Abstract
: The epistemological, philosophy-theoretic and justificational relation between skepticism and interpretationism as expounded by Günter Abel is explored. His interpretationism is understood as being validated by its capacity to refute skeptical arguments with their unpalatable, i. e. nihilistic, relativistic, irrationalistic, anarchic or simply self-contradictory conclusions. It is shown that the conditions of the skeptical arguments propounded by Sextus Empiricus, Agrippa, Hume, Descartes and - a modern specimen - Wright are not satisfied in interpretationism. Furthermore, in line with its internalistic and transitory selfconception, three direct skeptical attacks are dismissed and new ones are encouraged. On a practical side, Abel’s argument for a democratic form of government by showing its coherence with interpretationism and by discounting its alternatives via skeptical arguments is considered.
