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Notes
A notable exception among the latter is Bratman (1999).
Here as elsewhere, talk of ‘justification’ suggests something more akin to permission than to requirement or obligation. But plausibly, and although Harman and Sherman don’t say this explicitly, there are some cases in which it’s not only permissible to take something for granted but in which it would be impermissible or inappropriate not to do so. For example, consider a detective who is charged with solving some crime, but who spends his time reading philosophy journal articles in an attempt to get a better handle on the seemingly more fundamental question of whether it might all be one big dream. Such a detective is subject to criticism for not taking enough for granted: he is failing to take something for granted that he should take for granted, given his purposes, etc. Having noted this, I will set it aside in what follows.
Notice that this candidate necessary condition is consistent with the earlier proposal that one is justified in assuming p only if one knows that p is true.
For an argument, see Kelly (2002).
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Kelly, T. Taking things for granted: comments on Harman and Sherman. Philos Stud 156, 141–147 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9802-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9802-6