Complete versus Incomplete εἶναι in the Sophist: An unhelpful dilemma

I

In the year 1973, Charles Kahn published his book The verb ‘be’ in ancient Greek – a project of colossal aspiration and scale. But what was it about? In a 1966 paper that can be seen, in several respects, as the forerunner of Kahn 1973, one finds this opening statement:

I am concerned in this paper with the philological basis for Greek ontology. (Kahn 1966, p. 245)

Kahn never really abandoned this goal of providing a “philological basis for Greek ontology”. The most consistent and reoccurring finding of his was that the reason why existence does not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek philosophy has to do with the syntactical function of the verb εἶναι.^[1] Kahn has reached the (partly) philological conclusion that there is no distinct existential sense/use of the verb εἶναι in Greek. Ἔστιν means in principle (if not always) being something or other; not existing.

In Plato, for instance, Kahn is of the opinion that:

Every truth for Plato can properly be expressed in the copula form ‘X is Y’. Even the existential proposition can be so expressed: ‘Justice exists’ is expressed as ‘Justice is something (ti)’. (Kahn 1976, p. 331)

Independently of Charles Kahn, other leading scholars in ancient philosophy were reaching similar philologico-philosophical conclusions.

Thus, Michael Frede:

One may be worried here about the phrase “in a certain way” which I have introduced into the account. It reflects the fact that being for Plato always is a matter of being something or other. (Frede 1992, p. 409, my emphasis)^[2]

Similarly, Lesley Brown in a very influential paper on the Sophist:

This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ uses of ‘to be’, which has usually been associated with the distinction between the ‘is’ that means ‘exists’ and the ‘is’ of predication, that is, the copula. (Brown 1999, p. 455)

The way Brown addresses the issue is subtler and goes beyond the surface distinction between complete εἶναι=existence versus incomplete εἶναι=predication. Brown tries to draw philosophical conclusions from the linguistic fact that some verbs, though complete, allow for further completion (in the language of Burnyeat 2003, these verbs are “completable”).

In what follows, I will argue for a radical conclusion regarding the presence or absence of the existential εἶναι, at least as far as the Sophist is concerned. I will argue that philology, and more precisely investigations regarding whether or not εἶναι is complete or incomplete (or indeed completable), are nonstarters as far as questions regarding the Form of Being in the Sophist are concerned. More precisely, I will argue that they are nonstarters regarding the question of whether the Form of Being in the Sophist represents the concept of existence or true predication. That the question regarding the concept represented by the Form of Being in the Sophist and the syntax of the εἶναι are interconnected will become clear in the next part.

My methodology in this attempt will be the following. Starting from the end of the dialogue and the section where the major ontological conclusions of the Stranger are cashed out in the definition of the true and false λόγος (262a ff.),^[3] I will work my way back to the point where the problem of the false λόγος has first been linked to non-being in 237a.

The point I wish to argue for is the following: The question of whether the Form of Being in the Sophist has existential connotations or not cannot be reduced to the philological question of whether εἶναι in the same dialogue is complete or incomplete.

II

Near the end of the Sophist (262d–263d), it seems that an unambiguous agreement has been reached. This agreement is finally allowing the Stranger to pass onto the rewarding phase of some successful demonstrations, where the things proven are finally illustrated by simple, pedagogical examples. A criterion has been found for distinguishing between true and false statements (λόγοι): a statement is true if it predicates a being of a being and if the former being is relevant to (περί) the latter; a statement is false if it predicates a being of a being and if the former being is not relevant to the latter. For example, predicating “sitting” of Theaetetus when he is sitting results in a true statement. This is because sitting is both a being and a being relevant to Theaetetus. Predicating “flying” of him will result in a false statement; for, flying, though a being, is not one of the beings relevant to Theaetetus.

Now, no matter how controversial the semantics of the “true” and the “false” that underly examples like this one is, the following element of it is uncontentious (at least as far as the Sophist is concerned): the subjects of these statements denote beings, and the predicates of these statements denote beings.

In the context of this dialogue, it is also uncontroversial that when something is something, this is because the former participates in the Form that corresponds to the latter.^[4] Consequently, and since Theaetetus, sitting and flying are, all three of them, beings, there must be a Form in which they all participate and which renders them such: the Form of Being.

So, let us try to state a general formula that binds together predicates, Forms and true statements and, let us, subsequently, try to apply this to “being”.

“A is B” is true, if and only if what is denoted by the term ‘A’ participates in the Form that corresponds to the term ‘B’.^[5]

(A)

By combining (A) with the fact that there is a Form corresponding to the predicate “being” (254d), it follows that sitting and flying must participate in it. Why? Because, by a semantical analysis of the pedagogical example below, we get that being is said truly both of sitting and of flying (263b3–13).^[6]

THEAETETUS: The one is false, I suppose, and the other is true.

