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References
Thomas Hobbes,Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968 [orig. 1651]), chap. 15, p. 203.
Jean Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
David Gauthier,Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 161–62.
Conrad Johnson,Moral Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
When the other party has violated an agreement, or you have reasonable suspicion that she will (that has arisen since the agreement was made), Hobbes holds that the agreement is voided. See Gregory Kavka,Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, pp. 349–52. Hobbes's disagreement with the Foole concerns the rationality of performance when the other party has performed, or can reasonably be expected to perform her part of the bargain (e.g., due to the threat of civil sanctions for non-compliance).
Hobbes,Leviathan, chap. 15, p. 203.
Hobbes,Leviathan, chap. 15, p. 204.
Hobbes,Leviathan, chap. 15, p. 205.
For elaboration, see Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. chap 9; and Gregory Kavka, “Right Reason and Natural Law in Hobbes's Ethics”,The Monist 66 (1983): 120–33.
Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 344–49; and “Right Reason”: 123–25.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 56. Emphasis in the original.
See Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, pp. 19–24. Cf. Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 35–80.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, pp. 16–17, 71.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 93.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 16.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 71.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 93.
For elaboration of this view, see Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, p. 142.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 221.
Hampton,Hobbes and the Social Contract, p. 257.
These central themes of Hobbes are usefully emphasized in S.A. Lloyd,Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). There are conditions under which Hobbes allows for justified revolution, but these conditions are much narrower than those suggested by Hampton. For discussion of them, see Gregory Kavka, “Some Neglected Liberal Aspects of Hobbes's Philosophy,”Hobbes Studies 1 (1988): 89–108, esp. 102–5.
Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 225–35.
David Gauthier, “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist,”Journal of Philosophy 76 (1989): 554.
Gauthier, “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist”: 554–55.
Gauthier, “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist”: 548.
David Gauthier, “Three Against Justice,”Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 17.
Gauthier,Morals by Agreement, p. 162; and “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist”: 548.
Gauthier,Morals by Agreement, p. 167.
David Gauthier, “Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality,”Ethics 94 (1984): 474–95. In a recent paper (“Assure and Threaten”Ethics, forthcoming), Gauthier revises his view on rational threat-fulfillment. I question whether he can consistently do so, while retaining his view on rational agreement keeping, in Gregory Kavka, “Rationality Triumphant: Gauthier's Moral Theory,”Dialogue 32 (1993): 379–89.
Gauthier,Morals by Agreement, pp. 170–82.
It is also rational to fulfill a failed (but initially expected-utility maximizing) threat even if it is costly to yourself to do so. See Gauthier,Morals by Agreement, p. 187; and “Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality.”
Gauthier,Morals by Agreement, 163–64; and “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist,” p. 555.
Gauthier, “Thomas Hobbes: Moral Theorist”: 556–57; andMorals by Agreement, pp. 162–63.
Hobbes,Leviathan, p. 270.
Hobbes,Leviathan, p. 718–19.
Hobbes,Leviathan, p. 210.
See Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 139–40, 450–51. Gauthier is aware of this non-Hobbesian implication of his view, but thinks that his account of constrained maximization shows that a sovereign power — or external enforcement mechanism — is not at all necessary to enable rational agents to achieve cooperation. See Gauthier,Morals by Agreement, pp. 163–64.
Gauthier, “Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality.”
Gauthier, “Assure and Threaten.”
For my reasons, see Kavka, “Rationality Triumphant.”
Gregory Kavka, “The Toxin Puzzle,”Analysis 43 (January 1983): 33–36.
This conclusion is even clearer in a version of the Toxin Puzzle in which the toxin is known to be deadly. See Kavka, “Rationality Triumphant”: 352.
See, e.g., Stephen Darwall, “Rational Agent, Rational Act,”Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 33–57.
Allen Buchanan, “Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice,”Philsophy & Public Affairs 19 (1990): 239.
The use of probability concepts here does not imply that expected utility reasoning is appropriate. See Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 142–44, for discussion of a principle of choice that takes account of probability information, yet embodies a “play it safe” approach.
In his reply to the Foole, Hobbes emphasizes the threat of withholding a specific form of cooperation — membership in the commonwealth. That loss of the commonwealth, with its external enforcement mechanism, is the ultimate threat yielded in Hobbes's reply clearly indicates that he does not think the uncoordinated threat of withdrawal of cooperation by individuals is a sufficiently effective mechanism to render compliance rational. For discussion of related issues, see my “Why Morally Perfect People Would Need Government,”Social Philosophy & Policy 12 (1995), forthcoming.
See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds.,Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Shelley Taylor,Positive Illusions (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
This seems to be the position of the “sensible knave” described in David Hume,An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, IX, in Alasdair MacIntyre, ed.,Hume's Ethical Writings (New York: Macmillan: 1965 [orig. 1751]), p. 122.
A rule which allowed one to take advantage of “platinum opportunities” to cheat — where the gains are vast and one is (nearly) certain of getting away with it — might promise more benefit than strict adherence to core moral rules. But, in adopting such a rule, one abandons the self-satisfactions of being genuinely moral and undergoes the risks of self-deceptive optimism in identifying platinum opportunities. Given the rarity of true platinum opportunities (Philip Pettit [“Virtus Normativa,”Ethics 100 {1990}: 744] writes, for example, “the assurance of being able to keep an offense hidden from the eyes or ears of our compatriots is only rarely available”), trying to follow such a rule would probably not be worth it. Nor would morality — and social life — collapse if some deviant individuals followed such a rule and took advantage of the rare violations it allows.
In a similar vein, Robert Frank (Passions Within Reason, [New York: W.W. Norton, 1988, p. 84]) writes: “almost every merely prudent person ... will be caught cheating sooner or later.”
For discussion of some issues related to this presupposition, see Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 250–54.
Steven Hetcher, Review ofHobbesian Moral and Political Theory, Mind 99 (1989): 435–49, at 446–47; Robert Frank,Passions Within Reason, p. 112.
See “Still a Con Man's Paradise: The art of the scam is alive and well in Florida,”Newsweek, May 28, 1990, p. 49.
While treating others in your own group decently makes prudential sense, it is less clear why prudent members of strong groups should treat members of weak groups decently. This problem is the real challenge to a Hobbesian theory of morality. I discuss it in Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 439–46; and, Kavka, “The Problem of Group Egoism,” in Brad Hooker, ed.,Rationality, Rules, and Utility (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 149–63.
Johnson,Moral Legislation, p. 81.
See Kavka,Hobbesian Theory, pp. 372–73.
The individualist will respond to Johnson's above-quoted argument by saying that an individual's contributions to any “collective” effects (like mutual trust) should be counted in his calculations of the effects of his actions. If all agents did this, must some collective effects go uncounted (as Johnson suggests) or would they be fully represented in the agents' corrected calculations? This question raises subtle and difficult issues concerning coordination, counterfactuals, and collective action. For a thorough treatment, see Donald H. Regan,Utilitarianism and Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
Hobbes,Leviathan, p. 203.
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Kavka, G.S. The rationality of rule-following: Hobbes's dispute with the Foole. Law Philos 14, 5–34 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000523
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000523