Abstract
The pragmatics underlying Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning provide a powerful framework for investigating the commitments arguers undertake. Unfortunately, the complexity of Grice’s analysis has frustrated appropriate reliance on this important facet of his work. By explicating Cicero’s use of apostrophe in his famous “First Catilinarian” this essay attempts to show that a full complex of reflexive gricean speaker intentions in essentially to seriously saying and meaning something.
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Notes
Grice offers an analysis of “utterance-meaning,” an artificial term embracing verbal utterances, gestures and other symbolic means of expression. I focus on the primary communicative act of seriously saying and meaning something and rely on the ordinary sense of “saying” as it is employed in indirect speech reports of the form “S said that p”. If Grice’s analysis of the meaning utterances have on the specific occasion of their use has any purchase in the world, it must at least capture what is essential to the communicative act of seriously saying that p.
Of course, addressees do not need to reason out a speaker’s commitment to truthfulness in each and every instance of serious communication. Persons acquire a repertoire of communicative acts, including the act of seriously saying things, and they can rely on that inherited practical knowledge without puzzling out the internal calculation of each communicative act. They also make highly nuanced and deliberate choices based on their grasp of the pragmatics of communication. The problem for students of communication and of argumentation is to explicate the practical rationales and corresponding norms persons habitually and often unreflectively rely on, as well as their situation-based strategic calculations.
The idea that the configuration of speaker-intentions informing Stampe’s account is unrealistically complex has been encouraged by arguments which claim that the counterexamples that motivate a second level of reflexive speaker-intentions (I 3 above) seem to open the possibility of an implausible regress in the analysis as parallel counterexamples might be adduced to require supplementing the analysis with third, fourth, fifth, and so on levels of reflexive speaker-intention (Avramides 1989, pp. 56–58; Grice 1969, pp. 154–161; Schiffer 1972, pp. 18–30; Sperber and Wilson 1986, pp. 30–31; Strawson 1964, p. 454). The counterexamples motivating a second level of reflexive speaker-intentions seem at first glance to be exotic, but they involve a common and familiar inferential structure: (i) communicator (C) produces stimulus (s) intending 1 that associate (A) produce some response (r) [e.g., C behaves in a manner repellent to A intending that A depart]; (ii) C intends2 that A recognize C’s primary intention to get A to leave; and (iii) S intends that A’s recognition of C’s intention1 to disgust A serve as a reason to leave; however (iv) S also does not want A to recognize that S intends2 that A recognize S’s primary intention to motivate A’s departure [S does not want to flagrantly offend A] (Grice 1969, pp. 154–156; Stampe 1967, p. 27; Strawson 1964, pp. 446–447). Understandably scholars have not wanted to grant that in this type of case C does something equivalent to saying and meaning that A should depart, though C may have managed to convey that idea to A. Still, this case does satisfy the conditions set out in Grice’s initial analysis of utterance-meaning, an analysis which provides only a first level of reflexive speaker-intentions. To block this type of counterexample, Strawson introduces a second level of reflexive speaker-intentions (I 3) into the analysis, but as Strawson, himself, recognizes this move seems to leave the analysis open to still further counterexamples, e.g., C might design her communicative strategy so as to flagrantly offend A by intending that A recognize that A is intended2 to recognize C’s primary intention and is to take the very flagrant nature of the offense as reason to leave. At the same time, C may intend that A think C intends A to think (falsely) that C intends A to leave because C’s act is disgusting. Again one might not be inclined to grant that C has done something equivalent to saying A should leave, but these conditions satisfy the revised analysis provided by Strawson. Schiffer argues that strategies having this structure can be multiplied to the limits of human creativity (1972, pp. 22–23). If that is so, then the analysis as revised by Strawson seems open to an implausible regress of reflexive speaker- intentions, though some doubt whether this is ultimately problematic (Avramides 1989, p. 66; Grice 1969, pp. 157–159, 1989, pp. 299–303; Strawson 1964, p. 454). A good deal of ink has been devoted to discussion of this problem. A major strength of Stampe’s account of the pragmatics underlying Grice’s analysis is that it offers to eliminate this potential for a regress of reflexive speaker-intentions by specifying the structure of the reason S intends4 A to have for responding as S primarily intends. In the counterexamples thought to motivate a regress in the analysis, the apparent supposition that, e.g., C openly intends to offend A serves as an indicator (e.g., of C’s contempt for A) designed to directly elicit the response C is primarily seeking. Stampe’s account precludes a strategy of this nature by specifying that the reason S intends A to have is in the nature of what I have described as a special presumption, e.g., A is to believe that p on the supposition that S would not openly risk criticism for speaking falsely were it not the case that S is articulating a belief the truth of which S has made a responsible effort to ascertain (Kauffeld 2001, pp. 149–162, 2003, pp. 142–144; Stampe 1967, p. 26). In the regress threatening counterexamples, C does not have an intention of this nature. Of course, it remains to be seen just how an analytical condition requiring this rationale for A’s response should be formulated, but that is a matter for much larger and longer discussion.
