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Truth, rightness, and permanent acceptability

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Abstract

Goodman and Elgin want truth to be demoted and rightness to be promoted. In the first part of this paper the main reasons they offer for this reorientation are discussed. Goodman once suggestedthat one construe truth as acceptability that is not subsequently lost, but later he quietly dropped this proposal. In the second part of this paper it is argued that ultimate acceptability is indeed neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for truth.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 6, D-2000, Hamburg 13, Germany

    Wolfgang Künne

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  1. Wolfgang Künne
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Additional information

This paper was read at the ZiF authors' colloquium with Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin, Bielefeld, 1991.

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Künne, W. Truth, rightness, and permanent acceptability. Synthese 95, 107–117 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064670

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064670

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