VISITOR: And the true one says the beings as they are with respect to you.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

VISITOR: And the false one says others than the beings.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

VISITOR: So, it says the non-beings as if they are beings.

THEAETETUS: I suppose so.

VISITOR: And beings they certainly are, but beings other than beings with respect to you, since we said that in a sense and with respect to each thing, there are many beings and many non beings.

THEAETETUS: Absolutely. (translation by Nicholas P. White; substantially modified)^[7]

What differentiates these two λόγοι (τὸν μέν=Θεαίτητος πέτεται – τὸν δέ=Θεαίτητος κάθηται) is that the first predicates of him beings that are not relevant to him, while the latter beings that are so.

III

Based on the conclusion of the previous section, we can now go after the sentence that captures the corresponding ontic fact with respect to sitting:

“?” is true, if and only if what is denoted by the term ‘sitting’ participates in the Form of Being.

(A)*

What we now need to do is to figure out whether (A)* by itself can cast any light on “?”, i. e. whether we can we figure out “?” and its syntax, based on the rightbhand side of the bi-conditional?

The subject in “?” must be a term (or phrase) referring to sitting in general, or, alternatively, to the specific state of Theaetetus’ being sitting,^[8] like, e. g., the articular, nominalized infinitive τὸ καθῆσθαι, or the articular, nominalized phrase τὸ καθῆσθαι τὸν Θεαίτητον.^[9] In all cases, what is denoted by the term/phrase must enjoy ontic autonomy. This is the only condition that the subject needs to meet, and there are several terms and phrases in Greek that can do so, notably because of the function of the definite article. So, no controversy surrounds the subject in “?”

The rest in “?” is controversial. The reasons are as follows. To begin with, notice that the matrix in (A) describes a statement of the general form [Subject+copula+Predicate]. This might be raising some issues, but not any major difficulty. The verb phrase^[10] can always be made to consist of a single verb such that the sentence always complies with the matrix in (A). Take Theaetetus participating in the Form of Sitting, for example. The most natural rendering is the one appearing in the dialogue: Θεαίτητος κάθηται. Nonetheless, one can easily turn this (and any other similar case) into the [Subject + copula + participle] form: Θεαίτητός ἐστι καθήμενος. Having done that, we can simply ask whether the Form on the right-hand side of (A) represents a one-place or a many-place predicate. In the former case, we must be after a complete verb phrase on the left-hand side. In the latter case, we must be after an incomplete verb phrase on the same side. To see this, take the Form of Sitting as the representative of the one-place predicate and the Form of Difference as the representative of the many-place predicate. The corresponding statements on the left-hand side now become: Θεαίτητός ἐστι καθήμενος and Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος. Obviously, the former is saturated and needs no further complement, while the latter is not. Theaetetus is different from something, he cannot be just different. So, we need to assume the presence of an implied complement. For that purpose, an indefinite pronoun in the genitive, like τινός, would do.

Let us recapitulate. By following the general matrix in (A), “?” in (A)* becomes “Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος”. In order to make sense of it, we must construe it as “Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος <sc. ἕτερός τινος>”. This form makes the truth-conditions of the statement come to the surface; they correspond to there being something (anything) Theaetetus is different from.

This leads us to the following crucial observation. There must be Forms that have parts, and these parts are also Forms.^[11] More precisely, all Forms that do not correspond to one-place predicates have parts, and these parts are Forms. Let us illustrate this with an example. Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερός τινος is grammatical in Greek. But so is Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος Σωκράτους, so is Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος Πλάτωνος and so forth. As a matter of fact, so is any substitution instance of Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος …, where ‘…’ is substituted for a term in the genitive. However, if one provides this at the end of the sentence, one will also need to alter the phrase “the Form of Difference” on the right-hand side. Participating in the Form of Difference accounts for many things. Theaetetus being different than Socrates is one of them; it is not all of them. What we need for Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος Σωκράτους is Theaetetus’ participation in this part of the Form of Difference that specifically accounts for his being different than Socrates. That is to say, we need him to participate in the Form of Being-Different-than-Socrates. Thereby, on the right-hand side of the equation, we now have “the Form of Being-different-than-Socrates”, instead of “the Form of Difference” full stop. In general, the Form of Difference must have as many parts (Forms) as there are elements of our universe of discourse (more on this in what follows), and Theaetetus must be participating in each and every one of them, except, of course, in the Form of Being-different-than-Theaetetus. In virtue of these participations (and the unique non-participation), Theaetetus is different from all things except Theaetetus. All the above is captured in language by the resulting truth/falsity of the sentences on the left-hand side of (A). The exact opposite happens with participations in the Form of the Same. Theaetetus participates only in this part of the Form of the Same that corresponds to Theaetetus. By so doing, he is not-the-same regarding all things, except Theaetetus alone.^[12]