The central idea in Stampe’s account of the pragmatic efficacy of saying and meaning something is not new or radically unique; it has antecedents running back at least to Charles Sander Peirce’s (1931–1936) claim that the capacity of assertions to elicit belief fundamentally depends upon the responsibility a speaker undertakes for the truth of her assertions (Peirce 1931–1936, 5.547; cited in Stampe 1967, p. 25; also see: Vlach 1981, pp. 382 and 386–387). Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance: Communication and cognition (1986) provides an influential version of this view, which is in some respects similar to the position I am defending. Both accounts take Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning as a starting point for inquiry. Unlike many of Grice’s critics, Sperber and Wilson accept the arguments advanced by Strawson and others for the conceptual necessity of a second-level reflexive speaker-intention, i.e., they agree that in our ordinary conception of at least one significant form of human communication speakers not only must deliberately intend2 that their primary communicative intention1 be recognized, but must also openly intend3 that their secondary intention be recognized by their addressee(s) (1986, pp. 30–31). They also hold that pragmatically serious overt efforts to communicate work by providing the addressee with a guarantee regarding the speaker’s communicative effort; they refer to this guarantee as “a guarantee of relevance” and speak of it as a “presumption of relevance” (1986, pp. 50–51, 154–156, 179). This idea that what a speaker makes apparent about her “communicative intentions” (in Sperber and Wilson’s terms what she makes manifest about her intentions) serves to provides a “guarantee” on the order of a presumption is in some respects similar to Stampe’s claim that by deliberately and openly manifesting responsibility for her communicative effort and, thus, making herself vulnerable to criticism and resentment should she fail to live up to her self-imposed obligations, the speaker generates reason for her addressee to respond as the speaker primarily intends. But where Stampe’s account of the pragmatics underlying Strawson’s elaboration of Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning fits our commonsense understanding of the ordinary practice of generating presumptions in communicative acts (Kauffeld 2001), Sperber and Wilson provide a highly theoretical and speculative discussion which does not specify in satisfactory detail how their “presumption of relevance” can be engaged. The difference between these views starts with Sperber and Wilson’s acceptance of the claim that importing a second-level reflexive speaker-intention into Grice’s analysis opens the door to a regress of reflexive speaker-intentions (1986, pp. 30–31, see footnote 3 above for a brief discussion of the alleged regress potential of Gricean reflexive speaker-intentions). They welcome this “concession” as reason to (prematurely, I suggest) reject the distinction Grice attempts to clarify between utterance occasion meaning (in the sense which includes a speaker’s seriously saying and meaning something in producing a utterance) and “meaning” in the sense of an inference based on natural signs (1986, pp. 53–54). The cases pointing to a regress in Grice’s analysis show, they maintain, that these ordinary and intuitively distinct senses of “meaning” do not correspond to two distinct well defined domains; rather they claim that our ordinary conception of saying and meaning something masks a poorly defined continuum, vaguely demarcated in our ordinary conception of human communication (1986, p. 53). In order to provide a “psychologically” and “theoretically” satisfying account, they elaborate a theory of communication as relevance-oriented. At this point their theoretically motivated research program diverges sharply from the scholarly orientation of the present paper. Unlike Sperber and Wilson, the present essays remains committed to a study of utterance occasion speaker-meaning which takes explication of our ordinary conceptions and practices as its presumptive starting point. If, as I have argued in the preceding footnote and elsewhere, Stampe’s account provides a basis for closing the alleged vulnerability of Grice’s analysis to a regress of reflexive speaker-intentions, then Sperber and Wilson’s claim that our ordinary conception of saying and meaning something does not mark off a well defined domain is not warranted, and from a broadly gricean perspective, it would seem premature and wrong-headed to try to develop of a theory of communication