Conclusion
It remains only to remark that, what I, the survivor through, get called is in some measure a matter of semantical preference. And Sanskrit terms that might, sometimes, be rendered “consciousness” in English — like ‘citta’, or ‘caitanya’, or ‘cetana’, for instance — could serve, and do, solong as one stays mindful of the facts — that they are terms for what I am, surviving through my being conscious, and my not being so, and not merely for what I am, when conscious.
What seems to me of deep significance, though, is that other terms — like ‘ātman’, ‘puru \(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}\) a’, ‘sāk \(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}\) in’, and even ‘'jīvātman’ — far more often get used for what I'm talking of here; and that none of these obviously, or, indeed, ever need mean ‘consciousness’.6
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Kesarcodi-Watson, I. An ancient Indian argument for what I am. J Indian Philos 9, 259–272 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00235382
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00235382