Abstract
Constitutive Russellian panpsychism seems to combine the strengths of its rivals, physicalism and dualism, while avoiding their weaknesses: by acknowledging the irreducibility of phenomenal properties yet grounding macro- in microphenomenality (phenomenal constitution), the view can avoid both anti-physicalist arguments and the causal exclusion problem for dualism. However, two severe objections have been raised: the combination problem for phenomenal constitution, and the structural exclusion problem for the position’s account of microphenomenal causation. It is currently hotly debated whether the combination problem can be overcome. If not, panpsychists are forced to view macrophenomenality as emergent. Yet emergent panpsychism is subject to the causal exclusion problem, thereby sacrificing panpsychism’s advantage over dualism. With regard to the structural exclusion problem, Mørch (forthcoming) provides a solution in terms of microphenomenal powers. I argue that Mørch’s view is not tenable. This notwithstanding, I develop a modification of her view which can solve the structural exclusion problem. Moreover, the emergentist version of this approach can avoid the causal exclusion problem. Thus, I aim to provide both a satisfying account of microphenomenal causation in panpsychism and a viable version of emergent panpsychism in case the combination problem turns out to be unsolvable.
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Notes
Nothing-over-and-aboveness describes a relation of strong ontological dependence. While accounts which cash out this relation in purely modal notions have been prominent in the past, nowadays many philosophers argue that it is a primitive hyperintensional relation, metaphysical grounding (e.g. Fine 2001).
This does only follow, since the other two versions of panpsychism, autonomous and identity panpsychism are not tenable. See Chalmers (2016) for compelling objections to these views.
Note that emergent panpsychism does not offer a solution to the combination problems. A solution would show how phenomenal constitution is possible. Emergent panpsychism circumvents the problem by giving up phenomenal constitution. Rather, fundamental laws govern the production of macro- from microphenomenality.
However, Kim himself does not think that these physicalist replies are successful.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
The simple conditional analysis of dispositions is seriously flawed, since it cannot handle cases of finks and antidotes. Lewis (1997) therefore provides a revised version of the conditional analysis with additional criteria. Yet critics such as Bird (2007) also object to this proposal. However, Bird only attacks the conditional analysis for ordinary, nonfundamental dispositions. When it comes to fundamental dispositions—and only these concern us here—he admits that the simple conditional analysis might work, since the case can be made that there are neither finks nor antidotes at the fundamental level. Anyway, the simple conditional analysis at least provides a rough and ready idea of an analysis of fundamental dispositions—nothing more is needed for the discussion at hand.
More precisely, pain’s phenomenal character is a causal factor for pain-avoidance. There might be other mental states such as certain desires which counter-act this factor such that the subject does not ultimately try to avoid pain.
Since my account is a mixed view which allows for primitive dispositions and categorical properties, it is not subject to a regress objection against dispositionalism which some panpsychists, e.g. Goff (2017), utilize to motivate their Russellian version of categoricalism.
In the philosophy of action, there is no consensus about what intentions are and how they can be explained, for instance, whether they are reducible to other kinds of mental states or not. I basically argue that phenomenal powers panpsychism needs to allow for primitive micromental states of choosing such and such behavior in response to microphenomenal stimuli. I call this type of state microintention but one could also speak of microchoices or microvolitions if one believes that intentions have to be analyzed in a way incompatible with this way of using the term.
Mørch (2014) develops a version of emergent panpsychism which avoids genuine downward causation altogether, and is therefore not subject to the causal exclusion problem. Mørch takes the emergence relation to be a fusion process in which a macrosubject is generated that is a complex entity, having a myriad of microsubjects as parts to which it is ontologically prior. In fusing, the microsubjects and microphenomenal properties constituting the emergence base lose their ontological status of being fundamental and become derivative parts of the emergent macrosubject and its phenomenal properties. Prima facie, this seems to be an attractive option which—in difference to the account I defend—avoids additional ontological costs. However, I believe that it is not compatible with standard accounts of grounding and fundamentality such as Fine (2001) that fundamental entities can lose and regain their ontological status. The problem is especially severe in the case of decomposition. It does not seem to make sense that a property is derivative on some other property such that it is strongly ontological dependent on its ground, but that if its ground disintegrates, then the derivative property survives and is transformed into a fundamental property. Switching from being derivative to being fundamental is incompatible with the very concept of derivativeness, according to which a derivative entity is strongly ontological dependent such that it has to be sustained by its ground and can therefore not outlive the latter. Other versions of the fusion-view have similar problems. I therefore favor non-fusion versions of emergent panpsychism.
Moreover, note that the microphysical causal closure principle does not allow for a non-question-begging causal exclusion argument. For invoking microphysical causal closure implies outright denying macromental downward causation. I consider it to be a significant advantage of my version of emergent panpsychism that it seems to be impossible to provide a non-question-begging causal exclusion objection against it.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Thomas Sattig, Tobias Wilsch, Micha Kieser, two anonymous referees, and the audiences at two talks I gave at the University of Tübingen and the University of Osnabrück for very helpful comments on various drafts of this article.
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Klinge, F. The Role of Mental Powers in Panpsychism. Topoi 39, 1103–1112 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09632-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09632-x