which does not sharply distinguish between cases in which S’s merely intends2 that A recognize her primary speaker-intention and cases in which S deliberately and openly gives A to believe that she is trying by means of her utterance to secure a certain response from A on the presumptive basis of the risk of criticism she runs. Moreover, it seems doubtful that “relevance theory,” as articulated in Sperber and Wilson’s seminal essay, can sustain the claim that “mutually manifest intentions” can generate by implicated inference a “guarantee” of relevance without recognizing a sharp break between these types of cases. In situations where C merely intends that her stimulus produce a certain response on the basis of a reason generated by A’s recognition of her primary intention, whatever reason C generates for the desired response will not, on that basis, be in the nature of a guarantee. Suppose C succeeds in securing A’s recognition of her primary communicative intention (in Sperber and Wilson terms, her primary communicative intention is mutually manifest to speaker and addressee), on the principle that persons are responsible for their intentional acts, she would have gotten A to recognize her responsibility for her interactional efforts. However, this recognition of C’s responsibility does not provide a guarantee that C is acting responsibly. As Stampe points out, the fact that you recognize my responsibility for my action does not thereupon provide you with reason to suppose that I am acting responsibly (1967, p. 26). However, where S deliberately and openly gives A to believe that she is trying get A to r that p, she puts herself in position in which she cannot deny responsibility for her communicative effort and so, in effect, offers a guarantee of the truthfulness and, in more complex illocutionary acts, of the relevance of her communicative effort. Indeed, if we accept Sperber and Wilson’s claim that a presumptive guarantee of relevance is generated when a communicator engages the attention of an auditor (1986, pp. 154–159, 179), then Cicero would have engaged the same caliber of probative responsibilities when he manifestly intended the Senate to overhear and make inferences on the basis of the discourse he addressed to Catiline as the caliber of the probative responsibilities he engaged when he directly addressed the Senate. Were that the case, Cicero would, on this occasion, have charged Catiline with being an enemy of the state (a hostis), a charge he could not at that time afford to bring before the Senate. All of this is not to deny that Sperber and Wilson’s emphasis on the variety of strategies persons use to convey ideas to one another is a substantial contribution to our understanding of human communication.
It may seem that my focus on Cicero’s use of apostrophe in his “First Catilinarin” unduly privileges this figure at the expense of the rich stylistic texture of that address and its manifold uses of figures of thought. Granted, my focus on Cicero’s use of apostrophe is theoretically motivated by an overall interest in the pragmatics of saying and meaning something. But that interest does not impose an interpretation which is not supported by the text of Cicero’s oration as it has come down to us. Moreover, my reading (i) is consistent with Cicero’s and Rome’s oratorical practice and teachings, and (ii) is compatible with the stylistic amplitude of Cicero’s oration. My essays attempts to exhibit the ways in which apostrophe enabled Cicero to make apparent to the Senate an argument which Cicero could not openly state and for which he could not overtly take responsibility. In antiquity, apostrophe was classified as a figure of thought. Cicero includes among the uses of figures of thought a potential for “suggestion that causes more to be understood than one actually says” (1942, p. III. liii. 202; also quoted by Quintilian, p. IX. i. 28). Quintilian reports that a “commonest occurrence” of figures of thought in Roman oratory was to convey “a hidden meaning which is left to the hearer to discover” (1920, pp. IX. ii. 65–66). Quintilian recommends this practice “if it is unsafe to speak openly.”