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Ist die linguistische Theorie des logischen Apriori obsolet?

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Abstract

The linguistic theory of the logical A Priori: is it obsolete In holistic interpretations, the logical truths are considered as continuous with empirical science: they are revisable, a posteriori, though very near to the centre of our web of belief. In this paper, we consider the merits and demerits of this approach, and we propose that it is necessary to revaluate holistic philosophies of logic. Some arguments are put forward which point in favour of the logical empiricists’ theory of logical truth. We argue (following Hartry Field) that the concept of “correlation between logical facts and logical beliefs” (which is at the heart of the holistic theory) is inconsistent. Finally, we concentrate on the principle of contradiction and argue (following Manley Thompson) that this principle is fundamental for meaning, truth, and thinking. This thesis is derived from considerations on the nature of intentionality.

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  1. Gartenstr. 9, D-90443, Nürnberg (

    Darius Koriako

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Koriako, D. Ist die linguistische Theorie des logischen Apriori obsolet?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34, 43–68 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023243620445

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