Abstract
The paper attempts to discuss two contrasting views on Aristotle’s notion of ‘virtue’ advocated by Immanuel Kant and G. E. M. Anscombe. Kant maintains that good will is the primary condition of moral action. It is the foundation of moral laws. Virtue is given the secondary status while describing the nature of moral conduct. On the contrary, Anscombe is critical of this Kantian normative approach to the virtue. In her contention, the Kantian deontology excludes the psychological conditions while theorizing morality. This exclusion undermines not only the importance of virtue for the development of moral character, but also fails to judge motive and situation which are essential for investigating the intention of action. In conclusion, we would suggest that any overemphasis on rational construal of morality might restrict human freedom and thereby puts a veil on the basic content of humanity.
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Notes
In this context, Hogue Grotius, who is best known for his contributions to the natural law theories of normativity which emerged in the later medieval and early modern periods, specifically in his book, The Law of War and Peace? (1625). He criticized Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. He claims that ‘many virtues are not a mean.’ As we know that for Aristotle, virtues regulate our desires when we form middle-ground habits between more extreme habits. Contrary to Aristotle’s doctrine of mean, Grotius argues that some virtues do indeed control our passion through a middle course, but not all virtues do this. In fact, he claims some virtues are extreme dispositions’. Grotius rejects Aristotle’s insensibility or contempt for pleasure as a vice, and sees this as a virtue. Contrary to Aristotle’s list of under-ambition or contempt for great honors and achievement as a vice, Grotius sees this as a virtue. To prove his argument that doctrines of mean is false. Grotius gives an example of religious matters; Grotius says that we believe that it is impossible to worship God too much, or to seek heaven too much, or to fear hell too much. Thus, with religious devotion, the extreme is the virtue. Grotious, The Law of War and Peace (Trans.) A.C. Campbell, A.M., Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.
See, Driver, Julia, “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe,”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
It refers to Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle and Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
Utilitarian’s like Henry Sedgwick and deontologists like Immanuel Kant advocate that moral laws must have universal application. The condition of universalization of a maxim in order to be a moral law.
In this regards, Anscombe writes: “Anyone who has read Aristotle’s Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them. The concepts which are prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate, buried or far in the background, in Aristotle” (Anscombe, 1958:2). By this statement, she claims that how modern normative ethicists are misinterpreting Aristotelian virtue ethics and neglecting many aspects which is very necessary for doing moral philosophy.
In this context, Anscombe writes: “It would seem so; the criterion is presumably that a failure in an “intellectual” virtue–like that of having good judgment in calculating how to bring about something useful, say in municipal government-may be blameworthy. But-it may reasonably be asked-cannot any failure be made a matter of blame or reproach? Any derogatory criticism, says of the workmanship of a product or the design of a machine, can be called blame or reproach. So we want to put in the word “morally” again: sometimes such a failure may be morally blameworthy, sometimes not…” (1958:4). By this statement, she claims that morality is necessary to use ‘morally’ instead of use the word blameworthy for any kind of moral justification or moral worthy which modern moral philosophers had used in derogatory sense.
Like Anscombe, Bernard Williams also criticized Modern Normative Ethics in the context of moral obligation, duty, rules. Williams draws a distinction between ethics and morality. He argues that the notion of morality is not characterized by what Kant understands of duty and obligation. He claims that the notion of obligation is associated with blame and therefore many times we fail to confront our conduct and we violate our duty. Williams also rejects Kantian morality because morality always rejects the possibility of luck which is very important for good life, because sometimes attaining a good life depends on things outside our control. Williams argues against Kantian deontology and says that the analysts’ tight focus on such words as “ought”, “right”, and “good” has come, in moral theory, to give those words (when used in their alleged “special moral sense”) an air of authority which they could only earn against a moral and religious backdrop—roughly, the Christian world-view—that is nowadays largely missing. He contends that the claim that morality can and will go on just as before in the absence of religious belief is simply an illusion that reflects a lack of “historical sense” (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy: Fontana, London, 1985:174). He argues that ‘morality is distinguished by the special notion of obligation it uses, and by the significance it gives to it and that special notion is what he calls as moral obligations. He says that if anyone has given the purest, deepest and thorough representation of morality that is Kant but it is not given by any philosopher rather it is the outlook, or, incoherently, part of the outlook, of almost all of us. For him, moral obligation is an important kind of deliberative conclusion—a conclusion that is directed towards what to do, governed by moral reasons, and concerned with a particular situation. Further he states that, some moral conclusions merely announce that you may do something. Those do not express an obligation, but they are in a sense still governed by the idea of obligation: you ask whether you are under an obligation, and decide that you are not” (Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Fontana, London, 1985:175).
In this context, Anscombe discusses the debate in her article, “The Doctrine of Double Effect” (2006). As per this doctrine, she tries to show what was corrupt about Truman’s action. The basic idea is that there is a morally relevant distinction between intended versus merely foreseen outcomes. She says that to intend harm is worse than to merely foresee harm as a result of one’s action. This can sometimes be combined with a kind of absolutism to hold that intended harms are forbidden whereas the merely foreseen may not be. For that she took the example of strategic bomber and terror bomber. She claims that strategic bombers are worse than terror bombers. Because that is being done deliberately by a rationally acclaimed group of people while terror bombers’ intention is not always recognized for good action. Anscombe, “Double Effects”, Human Life, Action and Ethics, Imprint Academy, London, 2005–2006.
In this connection, Julia Annas points out that a virtuous person is someone whose existing character tendencies have been formed in such a way that he acts, reasons, and reacts bravely, rather than in some other way. This is why virtue is a disposition which is from the start an active and developing one. It is not a passive product of the string of impacts from outside; it is the way I (or you), an active creature, develop a character through formation and education. Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. (Chapter, IV).
Regular practice or habitual action makes persons more accurate in their actions.? Konch, M., Panda, R.K. Aristotle on habit and moral character formation. International Journal of Ethics Education 4, 31–41 (2019).
See, the quote of JohnDryden (15th century English poet, literary critics) which is published in (http://www.healingphilosophy.com)Archive Healing Philosophy: Harness your inner strength, 2008.
See, Aristotle’s in Nicomachean Ethics, book. II, 1152a30–33. Aristotle explains there aboutEvenus poem. (Aristotle. 1984. Nicomachean Ethics. Hippocrates, G. Apostle (Trans.) London: Peripatetic Press).
See, Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson., 2013. A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu.Lexington: Lexington Books. P.104. Which Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinsonhave edited and cited from (Aristotle.1999. Nicomachean Ethics. W.D. Ross (trans.). Kitchener: Batoche Book. pp. 1148b27–31, 1152a27–33, p.21).
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Konch, M. Kant and Anscombe: Two Contrasting Views on Aristotle’s ‘Virtue’. Philosophia 51, 793–810 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00585-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00585-x