Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Institutional Integrity: Its Meaning and Value

  • Published:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

People can have or lack ‘integrity’. But can public institutions?

It is common to speak of the ‘integrity’ of such institutions: in popular discourse, legal decisions, law and regulations, and also increasingly, political theory, and proximate disciplines. Such integrity is often said to be at risk of being ‘subverted,’ ‘corroded,’ and ‘corrupted,’ by both forces within and without. Furthermore, the implication is that this is a very worrying thing. The integrity of our institutions, at least, needs to be preserved, supported, and defended; against money, politics, power, and populists.

However, despite such common usage, the concept itself has attracted little theoretical reflection. What can it mean, if anything sensible, for an institution itself – instead of a person (or even say, a body, process, territory or a bridge) – to have ‘integrity’? And, why might it be so important?

This is the subject of this paper. It puts forward a substantive moral conception of institutional integrity as the robust disposition of an institution to pursue its purpose efficiently, within the constraints of legitimacy, consistent with its commitments. It argues that it is important because it provides the strongest grounding for a ‘duty of support’ owed by citizens to the institution. The strength of such support owed also gives content to a scalar dimension of the institution’s normative legitimacy, that is, the ‘strength’ (or weakness) of such legitimacy. Further, it illustrates how such a conception of institutional integrity will helpfully advance the current debate regarding institutional corruption.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Alexander Horne, Paul Heywood, Bernardo Zacka, Jonathan Wolff, Emanuela Ceva, Maria-Paola Ferretti, Mark Warren, and Marie Newhouse for help in developing this paper. I would also like to thank participants at the ECPR Political Theory Workshop on Institutional Trust, Corruption and Integrity, Cambridge Political Theory Seminar; Edinburgh Legal Theory Research Seminar, and Wharton Zicklin Center for Ethics Research Speaker Series. This research was supported by an Early Career Fellowship awarded by the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2017-095).

  2. E.g. India, (Mahalingam 2012); USA, (Lizza 2017); Australia, (Centre for Public Integrity 2019)

  3. E.g. Canada: R v Zalm [1992] BCWLD 1746 at [12]; Australia, Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA [23]; in USA, Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) at 845-6.

  4. E.g. Australia, Public Service Act (Cth) (1999), s 10; UK, (House of Commons 2015, Rule V.16.)

  5. E.g. (Brock 2014; Thompson 2013, 19, Waldron 2016, 35, 36, 65ff, Philp 2007, 229ff, Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 422-4, Thompson 2018, 505, Ceva 2018, 119, Ferretti 2018, Philp and David-Barrett 2015, 391, Marks 2019).

  6. E.g. (Sztompka 1998, 1, Rohr 1986, Ackerman 2010, Selznick 1983, Terry and Morgan 2015, Bartels and Kramon, 1, Teachout 2014, 51).

  7. Building upon earlier work: (Kirby 2020, 2021; Kirby and Webbe 2019).

  8. As Isaacs notes (at 32), this theory of organizational agency need not be continuous with other theory of collective, joint or group intention, action and agency. In particular, organizational action need not require ‘we-intentions’, ‘joint commitment’ or ‘joint action’ as the other collective literature presupposes. See also, (Hess 2018).

  9. Individual members, we might assume, typically bind themselves to follow such rules, structures and procedures, by the voluntary admission to the organization: (Hardimon 1994).

  10. Importantly, like any agent, just because responsibility presupposes the capability for intention action, this does not mean that an organization is only responsible for intentional action. It can be responsible for negligence, and omissions: (Isaacs 2011, 27)

  11. For example, one might add further such conditions for organisational agency, or indeed organisational moral agency such as minimal rationality, and/or responsiveness to moral considerations. However, one can then just follow the line of authors who illustrate how such further conditions can be fulfilled by organisations: (Arnold 2006; Donaldson 1980; Hess 2014, List and Pettit 2011, Mathiesen 2006, Collins 2019, 11–16).

  12. This is a species of agency relationship between organisation and member: when the former ‘acts on behalf of’ the latter. In turn, ‘Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (the ‘principal’) manifests consent to another person (the ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.’ Restatement (Third) of Agency (2007) § 1.01. Such a relations is distinct from an ‘instantiating’ or ‘acting as’ relationship between collective and member, more typical of the philosophical collective agency literature (see n21) and premised upon joint-action. For more on this distinction, see (Penner 2020, 136-8).

