The Conative Character of Reason in Kant's Philosophy
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from the first sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason through the writings of the late 1790s, Kant describes human reason as striving for the unconditioned and as having needs and interests.1 I refer to this as Kant’s characterization of reason as “conative.” Although several authors have aptly described this characterization of reason,2 few have reflected on the problems it raises. These [End Page 77] problems are more complicated than is generally assumed. Given the oddity of personifying reason as having needs and interests, one might be inclined to read these notions as merely decorative metaphors, and indeed this is how they are usually taken.
But metaphors for what exactly? Here Kant seems to get into difficulties. If he intends these notions to play a merely ornamental role,3 he cannot be justified in using them—as he does—to defend assumptions of pure reason, such as the practical postulates. Alternatively, if by “needs of reason” he means no more than “needs of humans,”4 he cannot legitimately claim—as he does—that such needs apply to all finite rational beings. Although the conative terms play a crucial role in several of Kant’s arguments, he nowhere explains this usage. In this essay, I examine the problems raised by Kant’s characterization of reason as conative and propose an interpretative solution.
The structure of this article is as follows. I first introduce Kant’s talk of the needs and interests of reason and give two examples of arguments in which it plays a decisive role. I then discuss four different interpretations. Having identified a number of problems with literal interpretations of the conative characterization of reason, I further examine whether a metaphorical reading, suggested by several authors, can solve these problems. I argue that it is impossible to regard the conative terms in which Kant describes reason as merely decorative metaphors, but that they are better understood as cases of “symbolic exhibition” in Kant’s own sense.
1. reason and the “right of need”
Kant assumes the meaning of the term ‘need’ (Bedürfnis) to be familiar and uses it in the ordinary sense of a deficiency of something necessary or desired. If the subject of the need is conscious of the deficiency, it is thought to desire whatever is expected to fulfill the need, and to aim at this fulfillment. If this striving is successful, a feeling of satisfaction on the part of the subject will [End Page 78] follow. ‘Interest’ is closely related to ‘need’, although the two terms are not identical in meaning. If one consciously has a certain need, one takes an interest in that which is expected to contribute to its satisfaction. According to Kant’s definition, ‘interest’ is the feeling of delight (Wohlgefallen) connected with the representation of the existence of a certain object or action, which can thus become a determining factor of our will, namely, to bring about this object or action (cf. KU V, 204, 207). “[T]o will something, and to take a delight in its [conceived] existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical” (KU V, 209).5 Finite rational beings always aim at the satisfaction of their needs, and this satisfaction always depends on the existence of what is needed (cf. KpV V, 137). Significantly, the concepts ‘need’ and ‘interest’ are applicable only to finite beings: for an infinite being, Kant claims, wanting something and the existence of the wanted object would coincide (cf. GMS IV, 413,n.).
Whereas Kant’s use of these terms is most often discussed in relation to inclination, I concentrate here on Kant’s attribution of needs and related characteristics to human reason. At the very beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces reason’s striving character. In the oft-quoted opening sentence of the first preface to the first Critique, he speaks of the “peculiar fate” of reason, that “it is burdened by questions which it cannot dismiss, because they have been prescribed by the nature of reason itself, but which it is unable to answer, because they transcend all powers of human...
