Wittgenstein on Religious Disagreements

Summary

Religious disagreement has recently been a popular topic in analytic philosophy of religion. Many of those who have dealt with the topic have done so from an assumption that logically there is no difference between disagreements on religious matters and disagreements on other areas of life. This assumption is called into question by Wittgenstein (and his followers). This paper explores how Wittgenstein’s view of religious disagreements should be understood. The main source of the study is Wittgenstein’s treatment of the nature of religious disagreements in his lectures on religious belief. In particular, I will explore Wittgenstein’s thought by referring to two recent studies on these lectures made by Cora Diamond and Martin Kusch. I will use the tools of epistemic logic to clarify some problems in this discussion. I will also comment on the common fideistic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s view of religion and his antiintellectualist conception of faith.