  13. Following the standard principles of agency law, the member’s mandate, or at least the organisation’s responsibility, will have express, implied and ostensible scope: Restatement (Third) of Agency (2007) § 2.01–2.03.

  14. Compare the analogous legal position of fiduciaries acting on behalf of their beneficiaries: (Gold 2009, 473-7).

  15. The exceptional circumstance are scenarios of ‘dirty hands’ in public life: see Sect. 5.2 and 5.4. below.

  16. Admittedly, Hawley herself is hesitant about applying her conception of trust at the organisational level (Hawley 2017). But see, (Kirby, Kirton, and Crean 2018, Festenstein 2020).

  17. As Greg Scheroske puts it, ‘We recognize (even if we cannot articulate) the difference between integrity and what we might call vicious steadfastness. … This is an emerging theme in recent literature and this might be encapsulated in the claim: Integrity requires that one’s convictions be responsive to relevant reasons bearing on the justifiability of those convictions’, (Scherkoske 2012). This literature includes: (Calhoun 1995, 257–260, Cox, La Caze, and Levine 2003, McLeod 2004, Breakey 2016).

  18. In theory, of course, an institution could be internally consistent and coherent without a purpose, if it had perfectly exclusive and exhaustive delegation of action to members, who happened to understand their mandates in a perfectly consistent and coherent manner. However, even in theory, this would not be robust across non-ideal conditions, and since robustness is further element of integrity, purpose is (instrumentally) necessary for integrity even in theory.

  19. This is congruent with DeMott’s account of an organisational member’s duty of loyalty: (DeMott 2019)

  20. Compare, (Amit et al. 2017, 449–451, Miller 2010, 154–179, Néron 2014).

  21. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer pressing me upon this point.

  22. Perfection need not be required, any more than in the individual case.

  23. See below, §§ 3.3.

  24. A virtue is a robust, positively valanced disposition to act in a certain way with a characteristic motivation: (Cox et al. 1999; McFall 1987, contra Williams 1981, Audi and Murphy 2006).

  25. This is was my own assumption in Kirby 2021, 1626.

  26. E.g. (Arendt 2003).

  27. Compare, Margaret Levi’s concept of ‘contingent consent’: (Levi 2009).

  28. Compare with Levi’s typology: (Levi 2009, 19)

  29. (Rawls 1999, 99): substituting ‘legitimacy’ for ‘justice’.

  30. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clap_for_Our_Carers.

  31. See, also, the deliberate application of this principle in the design of the U. S. Constitution: (Wood 1993, 108).

  32. For a comprehensive review, (Thompson 2018).

References

  • Ackerman JM (2010) “Understanding independent accountability agencies.“ In Comparative administrative law, edited by Rose-Ackerman S.; Liinndseth P. L.: Edward Ellgar

  • Allard-Tremblay Y (2015) Trust and Distrust in the Achievement of Popular Control. The Monist 98(4):375–390. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv019

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amit E, Koralnik J, Posten A-C, Muethel M, and Lawrence Lessig (2017) Institutional corruption revisited: exploring open questions within the institutional corruption literature. South Calif interdisciplinary law J 26(3):447

    Google Scholar 

  • Arendt H (2003) Responsibility and judgment, 1st edn. Schocken Books, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Arnold DG (2006) Corporate Moral Agency. Midwest Stud Philos 30(1):279–291. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00140.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Audi R, Murphy PE (2006) “The Many Faces of Integrity " Business Ethics Quarterly 16(1):3–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Australian Government. Australian Public Service Commission (2018) “Integrity in the APS.“ Last Modified 1 June 2018, accessed 27 November. https://www.apsc.gov.au/integrity-aps

  • Australian Government. Department of Social Services (2019) “About the Department.“ accessed 12 November. https://www.dss.gov.au/about-the-department

  • Baier A(2013) “What is Trust?“ In Reading Onora O’Neill, edited by David Archard, 175–185. Abingdon: Routledge

  • Breakey H (2016) Compromise Despite Conviction: Curbing Integrity’s Moral Dangers. J Value Inq 50(3):613–629. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9541-1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brock G(2014) Institutional Integrity, Corruption and Taxation. In Edward J. Safra Working Papers

