Śūnyatā and Ajāti: Absolutism and the philosophies of Nāgārjuna and Gau$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$apāda

Summary

Gau$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$apāda, whilst accepting much of the argumentation and style of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, aligns himself firmly with the ātman/ svabhāvatā tradition of Vedānta; his view of ātman is inspired by an absorption of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method. For both Nāgārjuna and Gau$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$apāda, the basis of both the Madhyamaka and Advaitic perspectives is the impossibility of change (na anyathabhāva). For Nāgārjuna this entails ni $\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$ svabhāvatā, for Gau$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$apāda it means absolute svabhāvatā. Both accept that the belief in an ‘own nature’ (which amounts to all views of reality) entails a non-active, unchanging absolute. Nāgārjuna takes this as grounds for a rejection of svabhāvatā, Gau$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$apāda accepts this as proof of its reality. The real dividing line between the two thinkers is on the question of the necessity (or not) of even positing a ‘nature’ to things. Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of an underlying and unchanging substratum behind all manifestations, Gau$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$apāda argues that for there to be an appearance there must be a thing that appears. It is this point, the debate over ātman (svabhāva) or anātman (ni $\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$ svabhāva) at its most fundamental level, that is the real dividing line between the philosophies of the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedāntin.