Abstract
This paper investigates the truth values of modal sentences within fictional discourse. I investigate the consequences of (im)possible worlds–based theories of truth in fiction for the truth, in fiction, of (explicit) modal sentences. I elaborate on the consequences of explicit reliable (modal) sentences within the truth-in-fiction operators if we embed the normal modal logics. I prove that the current main possible worlds theories of truth-in-fiction make explicit reliable sentences within fiction truth-value equivalent to their possibility. This has non-intuitive consequences if we employ normal modal logics. These consequences are shown to be contradictory. The main argument of the paper thus concerns the inconsistency of embedding the systems of normal modal logics within the truth-in-fiction operators provided in the discussion.
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Notes
With this said, Lamarque and Olsen discuss its merits; see Lamarque and Olsen (1994).
Although I consider these statements to be true, nothing in the argumentation of the paper rests on this. Some of the investigated cases do assume the existence of true readings of these sentences, but there are other investigated cases that do not rely on such assumptions. The point here is to show that the truth value of these statements can be in question. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
There are of course many more if we include other nearby fields investigating fiction (e.g. narratology).
For a similar point, see Fine (1982).
I do not primarily examine the problem of truth in fiction within contradictory fictions. Therefore, I will not specify the further theses presented by Lewis (1983).
These cases are investigated by Bonomi and Zucchi (2003).
Predelli speaks of a singular possible world for the sake of simplicity.
f-worlds are worlds where the fiction f is told as known fact; see Badura and Berto (2019, p. 182).
Or statement, or its utterance—the difference is not important for my argument.
The inclusion of impossible worlds within the Badura and Berto system will call for the qualification of my results. I address this point in the fourth section of the paper. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
I do not present the full cube of NML systems, as this is not needed for the argumentation of the paper.
The analyses can be straightforwardly amended by the use of the terms for particular fictions.
I do not claim that explicitness equals truth in fiction. For simplicity, I presuppose the existence of some such explicit sentences, which were cleared as reliable by whatever relevant agreed mechanism. What matters is that there are such sentences for every non-contradictory fiction, not which particular sentences they are.
This will be demonstrated via model-theoretic investigation.
Of course, the truth of a sentence over the subset is not the explanation of why it is considered true in the fiction (this would be circular).
The theories present the interpretation rule for sentences of the form ‘In fiction, p’. That is, they provide a rule of interpretation over models. The investigated theories do not provide an axiomatization of the truth-in-fiction operator, however.
This need not be the case if we include some impossible worlds among such fictional worlds. More on this below. This theorem does assume that the accessibility relation over fictional worlds is reflexive. That could indicate that system K is off the hook, since it does not assume the reflexivity of the accessibility relation. More on this later.
By non-contradictory (i.e. consistent) fiction I mean fiction that does not include contradictions. It would not suffice to characterize consistent fiction as fiction that contains some true sentences, simply because impossible worlds also make many statements true. It is also an open question whether this includes fictions that are only metaphysically impossible. For example, is The Last Action Hero contradictory? Thanks to an anonymous referee for this note.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this observation. This assumption (however minimal) must be made, as the results of the paper would not stand if there were no fictional worlds. The assumption seems minimal because I am investigating consistent fictions.
Therefore, I assume the axioms of the system M.
Assume that all statements within the proof are embedded within the operator F. The operator is omitted here for the sake of readability.
I do not claim that these are theorems of the NML systems. I am only claiming that these can be proved theorems of the investigated fiction, so long as it contains specified unproblematic assumptions and presupposes the validity of the particular system of NML. Of course, theorem C does not hold within the investigated systems of NML.
The careful reader will notice that this counterexample assumes that the sentence Possibly, Sherlock Holmes is a doctor does have a true reading.
I have borrowed these last three sentences from an anonymous reviewer. They precisely capture the shape of the argumentation presented in the paper.
‘In fiction, p’ is true and ‘In fiction, ◊¬p’ is false in this fiction (w2 is a world of the fiction with no access to a world in which ¬p is true). I will elaborate more on such cases in the following section.
The careful reader will notice that this is also a counterexample to the embedding of system K.
These last two sentences were again borrowed (with slight amendments) from an anonymous reviewer because they provide a precise picture of my argument.
Thanks to both anonymous reviewers for raising the points that prompted me to elaborate on these important issues.
The question of ambiguity is not equivalent to the question of the existence of true/false readings, though. Even if the sentences do not have two suggested readings, the question of their true or false readings may arise.
This possibility was assumed for the proof of C2 when considering the embedding of system M. My argumentation does not depend on this assumption, however, because I have presented another counterexample to M that does not rest on this.
Further still, is the claim that ‘In fiction f, p’ is false equivalent to ‘In fiction f, not-p’? With respect to the investigated theories of truth-in-fiction, ‘In fiction f, not-p’ is true iff not-p is true in all of the fictional worlds. ‘In fiction f, p’ is false iff it is not true that p is true in all of the fictional worlds (it can be true in some, just not all). So these are clearly not equivalent conditions. There is a dependence, though, if we only assume consistent fiction and possible worlds—the falsity of ‘In fiction f, p’ follows from the truth of ‘In fiction f, not p’. On the other hand, ‘In fiction f, not p’ can be false even if ‘In fiction, p’ is not true.
Currie (2003) seems to take similar considerations about the inclusion of non-fictional words into account when investigating truth in fiction.
The validity of C2 theorem rests on this.
That is, C2 is valid, and we can investigate its counterexample.
The careful reader will notice that there is a counterexample for each NML system in the paper that does not assume the problematic true reading of sentences like (1) and (2).
I am not suggesting that all modal operators could be subject to this restriction. However, the modal operators investigated in the paper (◊, □) do collapse if we restrict their evaluation to the worlds of the fiction.
The limits of the authority of the author are discussed, e.g., in Xhignesse (2021).
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Acknowledgements
I am indebted to anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. I thank also Martin Vacek, Daniela Glavaničová, Matteo Pascucci, Mirco Sambrotta, Dan Zeman, Shawn Standefer and Amalia Haro Marchal for their comments on a previous version of the paper. I would also like to thank Carolyn Benson for correcting my English.
Funding
This paper was supported by VEGA Grant No. 2/0117/19 Logic, Epistemology, and Metaphysics of Fiction.
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Kosterec, M. On modality in fiction. Synthese 199, 13543–13567 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03388-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03388-x