  • Buchanan A, Keohane RO (2006) The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. Ethics & International Affairs 20(4):405–437. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00043.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burks DJ (2011) “Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Victimization in the Military: An Unintended Consequence of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”?“. Am Psychol 66(7):604–613. doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024609

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byerly T, Meghan Byerly (2016) Collective Virtue. J Value Inq 50(1):33–50. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-015-9484-y

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calhoun C (1995) “Standing for Something”. J Philos 92(5):235. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2940917

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Centre for Public Integrity (2019) “Protecting the integrity of accounability institutions.“ accessed 13 January. https://publicintegrity.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report-Protecting-the-integrity-of-accountability-institutions.pdf

  • Ceva E (2018) “Political Corruption as a Relational Injustice.“ 35. 118–137. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052519000013. 2

  • Ceva E, Maria-Paola Ferretti (2021) An Ethics of Office Accountability for Well-Functioning Public Institutions. Public affairs quarterly 35(4):277

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins S(2019) Group duties:their existence and their implications for individuals. New product edition. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press

  • Cordell S (2016) Group Virtues: No Great Leap Forward with Collectivism. Res Publica 23(1):43–59. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9317-7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox D, Caze ML, Levine MP (2003) Integrity and the fragile self. Ashgate, Aldershot

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox D, LaCaze M, Levine MP (1999) “Should We Strive for Integrity?“. J Value Inq 33(4):519–530. doi: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004614232579

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dahlberg S, Sören, Holmberg (2014) “Democracy and Bureaucracy: How their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction”. West Eur Politics 37(3):515–537. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.830468

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeMott, DA (2019) "Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law." In The Oxford handbook of fiduciary law. ed Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, and Robert H. Sitkoff. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 321-338.

  • Denhardt JV, Denhardt RB(2016) The new public service: serving, not steering. Expanded ed. London: Routledge

  • Donaldson T (1980) Moral Agency and Corporations. Philos context 10:54–70. doi: https://doi.org/10.5840/philcontext1980107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easton D (1975) A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support. Brit J Polit Sci 5(4):435–457. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400008309

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferretti MP (2018) “A Taxonomy of Institutional Corruption.“ 35. 242–263. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052519000086. 2

  • Festenstein M (2020) Political Trust, Commitment and Responsiveness. Polit Stud 68(2):446–462. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719852569

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Finnis J (2011) Natural law and natural rights. 2nd ed, Clarendon law series. Oxford: Oxford University Press

  • French PA (1979) “The Corporation as a Moral Person”. Am Philos Q 16(3):207. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/20009760

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • French PA (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility. Columbia University Press, New York, NY

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • French PA (1995) Corporate ethics. Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth

    Google Scholar 

  • French PA (1996) Integrity, Intentions and Corporations. Am Bus Law J 34(2):141–156. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-1714.1996.tb00693.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fricker M(2010) “10. Can There Be Institutional Virtues?“ In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, edited by T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 3–235. Oxford University Press

  • Gilbert M (1992) On social facts. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gold AS (2009) The new concept of loyalty in corporate law. U C Davis law review 43(2):457

    Google Scholar 

  • Great Britain. Department for Constitutional Affairs Great Britain. Department for Constitutional, Affairs (2003) Constitutional reform: a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, Consultation paper (Great Britain. Department for Constitutional Affairs); CP 11/03. London: Department for Constitutional Affairs

  • Green L (1988) The authority of the state. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Habermas J (1988) Legitimation crisis. Polity, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardimon MO (1994) “Role Obligations”. J Philos 91(7):333–363. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2940934

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawley K(2014) “Trust, Distrust and Commitment.“ Noûs 48 (1):1–20. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12000

  • Hawley K(2017) “Trustworthy Groups and Organizations.“ In The Philosophy of Trust, edited by Paul Faulkner and Thomas W. Simpson, 230–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press

  • Hegel GWilhelmF(1991) Elements of the philosophy of right. Translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge texts in the history of political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Hellman D (2013) “Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy”. Mich Law Rev 111(8):1385–1422

    Google Scholar 

  • Hess K(2018) “The Peculiar Unity of Corporate Agents.“ In Collectivity: ontology, ethics, and social justice, edited by Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski and Tracy Lynn Isaacs, 35–60. London: Rowman & Littlefield International