—a fair description of the overriding constraint Cicero faced in presenting his case against Catiline to the Senate on this occasion. Roman rhetorical arts made apostrophe available to Cicero as a means for dealing with the immediate exigence of Catiline’s presence and Cicero’s lack of hard evidence. In addition, apostrophe, as classically understood, would have been a salient stylistic form for Cicero. Cicero needed to inspire intense anger in Catiline and powerful indignation among the Senators. Quintilian, whose discussion of the figures of speech is strongly indebted to Cicero’s teaching and practice, observes that apostrophe is “wonderfully stirring” and especially useful for “attacking our adversary” (1920, p. IX. ii. 38). The Rhetorica ad Herennium, a standard classical text familiar to Cicero from his youth, holds that apostrophe is especially well suited to the expression and evocation of indignation (1954, pp. IV. xv. 21–22). Cicero’s reflections on the stylistic demands imposed on the orator confronting a crisis of state on the magnitude Cicero saw in Catiline’s conspiracy call for a grand style, i.e., a style which vigorously moves auditors through powerful and fully amplified figuration of expression (1939, pp. xxviii. 97 ff.). Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that the potent figure of apostrophe would have immediate priority in Cicero’s stylistic repertoire on the auspicious occasion of his confrontation with Catiline. Consistent with his views regarding the elevated style Cicero richly amplified his apostrophies so as to intensify their potential for affective response from Catiline and the Senate, respectively. A brief review of some of the figures Cicero employed illustrates this point. Quintilian’s inventory of figures of thought provides useful guidance. Cicero employed the figure Quintilian calls communication when he purported to consult, on the one hand, with Catiline (Cicero 1977a, b, pp. I. 1–9; Quintilian 1920, pp. IX. ii. 20–24) and, on the other, with the Senate (Cicero 1977a, b, pp. 1–9 and 9–10, 27–33); in addressing Catiline, Cicero frequently employed suspension, to conspicuously hold Catiline (and the Senate) in suspense for a considerable period of time and, then, added a concluding episode even worse than the initial expectations (Cicero 1977a, b, pp. I. 6–21; Quintilian, pp. IX. ii. 22–23); Cicero strategically employed concession, leaving to Catiline the decision as to whether to leave the City and, ultimately, to the Senate to decide Catiline’s fate once the full evidence of his conspiracy has been made apparent by his subsequent conduct (Cicero 1977a, b, pp. I. 22–27 and 30–33; Quintilian, p. IX. ii. 25); in a striking move Cicero employed impersonation to represent himself as the voice of the City, expelling Catiline from her presence (Cicero 1977a, b, pp. I, 17–19; Quintilian 1920, p. IX. ii. 30); and throughout the narratives addressed to Catiline and to the Senate, Cicero’s use of apostrophe enabled him to heightened their potential emotional responses by use of ocular demonstration in which he described how he came to know the nature and extent of Catiline’s conspiracy (Cicero 1977a, b, pp. I. 6–9; Quintilian, p. IX. ii. 40). These references provide indications of the ways in which Cicero amplified the apostrophes in his “First Oration against Catiline.” However, the conformity to standard Roman teachings and practice, indicated by this brief overview of Cicero’s use of figures of speech to arouse his audiences, should not be taken to suggest that Cicero’s strategy as mature artist was restricted by pedagogically inspired correlations between figures of thought and emotional responses. Apostrophe in classical rhetoric art was seen as especially useful in arousing indignation, but this utility was not seen as an identifying or inherent feature of that figure or a practical limitation on its use. On the contrary, Cicero observes that the various figures of thought have many uses (1942, p. III. lv. 212). Quintilian provides numerous guides to the use of figures of thought to arouse emotional responses, but he explicitly declines to classify figures of thought on this basis, because figures of thought do not correlate one-to-one with potential affective responses and are not limited in their utility to eliciting emotional responses (pp. IX. i. 23–25). For both Cicero and Quintialin, figures of thought are identified by their structure; a student should recognize that certain figures are particularly useful in eliciting certain audience responses, but the mature practicing rhetorical artist recognizes that each has a rich variety of potential uses. The basic guide governing their use, in Cicero’s view, is appropriateness (1942, pp. III. liv. 210–211). Propriety in the situation which elicited Cicero’s “First Catilinarian” would prompt recourse to the resources of apostrophe. A careful reading of that oration shows that much of stylistic development of speech consists in figures which amplified and exploited the apostrophes which fundamentally organize the argument, disposition, and style of the address.