We now go back to the attempt to throw light on Greek ontology by philological means. The equivalence in (A) suggests that the number of complements to the verb phrase on the left-hand side is a function of the number of predicates corresponding to the Form on the right-hand side. Namely, a Form corresponding to an n-place predicate to the right implies the need for n–1 complements for the verb phrase to the left.^[13] This is natural, for consider it this way: If the predicate corresponding to the Form on the left is one-place, then ‘B’ alone suffices; thus, we need n–1=0 complements to the verb phrase on the right. It follows that only verbs corresponding to Forms that correspond to one-place predicates are complement-less. If so, it is not surprising that Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος is ungrammatical. “Being different” is a two-place predicate; thus, the left-hand side needs to be saturated by τινός. Now, in the case of ἕτερος, linguistic practice complies quite well with the above-mentioned formula. For consider it this way. “Being different” is a two-place predicate, so, since 2–1=1, one needs to assume the presence of a single complement for ἕτερος. Indeed, in Greek, ἔστιν ἕτερος requires one further complement. Without it, it is bad Greek. Not all cases, though, are equally straightforward. Lesley Brown’s example (Brown 1999, p. 460), “teaching” is (arguably) standing for a two-place predicate. One does not teach anything unless one teaches something. However, with respect to teaching, leaving the left-hand side without a complement (either written or implied) is unproblematic. Similarly: Θεαίτητος διδάσκει in Greek is just fine.

One way to account for the above discrepancy is to suspect the presence of an initial/use meaning where the verb was not complete – an initial stage where Θεαίτητος διδάσκει sounded as weird in Greek as Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος. The idea behind this hypothesis is that Θεαίτητος διδάσκει is a kind of shorthand for an older form like, e. g., Θεαίτητος διδάσκει τι. Along the same lines, one would say that, because people are not often caught in situations in life where they feel the need to declare that there is something from which they are different, while, on the other hand, there are occasions, where people need to say that they teach something, the indefinite pronoun at the end of Θεαίτητος διδάσκει τι was gradually expunged by linguistic practice. Nonetheless, although it no longer appears in the written phrase, semantically, it is as present as ever. Therefore, it needs to be implied in ways similar to the ones of Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος <sc. ἕτερός τινος>.

The reason that I do not particularly sympathize with this way of explaining the discrepancy is twofold. To begin with, I do not particularly sympathize with historically sensitive generative approaches regarding how languages evolved over time. Since I would need a book-length treatise to explain why I feel that way,^[14] I will focus on the second reason. This reason has to do with the semantics of the Sophist itself.

IV

I have previously drawn attention to the fact that, in Greek, Θεαίτητός ἐστιν ἕτερος is ungrammatical, while Θεαίτητος διδάσκει is not. I now want to resist the conclusion that the latter is, in reality, as ungrammatical as the former, but that people have become used to it so much as to automatically fill in the missing complement. In other words, I want to resist the point of view according to which, when someone is said to be teaching, we must thereby grasp the proposition that someone is teaching something. For example, I want to resist the conclusion that the semantical value of, e. g., “Jane is teaching” and “Jane is teaching something” is one and the same.

Sentences might be having different meanings and yet imply one another. So, imagine that someone is looking for you, but cannot find you and therefore calls you at home. Your partner answers the phone and says that you cannot be reached at the moment because you are teaching. Does she mean to say that you are teaching something? Hardly. The only thing she means to say is that there is an activity you are engaged in that makes it impossible for you to come to the phone. That is to say that, if anyone ever bothered for an à la Russell logical analysis of what your partner has just said, “teaching” in “He is teaching” would emerge as a saturated term. Now, the committed logician might be tempted to continue the logical analysis as follows: There is an activity you are actually engaged in, and this activity consists in teaching something. Ignoring the fact that this additional analysis is unnatural and potentially misleading, the fact remains that, even according to it, the logical subject of the main part of the statement is not a course, but an activity. The statement does not say that there is a course that you are actually teaching, but that there is an activity in which you are actually engaged. The fact that the sentence can be completed even futher by, e. g., “something”, or “a course”, or “French”, does not make it any less complete as it actually is: “Jane is teaching” is self-standing and complete, even if further completable.

***

This paper consists in a disjunction elimination argument built on the disjunction “complete or incomplete”. According to our previous analysis, but also according to Brown, a context in which a verb is completable does not take away any of its completeness.^[15] Thereby, being completable is a special way of being complete, and, so, it falls under the general disjunction our disjunction elimination argument will be based upon.