  • Hess KM (2014) “The free will of corporations (and other collectives)”. Philos Stud 168(1):241–260. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0128-4

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hetherington M(1998) “The political relevance of political trust.“The American Political Science Review:791–808

  • Heywood PM, Rose J(2015) “Curbing Corruption or Promoting Integrity? Probing the Hidden Conceptual Challenge.“ In Debates of corruption and Integrity, edited by Péter Hardi, Paul M. Heywood and Davide Torsello, 102–119. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

  • Hodgson GM (2007) Institutions and Individuals: Interaction and Evolution. Organ Stud 28(1):95–116. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840607067832

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hood C (1995) “The “new public management” in the 1980s: Variations on a theme. Acc Organ Soc 20(2):93–109. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/0361-3682(93)E. 0001-W

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • House of Commons (2015) The Code of Conduct. The Stationary Office Limited, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaacs T (2011) Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford University Press

  • Kirby N (2020) “From Anti-Corruption to Building Integrity.“ In Handbook on Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration, edited by Adam Graycar, 463–482. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited

  • Kirby N (2021) An ‘Institution-First’ Conception of Public Integrity. Br J Polit Sci 51(4):1620–1635. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712342000006X

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirby, Nikolas A, Kirton, Crean A (2018) “Do corporations have a duty to be trustworthy?“ Proceedings of the British Academy 6. doi: https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/006s1.075

  • Kirby N, Webbe S (2019) Being a trusted and respected partner:the APS integrity framework. Melbourne: ANZSOG . https://www.apsreview.gov.au/sites/default/files/resources/being-trusted-respected-partner-aps-integrity-framework.pdf

  • Kirby N, Jonathan Wolff (2021) “Quality of Government: A Philosophical Assessment.“ In The Oxford Handbook of the Quality of Government, edited by Andreas Bêagenholm, Monika Bauhr, Marcia Grimes and Bo Rothstein, 42–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press

  • Konzelmann Ziv A (2012) Institutional virtue: how consensus matters. Philos Stud 161(1):87–96. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9933-4

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard CM (2009) Self-constitution: agency, identity, and integrity. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lawford-Smith H (2012) The Feasibility OF Collectives’ Actions. Australasian J Philos 90(3):453–467. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.594446

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levi M (2009) Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi M (2019) “Trustworthy Government and Legitimating Beliefs " Nomos 61:362–384

    Google Scholar 

  • List C, and Philip Pettit (2011) Group agency [electronic resource]: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, Oxford scholarship online. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lizza R(2017) “Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump.“ The New Yorker, May22. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-up-to-trump

  • Lovett A, and Stefan Riedener (2021) “Group Agents and Moral Status: What Can We Owe to Organizations?“. Can J Philos 51(3):221–238. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Machiavelli N (1984) The prince, World’s classics. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Machiavelli N (2008) Discourses on Livy, Oxford world’s classics (Oxford University Press). Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • MacIntyre AC (1967) A short history of ethics. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mahalingam V(2012) “Institutional integrity – a forgotten value?“ Times of India, May 12. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/In-search-of-propriety/institutional-integrity-a-forgotten-value/

  • Marks JH (2019) The perils of partnership: industry influence, institutional integrity, and public health. Oxford University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Mathiesen KAY (2006) We’re All in This Together: Responsibility of Collective Agents and Their Members. Midwest Stud Philos 30(1):240–255. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00137.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McFall L (1987) “Integrity " Ethics 98(1):5. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/292912

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McLeod C (2004) Integrity and Self-Protection. J Soc Philos 35(2):216–232. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2004.00227.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller PB(2018) “Fiduciary Representation.“ In Fiduciary government, edited by Evan J. Criddle, Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Sung Hui Kim and Paul B. Miller, 21–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Miller S (1999) “Noble cause corruption in policing”. Afr Secur Rev 8(3):12–22. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.1999.9627889

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller S(2010) The moral foundations of social institutions: a philosophical study. Cambridge

  • New York :Cambridge University Press

  • Monaghan J (2017) The Special Moral Obligations of Law Enforcement. J Political Philos 25(2):218–237. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12123

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montefiore A. “Montefiore A(1999) 1999. ‘Integrity: a philosophers introduction.“ In Integrity in the public and private domains, edited by Alan Montefiore and David Vines. London: Routledge

