one of the primary aims of a school education today. Neither is hedonia—the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.

I have attempted to show that happiness is a valid education aim, as follows from the concept of education. I have conceptualized education as a process and activity aimed at and leading to a productive and constructive change, which, as I have argued, applies to happiness too. As has been noted, education can be understood to enhance human potential in multiple, morally unobjectionable ways that achieve the desired/valued result. The whole process is justified on this basis, and education aims are consequently tied to standards.

The outcome of the process whereby schooling shapes and influences students as desired is a social unit that is “manipulated” in line with the intended goal, and that should be a public good. If the mission of schools in a democratic state is to enhance social welfare, then happiness meets this objective better than anything else, because it is both universally desired and valued.