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Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions

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Abstract

Two scenarios illustrate uses of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in the construction of choice functions. A comparison is made to the construction of choice functions by the selection of maximal elements. A characterization is given of choice functions that are von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalizable by acyclic, asymmetric binary relations. Two examples illustrate the use of the characterization.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Oak Hall, Storrs, CT, 06269-1063, USA

    Vicki Knoblauch

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  1. Vicki Knoblauch
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Correspondence to Vicki Knoblauch.

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I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for a generous expenditure of time and effort and for many valuable suggestions.

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Knoblauch, V. Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions. Theory Decis 89, 369–381 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09755-3

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