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The Number of Senses

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Abstract

Many philosophers still countenance senses or meanings in the broadly Fregean vein.However, it is difficult to posit the existence of senses without positing quite a lot ofthem, including at least one presenting every entity in existence. I discuss a number ofCantorian paradoxes that seem to result from an overly large metaphysics of senses, and various possible solutions. Certain more deflationary and non-traditional understandings of senses, and to what extent they fare better in solving the problems, are also discussed. In the end, it is concluded that one must divide senses into various ramified-orders in order to avoid antinomy, but that the philosophical justification of such orders is, as yet, still somewhat problematic.

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Klement, K.C. The Number of Senses. Erkenntnis 58, 303–323 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022619903237

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