Abstract
Two-stage voting is prone to majority inversions, a situation in which the outcome of an election is not backed by a majority of popular votes. We study the probability of majority inversion in a model with two candidates, three states and uniformly distributed fractions of supporters for each candidate. The model encompasses equal or distinct population sizes, with equal, population-based or arbitrary voting weights in the second stage. We prove that, when no state can dictate the outcome of the election by commanding a voting weight in excess of one half, the probability of majority inversion increases with the size disparity among the states.
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Notes
For example, ten candidates ran for office in each of the three recent elections: 2008, 2012, 2016.
Miller (2012) documents inversions in legislative elections in the British-type or Westminster parliamentary systems. For parliamentary elections contested by more than two parties, one can ensure that the voters face a choice between two alternatives using the typical left–right ideological dichotomy to define the outcome.
We are aware of the fact that the actual weights used by the U.S. Electoral College do not accurately reflect the relative difference in the population among the states. Nevertheless, weighting electoral votes by the population is the intended design. The current allocation of votes to the states is based on the 2010 Census and applies to the 2012, 2016 and 2020 presidential elections.
For a discussion of the Penrose square-root rule, see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
The theoretical background for the methods used in LattE is elaborated in Loera et al. (2013).
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Michel Le Breton for constructive criticism.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1 (probability of inversion)
If \(v_{[1]}\le \frac{1}{2}\), then the probability of majority inversion
Each summand can be expressed as a multiple integral
evaluated over the following convex polytopes
Here, we use the fact that if \(x_i\sim U(-\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2})\), then also \(-x_i\sim U(-\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2})\) for \(i=1,2,3\).
Assume \(w_1\ge w_2\ge w_3\). Eliminating y yields
where the transformed integration regions are given by
The integrals corresponding to \(P_2\) and \(P_3\) evaluate as
The value of \(P_1\) depends on whether the largest weight exceeds \(\frac{1}{2}\).
If \(w_1>\frac{1}{2}\), then
If \(w_1\le \frac{1}{2}\), then
Therefore, if \(w_1>\frac{1}{2}\), then
or else
Consider the case \(v_{[1]}>\frac{1}{2}\). As before, let \(w_1\ge w_2\ge w_3\).
(i) If \(v_{[1]}=v_1\), then the probability of majority inversion
Thus, \(P'_2=P_2, P'_3=P_3\). For \(P'_1\), we have
where \(A=\{(x,y,z) : x\in (0,\tfrac{w_1}{2}), y\in (0,\tfrac{w_2}{2}), z\in (0,\tfrac{w_3}{2}), x<y+z\}\). Since \(P'_1=\frac{1}{4}-P_1\),
(ii) If \(v_{[1]}=v_2\), then the probability of majority inversion
Here \(P''_1=P_1, P''_2=\frac{1}{4}-P_2, P''_3=P_3\). Therefore,
(iii) If \(v_{[1]}=v_3\), then the probability of majority inversion
Here \(P'''_1=P_1, P'''_2=P_2, P'''_3=\frac{1}{4}-P_3\). Thus,
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2 (Schur-convexity)
Assume for simplicity that \(w_1\ge w_2\ge w_3\). To prove that \(P(w_1,w_2,w_3)\) is Schur-convex, we use Lemma 1 to show that
-
(a)
\(P(w_1,w_2+\varepsilon ,w_3-\varepsilon )\) is an increasing function of \(\varepsilon \) in \(0\le \varepsilon \le \min \{w_1-w_2,w_3\}\);
-
(b)
\(P(w_1+\varepsilon ,w_2-\varepsilon ,w_3)\) is an increasing function of \(\varepsilon \) in \(0\le \varepsilon \le w_2-w_3\).
Part (a).
If \(w_1>w_2+w_3\), then
and the derivative
The inequality follows since \(\frac{w_2+w_3}{w_2+\varepsilon }<2\) due to \(w_2-w_3+2\varepsilon >0\).
If \(w_1\le w_2+w_3\), then from
we obtain
and the derivative
The expression in the numerator of the first fraction is non-negative:
Therefore,
Part (b).
If \(w_1+2\varepsilon >w_2+w_3\), then
and
If \(w_1+2\varepsilon \le w_2+w_3\), then
Consequently,
The derivative
where \(A=3w_3(1-2w_3)+\frac{3w^3_3}{1-w_3}+(1-w_3)^2\). We show that
or, equivalently,
The expression on the left-hand side is not smaller than \(4(\frac{1}{2}-w_3)^2(1-w_3)\) since \(w_2-\varepsilon \ge \frac{1}{2}-w_3\), \(2(w_2-\varepsilon )\le 1-w_3\). But \(4(\frac{1}{2}-w_3)^2(1-w_3)=1-5w_3+8w^2_3-4w^3_3\ge 1-6w_3+12w^2_3-10w^3_3\), as \((1-5w_3+8w^2_3-4w^3_3)-(1-6w_3+12w^2_3-10w^3_3)=w_3(1-4w_3+6w^2_3)=w_3((1-2w_3)^2+2w^2_3)\ge 0\).
Appendix C: The upper bound on the probability for EC
Again, assume \(w_1\ge w_2\ge w_3\). In part (b) of Appendix B we have established that the function \(P(w_1+\varepsilon ,w_2-\varepsilon ,w_3)\) is increasing of \(\varepsilon \) in \(0\le \varepsilon \le w_2-w_3\) for EC if \(w_1+2\varepsilon \le w_2+w_3\). For EC, we show that if \(w_1+2\varepsilon >w_2+w_3\), the function \(P(w_1+\varepsilon ,w_2-\varepsilon ,w_3)\) is decreasing in \(\varepsilon \) for \(0\le \varepsilon \le w_2-w_3\). Indeed,
implies
Denote \(X=w_2-\varepsilon \). Let us show that \(3(w_1+w_2)X^2+2w^2_3X-(w_1+w_2)w^2_3>0\) for \(X\in [w_3,w_2]\). The roots \(X_{1,2}\) of the quadratic are
with the largest root being smaller than \(w_3\). It follows that \(w^*_1=\frac{1}{2}\) maximizes \(P(w_1,w_2,w_3)\).
The function
is increasing in \(w_2\), and so it is maximized for \(w^*_2=\frac{1}{2}\), because
Consequently, \(\mathop {{{\mathrm{arg\,max}}}}\limits _{(w_1,w_2,w_3)} P(w_1,w_2,w_3)=(\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},0)\) and \(\max \limits _{(w_1,w_2,w_3)} P(w_1,w_2,w_3)=\frac{1}{4}\).
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Kaniovski, S., Zaigraev, A. The probability of majority inversion in a two-stage voting system with three states. Theory Decis 84, 525–546 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9660-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-018-9660-1