Preview: The conclusion of this argument will be that syntax can provide no clue as to whether εἶναι has existential connotations or not. This is because the complete εἶναι need not be existential in meaning, and the incomplete εἶναι may be existential in meaning. Since “complete or incomplete” covers all possibilities, we can conclude that syntax can provide no answer to the exegetical puzzle.

Here is a roadmap for this argument. In part V, I map onto the metaphysics of the Sophist two different possible semantical analyses: (i) the verb in the spoken/written sentence appears alone, but a complement must be tacitly implied, (ii) the verb appears alone, and it does not need any complement. In part VI, I develop an argument coming from one who believes that forms of the verb with no complement suggest the presence of an existential meaning. I do this only to undermine it. My point, in parts VI–VII, will be that, even if she is right about the syntax, the semantical conclusion she draws from it does not follow. In part VIII, I do the inverse. That is to say, I assume an incomplete syntax together with a non-existential meaning for the verb phrase. Again, my aim is to undermine it by showing that these two (i. e. incomplete syntax and non-existential meaning) do not necessarily imply one another.

V

Let us now go back to the text of the Sophist and draw attention to a persistent feature of all Forms that stand for many place predicates. To begin with, it cannot be doubted that Forms corresponding to relations, like, e. g., Difference, are said to be divisible in parts, notably in 258d5–e3. However, the things that are referred to as Forms (γένη, φύσεις, εἴδη, ἰδέαι) might also be parts of Forms. To be precise, Plato expressly considers μὴ ὄν to be (i) a part of the Form of Difference and (ii) a Form (258a7–9, 258c4, 258d6, 260b7–8). On this basis, one might assume that the Sophist contains an implicit distinction^[16] between (i) Forms corresponding to two-place predicates, like “… other than ---”, and Forms corresponding to the parts of these Forms, like “… other than Being”, “… other than Socrates” etc. I will explain why this is important for our purposes by employing (A) once more.

To begin with, notice that, regarding many place predicates, there are, in principle, two ways to provide metaphysical grounding for (A). I will call them the Conglomeration Viewpoint (CV) and the Supervenience Viewpoint (SV). For simplicity, I restrict the analysis to two-place predicates. Of Forms corresponding to two-place predicates CV provides the following account:

According to CV, when one says “A is B” without adding any explicit complement to ‘is-B’, one postulates that there is a part of the Form corresponding to ‘B’ in which A participates. The implicit complement that effectively captures the above is the indefinite pronoun^[17] to which a domain is assigned relevant to the Form corresponding to B.^[18]

More formally, CV can be formulated as follows:

The truth of “A is B <sc. indef(B)>” is grounded on the fact that what is denoted by the term ‘A’ participates in some part of the Form that corresponds to the term ‘B’.

CV

“indef(…)” is the indefinite pronoun. ‘(…)’ is a functor such that it effectively restricts the domain of the indefinite pronoun in order to make it comply with the Form corresponding to B. So, if we substitute “teaching” for B and “Jane” for A, CV gives us:

The truth of “Jane is teaching <sc. indef(teaching)” is grounded on the fact that what is denoted by “Jane” participates in a part of the Form that corresponds to the term “teaching”.

This accounts for Jane teaching a course, any course to be sure, but still: a course.

By the standards of CV, when one predicates a B of this kind, i. e. a B representing a relation, one must assume the implicit presence of “indef(B)” at the end of the written sentence. By the same token, the Form that corresponds to ‘B’ is, strictly speaking, no Form at all. It is but a set having Forms as elements. Consequently, CV can be innocuously rewritten as follows:

The truth of “A is B <sc. indef(B)>” is grounded on the fact that what is denoted by the term ‘A’ participates in an element of the set that corresponds to the term ‘B’.

CV*

The Supervenience Viewpoint, on the other hand, assumes that the Form corresponding to the two-place predicate, though grounded on its parts, which are Forms, supervenes on them and constitutes yet another distinct Form. Forms are no longer just sets. By the standards of the same approach, no complement must be implied at the end of the written sentence. The verb phrase corresponding to the predicate is self-standing and complete.

The truth of “A is B” is grounded on the fact that what is denoted by the term ‘A’ participates in the Form that corresponds to the term ‘B’

SV

As the reader can easily check, both SV and CV imply (A), and SV implies CV. This is natural because SV is stronger than CV. Moreover, with a slight modification, SV can also be made to imply CV*. Substitute in CV* “in an element of the set ‘B’” for “in an element of the set that has the parts of B as elements” and you are done. “Forms” of many place predicates still have sets of other Forms assigned to them. They just stop being identical to these sets.^[19]

This analysis allows us to draw some initial conclusions. If it is the Form of a one-place predicate we are dealing with, the verb phrase corresponding to it is trivially complete. The tricky cases concern many-place predicates. With respect to these, there are two options. Either CV wins, or SV wins. If CV wins, the verb phrase is “complete” only in appearance. In order to properly render the semantics of the sentence, we need to tacitly supply the missing complement at the end. If SV wins, the verb phrase is complete.