  • Montesquieu CS(1999) Considerations on the causes of the greatness of the Romans and their decline. Translated by David Lowenthal. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett

  • Néron P-Y (2014) “À quoi sert la conception institutionnelle de la corruption ?“. ateliers de l’éthique 9(1):103–125. doi: https://doi.org/10.7202/1024297ar

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pasternak A (2017) From Corporate Moral Agency to Corporate Moral Rights. Law & ethics of human rights 11(1):135–159. doi: https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0003

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Penner J(2020) “Trustees and Agents Behaving Badly.“ In Fiduciaries and trust: ethics, politics, economics and law, edited by Paul B. Miller and Matthew Harding, 128–148. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Philp M (2007) Political conduct. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Philp M, Elizabeth David-Barrett (2015) Realism About Political Corruption. Annu Rev Polit Sci 18(1):387–402. doi: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-092012-134421

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rawls J(1999) A theory of justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

  • Raz J (1986) The morality of freedom, Ebook central. New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, Oxford [Oxfordshire]

    Google Scholar 

  • Real JA, Del(2019) and Julie Turkewitz. “Should the Electoral College Be Eliminated? 15 States Are Trying to Make It Obsolete.“ New York Times, May 22, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/electoral-college.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FElectoral%20College&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=9&pgtype=collection

  • Rohr JA (1986) To run a constitution: the legitimacy of the administrative state, Studies in government and public policy. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross T (2004) Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College. World Ahead Publishing, Los Angeles

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothstein B(2008) and Jan Teorell. “What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions.“ Governance 21 (2):165–190. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x

  • Scherkoske G (2012) “Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?“. Int J philosophical studies: IJPS 20(2):185–215. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2011.635676

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt C, Schwab G, Konzen M, McCormick JP, Strauss L, Harvey J(2007) Lomax. The concept of the political. Expanded ed. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press

  • Scholz JT(1998) “Trust, Taxes, and Compliance.“ In Trust and governance edited by V. Braithwaite and M. Levi, 135–166. New York: Russell Sage Foundation

  • Selznick P (1983) Leadership in administration: a sociological interpretation. University of California Press, California

    Google Scholar 

  • Sztompka P (1998) Trust, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy. Eur J Social Theory 1(1):19–32. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/136843198001001003

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor G(1981) and Raimond Gaita. “Integrity.“ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:143

  • Teachout Z (2014) Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Terry LD, Douglas F, Morgan(2015) Leadership of public bureaucracies: the administrator as conservator. Second ed, Ebook central. London, [England]; New York, New York: Routledge

  • Thompson DF (1995) Ethics in Congress: from individual to institutional corruption. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson DF (2005) Restoring responsibility: ethics in government, business and healthcare. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson DF (2013) “Two Concepts of Corruption”. SSRN Electron J. doi: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2304419

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thompson DF (2018) “Theories of Institutional Corruption " 21(1):495–513. doi: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-120117-110316

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tollefsen DP (2015) Groups As Agents. Polity Press, Chicester

    Google Scholar 

  • Tyler TR (2006) Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. Ann Rev Psychol 57:375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waldron J (1993) Special Ties and Natural Duties. Philos Public Affairs 22(1):3–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldron J (2016) Political political theory: essays on institutions. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Walzer M (1973) Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands. Philos Public Affairs 2(2):160–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Warren M (1999) Democracy and trust. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Weber M (1994) Political writings, Cambridge texts in the history of political thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams B(1973) “Integrity.“ In Utilitarianism; for and against, edited by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 40–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

  • Williams B (1981) Moral luck: philosophical papers, 1973–1980, Cambridge books online. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wood GS(1993) The radicalism of the American Revolution. 1st Vintage Books ed. ed, American Revolution. New York: Vintage Books

  • Zimmerman MJ (2009) Responsibility and Awareness. Philosophical Books 50(4):248–261. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2010.00497.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

    Nikolas Kirby

  2. Political Science, Duke Kunshan University, Kunshan, China

    Nikolas Kirby

Authors
  1. Nikolas Kirby
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nikolas Kirby.

Ethics declarations

Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest

None.

Research involving Human Participants and/or Animals

Not applicable.

Informed Consent

Not applicable.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kirby, N. Institutional Integrity: Its Meaning and Value. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 25, 809–834 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10330-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10330-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation