Abstract
This paper examines the application of the mutual manipulability criterion as a way to demarcate constituents of cognitive systems from resources having a mere causal influence on cognitive systems. In particular, it is argued that on at least one interpretation of the mutual manipulability criterion, the criterion is inadequate because the criterion is conceptualized as identifying synchronic dependence between higher and lower ‘levels’ in mechanisms. It is argued that there is a second articulation of the mutual manipulability criterion available, and that it should be preferred for at least two reasons. The first is that the criterion of mutual manipulability is an instance of continuous reciprocal causation. The second is that it has implications for how to understand this distinction between causation and constitution. It is shown that when considering dynamic systems, continuous reciprocal causation - ubiquitous in dynamical systems - is a form of constitutive causality, which entails that causal factors may, in the right circumstances, by genuine constitutive factors of cognition. This notion of constitutive causality lends support to conceiving of the mutual manipulability criterion as a genuine demarcation principle in the debate over the boundaries of mind.
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Notes
The concept “level” (and by extension “inter-level”) is ubiquitous in the sciences, and so is its application. One can find talk of levels of abstraction, levels of causation, levels of explanation and description, levels of function, levels of generality, and so on. Here I restrict my focus to levels in mechanisms (cf. Craver and Bechtel 2007).
Just consider how Clark & Chalmers define the idea of active externalism (i.e. EC) in their seminal paper ‘the extended mind’. They say: “In these cases [cases of putative extended cognition], the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right.” (1998, p. 8) The classical case of Otto and his notebook exemplifies this idea perfectly.
Of course, were a defender of EC to develop a case for cognitive extension starting not with causal facts but with constitutive ones, then it would turn out that the causal-constitutive fallacy is not an objection of EC at all (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out). Unfortunately I do not know of a case for EC that does not has as its premise observations about causality.
From reading Kaplan’s “How to demarcate the boundaries of cognition,” (2012), it is unclear whether Kaplan endorses (d1) or (d2). Insofar as he follows the mechanists in their interpretation of the criterion, it is likely that Kaplan is working with (d2). For the sake of argument, and to draw out challenges and implications to the use of the mutual manipulability criterion – as a bona fide demarcation principle –I target (d2).
To pre-empt the worry that talk of ‘levels’, in discussions about the extent of mind, are not doing any actual work, consider the following example from Menary: “X is the manipulation of the notebook reciprocally coupled to Y – the brain processes – which together constitute Z, the process of remembering.” (2006, p. 334; emphasis in original) In Menary’s example, Z, the process of remembering is a higher-level process of the system as a whole, where the system is constituted by X and Z in continuous reciprocal causal interaction.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
This way of distinguishing between causation and constitution is not restricted to the mechanistic literature. The distinction is explicitly and implicitly all over philosophy. For example, Aizawa & Gillett say: “[We] should mark that relations like realization are obviously a species of determination relation, but are rather different from causal relations. The ‘horizontal’ determination involved with causation is temporally extended […]. In contrast, compositional relations are not temporal in nature, since their ‘vertical’ determination is synchronous […]. Composition is thus a variety of what has been termed ‘non-causal’ determination.” (2009, p. 187) Or, as Bennett says in her survey of dependence relations (though she prefers to call such relations for ‘building relations’): “Building relations do not unfold over time. If property P realizes property Q, it does so at some time t; if these molecules compose that table, they do so at some time t; of these time slices compose that persisting object, they do so simpliciter. Causation, in contrast, is paradigmatically diachronic, and that idea is frequently invoked to distinguish causation from relations like composition, constitution, or supervenience […].” (2011, pp. 93–94)
The specification that ‘higher-level’ processes of the mechanism as a whole unfolds at different – and longer – timescales from its underlying components and processes it not intended as a challenge to Kaplan’s account. In fact, Kaplan is sensitive to the fact that in systems with time-continuous processes such temporal variation between the timescales of higher and lower ‘level’ processes is commonplace.
One could argue that it is problematic to propose that continuous reciprocal causation is a form of constitution. One reason for thinking so would be that there are plenty of theories of constitution and also composition that hold that these relations are asymmetrical, while continuous reciprocal causation is symmetrical. For example, in the metaphysical literature the constitution relation is conceived of as asymmetrical – we say that a statue is constituted by a piece of marble but not that the relevant piece of marble is constituted by the statue. I do not wish to deny that metaphysical terms such as material constitution are real relations, and do actual explanatory work. What I am suggesting is that when projected onto the dynamical cases considered in the discussion over the boundaries of mind, pure asymmetrical relations such as material constitution do not apply (or at least not without substantial modification).
The term ‘mechanistically mediated effects’ is due to Craver and Bechtel (2007). They define such effects as follows: “Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The idea of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes.” (2007, p. 547)
This does not rule out the legitimacy of pure constitution relations in other areas such as analytical metaphysics, where constitution relations track the spatial and material overlap of distinct objects. What seems problematic here is the claim that pure constitution relations have currency in dynamical systems – which may, through reciprocal and continuous causality entwine embodiment, action, and embedding environment.
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Acknowledgments
This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. Thanks also to the New Directions in the Study of the Mind project at the University of Cambridge.
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Kirchhoff, M.D. From mutual manipulation to cognitive extension: challenges and implications. Phenom Cogn Sci 16, 863–878 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9483-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9483-x