***

Now the time has come for us to go back to the challenge of filling out “?” in (A)*. I remind you that this task was said to depend on the question of whether the right-hand side of the equivalence could possibly throw some light on the question concerning the syntax on the left-hand side. More precisely, we wanted to know whether the syntax of the verb on the left (complete/incomplete) has anything to do with whether the predicate corresponding to the Form on the right is one-place or many-place.

We are now in a position to argue why this endeavor is doomed.

Combinatorially, there are three possibilities regarding the sentence on the left and its syntax:

The verb has a complement.

No complement appears in the written sentence, but a complement is implied.

The verb has no complement.

We are going to go through these cases and show that none of them provides an unambiguous answer.

VI

The sentences corresponding to the attribution of being to sitting according to the matrix in (A) are τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν ὄν and τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν ὄν τι. Now, since ὄν is the participle of εἶναι, it is redundant in these renderings. Thereby, the same sentences can be rewritten in the form:

τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν.

τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστί τι.

For all occurrences of εἶναι in sentences where no complement appears, I will first assume that the syntax is complete and that no complement is meant to be there. Then, I will examine the possibility that the indefinite pronoun is meant to be there and must be tacitly added.

***

As far as (1) is concerned, the semantics give, prima facie, the impression of being uncontentious. At first glance, εἶναι, under this syntax, seems to be the εἶναι of existence. This is because, by assuming that the verb has no complement, we tend eo ipso to put the Form corresponding to it in the family of Forms that represent one-place predicates. Now, since Being is said, time and again in the dialogue, to be among the highest genera and, more specifically, among the highest genera absolutely everything participates in (249d3–4, 259a4–7), it would be reasonable for one to think that the function of Being is to restrict the domain of predication to existents. Consider it this way. According to both approaches, the Form of Being keeps anything that does not participate in it outside of the universe of discourse; this is the part of Parmenides’ dictum the Stranger is willing to agree upon (258e4–259a2). Thereby, according to the existential line of approach, the function of the same Form is to keep anything that does not exist out of the universe of discourse. Only things that exist can be talked about. Moreover, according to the same approach, the function of Being allows all existents to be predicated of one another truly but also falsely (this is the part of Parmenides’ dictum the Stranger is not willing to agree upon, 259a4–b6). For example, when one predicates flying of Theaetetus (263a8), one predicates an existent (ὄν) of another existent. It is only that the former does not belong to the existents that are relevant to the latter (ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ, 263b11).^[20]

A closer inspection of the situation, however, reveals these to be over-hasty conclusions. As will become clear, the fact that, under this syntax, one must place Being in the inventory of Forms that stand for one-place predicates does not necessarily assign an existential use/sense to it. Consider it this way. The only thing that, under the same assumptions, is unquestionably affirmed by εἶναι having no complement (either written down or implied) is the following: The Form of Being must be delimiting a specific domain: the universe of discourse. Anything that belongs to that universe can be talked about, either truly or falsely.^[21] Anything else can do neither. So, to whatever can be found in the realm of “being” (technically, whatever participates in Being) one can attribute other things, provided that they belong to the same realm (i. e. other things that participate in Being). Now, since it is neither the case that (i) all beings participate in all beings, nor that (ii) no being participates in no being (252b1–253a2), it follows that, to every being such that there are beings in which it participates and others in which it does not, we can assign a set of beings that can truly be predicated of it: the set of beings in which it participates. For all elements belonging to the complement of this set, predications are false. Just notice that “existence” figures nowhere (not even implicitly) in this paragraph.

If this is so, it means that, on the assumption that the syntax of εἶναι is complete, one can draw the valid conclusion that the predicate corresponding to the Form of Being is one-place. Nonetheless, the conclusion that the specific one-place predicate that Being corresponds to is the predicate of existence does not follow.

