Abstract
In this chapter I discuss several important issues in Mencius’s moral psychology. I begin with some methodological thoughts about how to study emotions in Mencius and ancient China in general, and then move on to a discussion of Mencius’s conception of four sprouts (siduan 四端). Specifically, I argue that moral emotions in Mencius are best interpreted as a kind of “concern-based construals,” and show how they are conceptually distinguished from both desire and behavioral dispositions. Next, I delineate the unique character of shifei zhi xin 是非之心, one of the four sprouts, as moral judgment, and I discuss how the other three sprouts as moral emotions are related with shifei zhi xin under the rubric of the relationship between reason and emotion in the Mencius. Finally, I examine previous interpretations of the Mencian notion of emotional extension (tui 推) and conclude the chapter with some ideas and brief suggestions about how to cultivate ethical emotions in the context of the Mencius.
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Notes
- 1.
This chapter is largely based on my dissertation (Kim 2008) and contains (summaries of) some important ideas or arguments presented in my previous work cited in the References.
- 2.
Chad Hansen seems to hold this position. He understands emotion as part of the dichotomy between reason and emotion, which is “popularly linked” with other dichotomies such as belief/desire, intellect/passion, and mind/body and is passed on to us as a Greek philosophical legacy. He argues that we cannot find any of these dichotomies in the ancient Chinese philosophical context, and consequently we cannot attribute the conception of emotion as we find in the “Western folk psychology” to the ancient Chinese (Hansen 1992: 18–28; Hansen 1995: 183–186).
- 3.
Oxford English Dictionary (second edition, online), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. http://www.oed.com.ssl.access.yonsei.ac.kr:8080/oed2/00074107; accessed on January 17th, 2021.
- 4.
- 5.
As just mentioned, the king tells Mencius that he saved the ox because he could not bear its cowering like an innocent man going to the execution ground (吾不忍其觳觫, 若無罪而就死地). However, he subsequently ordered to replace the ox with a sheep, and Mencius asks him what there is to choose between an ox and a sheep if the king found it painful for the ox to go to the execution ground innocently (王若隱其無罪而就死地).
- 6.
For further explanations, see Kim 2014b: 247–248.
- 7.
For further explanations and responses to possible objections favoring Nivison’s view, see Kim 2014b: 238–240.
- 8.
For example, see the underlined parts of the following sentences: “挾太山以超北海, 語人曰 ‘我不能,’ 是誠不能也. 爲長者折枝, 語人曰 ‘我不能,’ 是不爲也, 非不能也” (1A7); “鄧文公問曰: ‘鄧, 小國也, 間於齊楚. 事齊乎? 事楚乎?’ 孟子對曰: ‘是謀非吾所能及也…’”(1B13).
- 9.
Against the common assumption that the usage of “shi” as a copula is quite late, we find two instances of such a usage of “shi” in the Mencius: “王之不王, 非挾太山以超北海之類也; 王之不王, 是折枝之類也.” Mencius 1A7; “鈞是人也, 或爲大人, 或爲小人, 何也?” (6A15). In the first passage, “shi 是” is used in parallel with the negative copula “fei 非”; and in the second passage, “shi” is followed by a complement (ren 人), while being modified by an adverb (jun 鈞).
- 10.
For example, “一人則一義, 二人則二義, 十人則十義. 其人玆衆, 其所謂義者亦玆衆. 是以人是其義, 以非人之義…” Mozi 墨子, “Shangtong shang” 尚同上 (Sun 2001: 74, verb); “吾聞夷子墨者. 墨之治喪也, 以薄爲其道也. 夷子思以易天下, 豈以爲非是而不貴也?” (3A5) (noun); “掩之誠是也, 則孝子仁人之掩其親, 亦必有道矣” (3A5) (noun or adjective).
- 11.
For a more detailed explanation of shifei zhi xin and a full argument for my position about this Mencian sprout, see Kim 2014a: 52–58.
- 12.
I finished writing this chapter in early 2016, and since then I have developed a more concrete picture of the emotional extension in Mencius. This new development can be found in Kim 2022.
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Kim, Ms. (2023). Mencius on Moral Psychology. In: Xiao, Y., Chong, Kc. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_27
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