Abstract
Finding a naturalistic account of biological function is important both for making sense of the way functions are talked about in biology and medicine and for the project in the philosophy of mind of naturalising mental content via teleosemantics. The selected effects theory accounts for the proper functions of traits in terms of their selectional history, and is widely considered to be the most promising approach to naturalising biological functions. However, new challenges to the selected effects account have recently emerged. Matthewson (2020) argues that natural selection comes in degrees and that on the face of it biological function does not, suggesting that analysing the latter in terms of the former is therefore problematic. Christie et al. (forthcoming) argue that the selected effects account of function does not fit with biologically detailed accounts of actual selection processes, in that it focuses on the functions of traits of individuals rather than the frequency of traits in populations and does not generate accurate selectional explanations in cases in which there is not a uniform selective environment. This paper defends the selected effects account against these challenges, arguing that a viable response to Matthewson is that any degree of selection suffices to confer proper functions, and that Christie et al. mischaracterise the aims and assumptions of the selected effects account.
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Notes
This is true in particular in Anglophone philosophy of biology, although there is not complete consensus even there: see Garson (2016) for an overview.
Amongst others, Paul Griffiths (1993) and Peter Godfrey-Smith (1994) also give selected effects accounts of proper function. Godfrey-Smith adds to the Millikan/Neander view the proviso that the trait a function is being attributed to must have contributed to the fitness of its possessors in the recent past (359). Griffiths’ account is similar to Godfrey-Smith’s, but unlike Godfrey-Smith, Millikan and Neander, Griffiths defines what it is for a trait-type rather than a trait-token to have a biological function. A corollary of this is that on Griffiths’ account, the present-day state of affairs that is explained by a function-attribution is not an individual’s possession of a trait, but the non-zero proportion of a trait in a current population. This is also a feature of the “canonical” account proposed (although not endorsed) in (Christie et al., forthcoming), to be discussed below.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for the objection, for suggesting a minimal condition similar to this one, and for one of the examples below of non-proper-functional but useful traits.
A Normal explanation is an explanation of how, historically, a type of thing has performed its proper function. Where R is a type of object and F is the function of objects of that type,
[the most proximate Normal] explanation is the least detailed explanation possible that starts by noting some features of the structure of members of R, adds some conditions in which R has historically been when it actually performed F—these conditions being uniform over as large a number of historical cases as possible—adds natural laws, and deduces, i.e. shows in detail without gaps, how the setup leads to the performance of F. (Millikan, 1984, p. 33)
The Normal conditions for the performance of a mechanism’s proper function are the conditions that must be mentioned in the most proximate Normal explanation of the proper functioning of that mechanism.
Note that Normal conditions are Normal conditions for the performance of a particular proper function—if an item has multiple proper functions, these functions may not have the same Normal conditions. Note also that Normal conditions are not necessary conditions: there may be cases in which my belief that there is coffee at Stacey’s helps me to satisfy my desire for coffee even if there is no coffee at Stacey’s, if, for example, there is a coffee shortage and Stacey has run out, but he directs me to the nearest cafe that still has some.
See also Kingsbury (forthcoming).
Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) draw the distinction between something’s being an adaptation—something that has been naturally selected for—and it’s being currently adaptive—fitness-enhancing in its current environment.
An alternative would be to move to something like the “modern history” approach suggested in Godfrey-Smith (1994), but I think I have shown that this move is not necessitated by examples in which the direction of selection changes across time.
Garson (forthcoming) suggests that selected effects theorists have acknowledged this all along.
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks for constructive feedback on drafts of this paper to: Tim Dare, Joe Ulatowski and his Kaffeeklatsch group at the University of Waikato, audiences at the Central European University teleology research seminar in March 2022 and the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference in July 2022, and three anonymous referees for this journal. Particular thanks to John Matthewson for the earlier discussions that led me to write this paper.
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Kingsbury, J. New challenges to the selected effects account of biological function. Synthese 202, 177 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04404-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04404-y