***

Nonetheless, one must confess that existence is the first thing that comes to mind if εἶναι is complement-less here. After all, there is just one gap in “… exists”, while there are two in “… is ---”. Moreover, the part of the dialogue that first introduces the Form of Being, 250c3–8, can be thought of as a (allow me the anachronism) meta-ontology dealing with several first-order ontologies that were “in the market” in this period.^[22] We will call these latter the “received ontologies”. What the Stranger invites us to do here is to leave behind the controversies between monists/pluralists (244b6–245e2), materialists/immaterialists (245e3–247d1) and advocates of motion/advocates of rest (248e7–250a2) in order to “let a thousand flowers bloom” by embracing a meta-ontology according to which all these candidates can eventually participate in an all-encompassing Form of Being via the meta-condition of being able to affect or be affected (247d8–e4, 248c4–5). Now, it is difficult, if not impossible, not to read existential parameters into the received ontologies,^[23] but this also holds for the ensuing meta-ontological compromise. Materialists believe that there is (existential sense) nothing other than material things. Immaterialists believe the opposite. The same, mutatis mutandis, is the case regarding the rest of the received ontologies. So, when δύναμις is first introduced as the criterion for the new “anything goes, provided that…” meta-ontology, the existential claims of the received ontologies are transferred to the new meta-ontology. Consider it this way. If the received ontologies make existential claims, the ontology that imposes the δύναμις meta-criterion upon them, and by so doing sifts out all candidates that do not satisfy it, needs to be making an existential claim as well. That is to say that, if ontologies X, Y and Z claim that only x-s, y-s and z-s “are” (existential sense), and the new ontology claims that only those among x-s, y-s and z-s that satisfy a certain meta-criterion are, this last “are” must also be read in the existential sense.

As previously said, we uphold that the assumption of a one-place predicate corresponding to the Form of Being does not necessarily imply the presence of an existential εἶναι. So, the argument in the previous paragraph in favor of the existential εἶναι depends on the specific context in which the Form of Being has been introduced, not on the assumption that εἶναι is complete. The above means that, if we are right in our analysis thus far, and the presence of a one-place predicate corresponding to the Form of Being does not eo ipso imply an existential εἶναι, there must be suitable interpretations of the Form of Being that make it correspond to a one-place predicate but not to the εἶναι of existence.

Before going into the details of what this interpretation is, let me call attention to an arguably weak point of the existential construal. What is unquestionably the case, in both the existential and the predicative interpretations, is that what is left outside of the domain of being, i. e. what does not participate in the Form of Being, is utterly unspeakable and unthinkable. Now, centaurs, fairies, golems and the like do not exist, but one can hardly claim that there is nothing that can be said about them. And yet, according to the existential interpretation of the Form of Being, one cannot even say that they do not exist. The Form of Being delimits the universe of discourse in such a radical manner that “whatever” lies outside cannot even be said not to exist; it is ὂν μηδαμῶς (237b7–8, 240e2–5, 263c9–11). For, to explain the fact that centaurs do not exist, one would need to formulate the claim that they do not participate in the Form of Being. But, since the Form of Being determines the universe of discourse, predications must always be of elements that participate in the Form of Being, and so one cannot formulate claims of non-existence on the existential construal of the Form of Being. The above is not an inconsistent point of view. After all, Frege was seriously inviting people to remove all terms with no denotation from their language.^[24] However, since the Sophist is a dialogue on false statements and since, e. g., “Centaurs are dogs” is both a statement and a false one, the fact that this interpretation of the Form of Being renders this statement ungrammatical does not sound entirely right.

Let us summarize. The Form of Being is unquestionably a kind of standard delimiting the universe of discourse. Besides, what is also unquestionable is that “x is ὄν” or “x ἔστιν” can be made materially equivalent to “x participates in the Form of Being”. What is controversial is the exact range of this universe of discourse. In the previous paragraphs, we considered the possibility that it is identical to the class of existents. This suggests an εἶναι that is both complement-less and existential. For this kind of εἶναι we have found some considerable, or so we think, contextual support in the dialogue. On the other hand, there are arguments against this interpretation, for it makes nonsensical any λόγος that is not made entirely of terms with denotation. So, if one finds this to be a consequence one cannot cope with, one must abandon the existential εἶναι in favor of an εἶναι with no existential import.

In what follows, I am going to present a counterexample to what the average grammarian has been trained to believe. Namely, I will put forward an interpretation according to which (i) a one-place predicate corresponds to the Form of Being, and (ii) the syntax of εἶναι is complete, but (iii) εἶναι is not existential.

VII

There is just one gap in “… belongs to the universe of discourse”. Thus, “belonging to the universe of discourse” is a one-place predicate. Now, if participation in the Form of Being stands for this predicate, the syntax of the verb corresponding to it must be without a complement. On the other hand, there is nothing in the idea of “belonging to the universe of the discourse” that implies existence. The burden of proof regarding co-implication between “belonging to the universe of discourse” and “existing” lies with the proponent of the existential reading, not the other way around. Attempts to argue in favor of this co-implication, as the ones in part VI, were based on the context;^[25] they were not a priori.

At this point, let us summarize once more: Co-implication between universe of discourse and existence can provide no semantical foundation for statements with empty terms. This is arguably a shortcoming. Contextually, the situation looks even worse. Consider the fact that the programmatic goal in the Sophist, as expressed as soon as 241a3–c9, is to establish the possibility of false λόγος. Now, on the co-implication assumption, this possibility has been established indeed, but only within the restricted realm of existents.

Another candidate for the “universe of discourse” fares much better regarding both non-existents and (utter) ineffability.

Let us begin by taking “ineffability” seriously here. The motivation behind this detour is not only some abstract intellectual curiosity but also the way Plato repeatedly emphasizes how ineffable this non-being truly is.^[26] Within the same frame of mind, consider the possibility that the apparatus connecting things to Forms is just a semantical monitor keeping track of true predications. No existential connotations thus far. There are none, unless we want to put some in there ourselves, and, in this part, we have no intention of doing so. What about the Form of Being in this setting? Obviously, this Form will be a meta-Form keeping track of whether there is something in general that can be truly predicated of the subject; i. e. it will not keep track of the fact that this specific thing or the other can be truly predicated of the subject, but of the fact that some thing can be truly predicated of the subject. Let us illustrate this model with an example. “Animal” can truly be predicated of dogs. Therefore, there is something that can truly be predicated of dogs. Therefore, dogs participate in the Form of Being.

The crucial question here is to ask ourselves about the theoretical possibility of a thing of which nothing can be truly predicated. Assume that there is something of which nothing can be truly predicated. By assuming that much, we have predicated something of it. Therefore, there can be no such thing. In this setting, this “utterly ineffable” Parmenidean non-being, becomes utterly ineffable indeed. One can no longer produce a witness for things falling outside of the universe of discourse.^[27]

The Form of Being no longer corresponds to existence, but still, for each and every subject, there are Forms in which it participates and others in which it does not. Here too, just as in the existential interpretation, predicating of the subject the predicates corresponding to the Forms it does not participate in amounts to predicating of it the non-being with respect to it (πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἐκάστου μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον, 258e1–2).^[28]

The mechanics behind the solution to the paradox are structurally the same in both approaches. Its common modus operandi is as follows: To each and every subject assign the class of predicates that are true about it. Let the complement of this class be the class of predicates that are false about it. The members of the latter class are non-beings with respect to it. The subject “is not” (predicative sense) any of these.

The key to the solution in both approaches (existential and predicative) is that (i) it is not the case that everything participates in everything and also that (ii) for every thing, there are things in which it participates and others in which it does not.

Another feature that reveals how the two approaches, antagonistic as they may be, are not antagonistic regarding the way they tackle the problem concerns the stages in which the community of the highest genera is gradually built in the dialogue. At first, we have a number of contenders for the High Seat of “Being” (244a4–247d7). Then, we have the “meta-compromise” emanating from the definition of being as the capability to act or be acted upon (247e3–4). This is a second-order concept ranging over the first-order concepts of the first attempts. It goes as follows: It is of no importance whether or not something moves, is at rest, etc.; what matters is whether it can act or be acted upon. Finally, “being” gets the status of a closure concept, as soon as its status of a Form everything participates in is affirmed (259a4–6).

Notice how this itinerary can be narrated both ways.

Existential approach: (1) Only things that move exist; only things that are at rest exist; etc. (2) Any of the above exists, provided that the δύναμις condition is met. (3) Everything exists since everything participates in the Form of Being. (The rest is the Parmenidean non-being.)

Predicative approach: (1) “Motion” is true about everything; “rest” is true about everything; etc. (2) All these things might be true about things, provided that the δύναμις condition is met. (3) For everything, there is something that is true about it, since everything participates in the Form of Being. (The rest is the Parmenidean non-being.)

The point where they diverge is different:

Existential approach: The Form of Being narrows down subject and predicate terms to terms that are not empty. True predication of x to y and false predication of x to y depend on y participating in the Form corresponding to the predicate x, and on y not participating in the Form corresponding to the predicate x, respectively.

Predicative approach: True predication of x about y and false predication of x about y depends on y participating in the Form corresponding to the predicate x, and on y not participating in the Form corresponding to the predicate x, respectively. That y participates in the Form of Being amounts to there being at least one Form y participates in.

Notice that the definition of true and false predication is structurally the same in both narratives. The solution to the problem of false λόγος is the same in both. It does not hang on Being representing existence or not representing it.

As a consequence, both narratives can host a semantical account of x participating in the Form of Being such that the corresponding syntax of εἶναι becomes complement-less. “x ἐστιν” needs no complement in either of them, since, in both of them, it means: x belongs to the universe of discourse.

One could object, at this point, that “x ἐστιν” in the predicative approach comes out complete because it is built upon a ground layer of εἶναι that is predicative and not complete. “x ἐστιν” abbreviates: “there is something that can be truly predicated of x.” This might be so, but what we are trying to answer here is the question of whether it is possible for the syntax of εἶναι to be complete, and, at the same time, the existential interpretation not being the correct one. “… belonging to the universe of discourse” is a one-place open expression no matter how one sees it. So, the verb must be complete in either case.

We now sum up with respect to (1) of part VI.

In both narratives, τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν (complete) can be the appropriate sentence capturing the fact that sitting participates in the Form of Being. If we follow the existential interpretation, it is obvious why this is so. Along the lines of the predicative interpretation, this is less straightforward. However, in both narratives, “x participates in the Form of Being” can be made to mean: “x belongs to the universe of discourse”. Thereby, whether or not it is the existential or the predicative interpretation that gets the upper hand cannot be settled on a supposed tentative hypothesis that ἐστιν in τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν needs no complement.

Let us now move to (2) of part VI.

τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστι τι.

Our initial dilemma was whether the statement corresponding to sitting participating in the Form of Being can have a syntax without a complement or not. If complements must appear in the written/spoken sentence, we should, given the massive evidence of forms of εἶναι appearing without any complement in the dialogue, conclude that it can. However, the fact that, in Greek, complements are allowed not to appear in the written sentence obliges us not to decide on the matter, unless we have subjected all solitary occurrences of εἶναι to the following test procedure. After assuming that, in each and every occasion where forms of εἶναι appear with no complement, an implied complement has to be understood and supplied,^[29] we will examine two things. First, we will test whether there are, in principle, syntaxes of this nature that can account for the fact that the subject participates in the Form of Being. Second, we will test whether these syntaxes could be underpinning rather than undermining the existential interpretation.

The answer to the first question is easy. In Greek, just like in English, French, German, etc., there are “indefinite” pronouns. These pronouns do not refer to this or that definite object, but to any object that belongs to a domain of objects contextually defined.

So, let us supply the indefinite pronoun τι in, e. g., (2): τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν [sc. τι]. Now, a domain must be assigned to it (cf. the functor ‘(…)’ in the formulas in part V). The context supplies a domain that can satisfy the equivalence:

“τὸ καθῆσθαί ἐστιν [sc. τι]” is true, if and only if what is denoted by the term ‘καθῆσθαι’ participates in the Form of Being.

Here, it is the Form of Being that determines the domain of the indefinite pronoun. This is the maximal domain since the Form of Being in the Sophist is under a closure principle: everything participates in it. But can we say anything about it other than that it is maximal?

Two antagonistic schools of thought suggest two different maximal domains: (i) the universe of things that exist (ii) the universe of things of which at least one thing can be truly predicated. Both schools agree that this domain is the universe of discourse.

To the first question, we have answered. There are incomplete syntaxes that can account for sitting participating in the Form of Being.

As it happens, by providing an answer to the first question, we have answered the second question too. One of these syntaxes is underpinning the existential semantics. Just assume the point of view of the existential narrative above and assign the domain of existents to τι.

The same syntax can also be considered as underpinning the predicative semantics. Just assume the point of view of the predicative narrative above and assign to τι the domain of things of which at least one thing can be truly predicated.^[30]

***

At this point, we have come full circle. Regarding (1), we have reached the conclusion that both dialectical opponents can, in principle, feel comfortable with a complement-less syntax. Regarding (2), we have also reached the conclusion that both opponents can, in principle, feel comfortable with a non complement-less syntax.

Syntax is not decisive with respect to the question regarding the notion of existence in the Sophist.^[31]

I can hear an objection approaching: “This was far too easy and uneventful.” I agree, but my aim, in this paper, was not to bring forward the final answer to the dilemma “existence vs. predication” in the Sophist. It was to point out the fact that syntax cannot be of any avail in our struggle to see whether existence plays any role in the Sophist.

VIII

Since the monumental The verb “be” in Ancient Greek, people have put a lot of emphasis and invested too much labor in all kinds of historico-philological analyses in order to resolve philosophical questions regarding εἶναι in the Sophist and in Greek Philosophy in general. Useful as these analyses might be, they cannot provide us with conclusive answers to the specific philosophical questions under scrutiny, and perhaps it is time for us to abandon the overwhelming optimism motivating the pioneers behind these attempts.

We have yet another reason for doing so. Philology is often called for in the guise of the neutral, objective and unbiased umpire that will decide an otherwise ideological matter. On this occasion, it has been called for in order to decide whether there are existential connotations in Greek philosophical texts. The idea/hope is that the sober science of philology will reason with the “fanatics” on either side of the debate. Now, one of the few definite gains of our post-modernity is the lesson that there are no such things as objective sites, groups, platforms, venues, methods, sciences, etc. I say this in order to highlight a lurking danger. Scholars who invite the “sober” and “objective” discipline of philology to arbitrate over the existential versus predicative debate might be operating, without even realizing it, under their own prejudices. If so, they might be under the sincere impression that they have settled the philosophical matter by some objective means, while, in reality, they were misleading themselves and others all along, by projecting their own prejudices onto these “objective” means.^[32]