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Justification and Causation

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  1. Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität Berlin, Habelschwerdter Allee 30, D-14195, Berlin, Germany

    Dirk Koppelberg

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  1. Dirk Koppelberg
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Koppelberg, D. Justification and Causation. Erkenntnis 50, 447–462 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005573821959

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