In addition to the three lines of argument discussed above, Cicero also developed a fourth line calculated to reinforce the first line which called for Catiline to leave the city. This fourth line was not openly developed but was clearly apparent. This dimension of Cicero’s address was calculated to drive Catiline to leave by humiliating him before the Senate—demonstrating to Catiline that he could no longer maintain his dignity before that august body in the face of Cicero’s invective. Cicero’s purpose here was certainly apparent but was not openly avowed. While this line of argument was important to Cicero’s success, we will devote little attention to it in this essay.
The editor of Cicero: Orations explains the vagueness and liabilities of a Roman decree of national emergency, called a senatus consultum ultimum, as follows: “The legal and political conflict that surrounded the use of this decree resulted from the vagueness of the exhortation to the magistrates, a vagueness which seriously undermined its value. The wording of the decree did not indicate to what extent there was implicit encouragement to take non-legal measures, nor to what lengths a magistrate could go in the contravention of the law. The result was that opponents of action taken with the backing of the decree could indict individual magistrates for violating civil rights, while supporters pleaded interests of the state and the authority of the Senate” (Cicero 1977a, pp. 570–571).
Ann Vasaly, in a footnote to a discussion primarily devoted to Cicero’s subtle choice and use of the site for In Catilinam One, insightfully describes the strategy Cicero used to address his argument to Catiline, using that address to provide the Senate implicitly with evidence for Catiline’s guilt. She observes, “The dual strategy is masterfully carried through and successfully avoids the appearance of self-contradiction” (1993, p. 49). An appreciation of Cicero’s use of apostrophe on that occasion enables us to better understand how he executed this dual strategy and avoided self-contradiction.
A reflection of where the bulk of the Cicero’s reason and evidence is presented in this oration can be seen in the proportion of the text explicitly addressed to each of Cicero’s two audiences: 81% of the text is openly addressed to Catiline as compared to 19% addressed to the Senate. The bulk of the address to the Senate (73%) comes at the conclusion of the oration as Cicero summarizes his self-defense, drawing on argumentation introduced in his address to Catiline.
Cicero’s argument in “Catiline One” seems to have achieved certain objectives: Catiline did subsequently leave the city and join his forces in Etruria providing some confirmation for Cicero’s interpretation of events. Remarkable mismanagement by Catiline’s co-conspirators in Rome, whose plotting and misadventures are the stuff of media melodramas, eventually provided Cicero with hard evidence bearing out the proto-argument articulated in “Catiline One.” Utilizing this evidence in the argumentative frame established in “Catiline One” (and in subsequent addresses), Cicero was able to secure from the Senate the explicit authority to quell Catiline’s conspiracy, but not without cost. I commend longer story to my reader’s attention.
It might be objected that the record we have of what Cicero said on this occasion comes to us from his own publication of his “Consular Speeches” and that this is not a reliable record of his “real life” performances. For some research purposes, this would be an important objection, as Cicero did, no doubt, “edit” his recalled version of this oration to his advantage, and the text of his discourse which comes down to us should be regarded with appropriate caution. However, there are good reasons why this concern is little more that quibble as regards my argument. First, we have available us other contemporary accounts of Cicero’s conduct in the crisis created by Catiline, and they do not contradict his report of what he said in “Catiline One” (see: Sallust 1921, p. XXXI). Second, there seems to be little reason to believe that the remarkable and ingenious argumentative strategy which I attribute to Cicero was beyond his capacities as an orator. Thirdly, even if we distrust the published version of what he said on that occasion, still his “edited” version has historically stood for centuries as a plausible and intelligible record of what a person of sufficient rhetorical talent might say on such an occasion. This fact powerfully supports the claim that speakers do intelligibly employ strategies in which they make apparent to addressees arguments they might well want not to openly avow.
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Kauffeld, F.J. Grice’s Analysis of Utterance-Meaning and Cicero’s Catilinarian Apostrophe. Argumentation 23, 239–257 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9123-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-008-9123-x