Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Reasoning and Representing

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledgebut is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further arguethat given the best explanation of logical understanding someversion or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Block, N. (1986): 'Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, 615–628.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (1993): 'Holism, Hyper-Analyticity and Hyper-Compositionality', Mind and Language 8, 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P. (1989): 'The Rule-Following Considerations', Mind 98, 507–549.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P. (1993): 'Does and Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake?', Mind and Language 8, 26–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandom, R. (1994): Making It Explicit, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byrne, A. (1993): The Emergent Mind, Ph.D.thesis, Princeton University.

  • Carnap, R. (1937): The Logical Syntax of Language, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, L. (1895): 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles', Mind 4, 278–280.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, H. (1977): 'Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role', Journal of Philosophy 74, 379–408.

    Google Scholar 

  • Field, H. (1989): 'Realism, Mathematics and Modality', in Realism, Mathematics and Modality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (1998): Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foster, J.A. (1976): 'Meaning and Truth Theory', in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning (pp. 1–32), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1986a): Change in View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1986b): 'The Meaning of Logical Constants', in E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation (pp. 125–134), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwich, P. (1995): 'Meaning, Use and Truth', Mind 104, 355–368.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalderon, M.E. (1996): 'What Numbers Could Be (And, Hence, Necessarily Are)', Philosophia Mathematica 3(4), 238–255.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalderon, M.E. (1997): 'The Transparency of Truth', Mind 106, 475–497.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1976): 'Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?', in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning (pp. 325–419), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1982): Wittgenstein on Rule-Following and Private Language, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1972/1980): 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications', cmreprinted in N. Block (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume One (pp. 207–215). Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (1976): 'What is a Logical Constant?', Journal of Philosophy lxxiii, 221–240.

  • Peacocke, C. (1987): 'Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's Account', Proceedings of the British Academylxxiii, 153–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (1992): A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W.v.O. (1935/1979): 'Truth by Convention', reprinted in The Ways of Paradox (pp.77–106), Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, G. (1993): 'A Refutation of Nominalism(?)', Philosophical Topics21, 149–186.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. (1949): The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S. (1997): 'Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox', in A. Kazmi (ed.),Meaning, Reference and Truth, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume.

  • Tarski, A. (1935/1983): 'On the Concept of Logical Consequence', J.H. Woodger (trans.), reprinted in J. Corcoran (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (pp. 409–420), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, J.F. (1960): 'What Achilles Should Have Said to the Tortoise', Ratio 3, 95–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1945/1968): Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C. (1983): Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press. Department of Philosophy University College London Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT UK E-mail: m.kalderon@ucl.ac.uk

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK

    Mark Eli Kalderon

Authors
  1. Mark Eli Kalderon
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kalderon, M.E. Reasoning and Representing. Philosophical Studies 105, 129–160 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010341316352

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010341316352

Keywords

Search

Navigation