Abstract
Despite the discrepancies between quantum objects and `classical' ones, mainly with regard to the fact that the latter may be thought of as `individuals', contrary to the former, we still regard the quanta as `things' in our ordinary discourse as well as in the logico-mathematical basis of quantum theories. This paper considers some possibilities for accomodating the logico-mathematical framework of the theories which deal with such a strange ontology where the inhabitants are things devoid of identity and both having and not having certain properties.
``All right'', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.
``Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin'', thought Alice, ``but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!''
Lewis Carroll
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Krause, D. Remarks On Quantum Ontology. Synthese 125, 155–167 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005235125284
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005235125284