Abstract
Many philosophers of theistic religions claim (1) that there are powerful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence that make it rational to believe that He exists and at the same time maintain (2) that God always has the freedom to do otherwise. In this article, I argue that these two positions are inconsistent because the empirical evidence on which the a posteriori arguments for God’s existence rest can be explained better by positing the existence of a God-like being without the freedom to do otherwise.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
However, there are some outspoken critics of this position in contemporary philosophy of religion as well (e.g., Daeley 2022).
In this article, I wish to remain neutral on the question whether there actually are any successful a posteriori arguments for God’s existence.
P(E|G) and P(E|¬G) are only defined if we make the (harmless) assumption that P(G) ≠ 0 and P(¬G) ≠ 0. Furthermore, E is only relevant for assessing the probability of G and ¬G if we make the (equally harmless) assumption that P(E) ≠ 0 and P(E) ≠ 1.
Thus, an a posteriori argument for God’s existence is what Swinburne calls a ‘C-inductive argument’ (Swinburne, 2004: 17).
Even if proposition (2) turns out to be false, one might still maintain that believing in God’s existence is rational on other grounds that have nothing to do with arguments for God’s existence. For instance, proponents of reformed epistemology such as Wolterstorff (1976) and Plantinga (1983) have argued that believing in God’s existence would be rational even if there were no compelling arguments for His existence. Craig himself professes sympathies for reformed epistemology (e.g., Craig 2008: 43–51) but, nevertheless, argues that natural theology alone is sufficient to make the case that believing in God’s existence is rational. Thus, Craig remains vulnerable to the argument of this article despite his sympathies for natural theology.
Hunt (2014) argues that Swinburne fails to make a compelling case for the aforementioned version of the principle of alternative possibilities because his preferred understanding of free will remains vulnerable to modified Frankfurt cases. For this reason, Hunt points out that Swinburne would have been better off with a sourcehood account of free will that does not incorporate this version of the principle of alternative possibilities. The argument of this article can be understood as yet another way of pointing out the problems that beset Swinburne’s understanding of free will.
Again, please note that P(E|G*) and P(E|¬G*) are only defined if we make the (harmless) assumption that P(G*) ≠ 0 and P(¬G*) ≠ 0.
That being said, it is worth mentioning that Swinburne (2004) himself denies that his case for the existence of God rests on any a priori arguments.
I thank Andrew Ter Ern Loke for raising this objection.
I think that it is a legitimate question whether belief in God*’s existence still counts as theism in a meaningful sense. For related reasons, there has been a vivid debate in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany on the question whether Spinoza and others who were influenced by him (e.g., G.E. Lessing and G.W.F. Hegel) should be classified as atheists (cf. Gerrish, 1987).
This is not the first time that contemporary philosophy of religion has been accused of an overly narrow research agenda that ignores countless religious traditions (Draper & Nichols, 2013; Schilbrack, 2014, Leftow et al., 2015: 442–3). The argument developed in this article can be understood as a way to flesh out this general objection.
For helpful feedback on previous drafts of this paper, I would like to thank Andy Sullivan, Jakob Vikner, as well as the attendees of the 2022 Pluralistic Philosophy Workshop at Georgetown University and the 2021 Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion Conference at the University of Oxford.
References
Al-Ghazālī, A. H. M. (2000). The incoherence of the philosophers (M. E. Marmura, Trans. and Ed.). Brigham Young University Press.
Craig, W. L., & Sinclair, J. D. (2009). The Kalam cosmological argument. In W. L. Craig, & J. P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to natural theology (pp. 101–201). Wiley-Blackwell.
Craig, W. L. (2008). Reasonable faith: Christian truth and apologetics. Crossway.
Daeley, J. J. (2022). Why God must do what is best: A philosophical investigation of theistic optimism. Bloomsbury.
Dennett, D. C. (1984). Elbow Room. The MIT Press.
Draper, P., & Nichols, R. (2013). Diagnosing bias in philosophy of religion. The Monist, 96(3), 420–446.
Gerrish, B. A. (1987). The secret religion of Germany: Christian Piety and the pantheism controversy. The Journal of Religion, 67(4), 437–455.
Hunt, D. P. (2014). Swinburne on the conditions for free will and moral responsibility. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(2), 39–49.
Leftow, B., Anderson, P. S., & Schellenberg, J. L. (2015). Whither philosophy of religion? Religious Studies, 51(3), 441–454.
Manekin, C. (2014). Spinoza and the determinist tradition in medieval Jewish philosophy. In S. Nadler (Ed.), Spinoza and medieval Jewish philosophy (pp. 36–58). Cambridge University Press.
Manley, D. (forthcoming). God and the Bayesian conception of evidence. Religious Studies. https://philpapers.org/rec/MANGAT-10
Miles, M. R. (2005). The word made flesh: A history of Christian thought. Blackwell.
Miller, C. (2014). A Bayesian formulation of the Kalam cosmological argument. Religious Studies, 50(4), 521–534.
Miller, C. (2016). Is theism a simple hypothesis? The simplicity of omni-properties. Religious Studies, 52(1), 45–61.
Morriston, W. (2000). Must the beginning of the universe have a personal cause? A critical examination of the Kalam cosmological argument. Faith and Philosophy, 17(2), 149–169.
Oppy, G. (1995a). Reply to Professor Craig. Sophia, 34(2), 15–29.
Oppy, G. (1995b). Ontological arguments and belief in God. Cambridge University Press.
Oppy, G. (2014). Describing Gods: An investigation of divine attributes. Cambridge University Press.
Plantinga, A. (1983). Reason and belief in God. In A. Plantinga, & N. Wolterstorff (Eds.), Faith and rationality (pp. 16–93). University of Notre Dame Press.
Schilbrack, K. (2014). Philosophy and the study of religions: A manifesto. Wiley.
De Spinoza, B. (2018). Ethics, proved in geometrical order (M. J. Kisner (Ed.), M. Silverthorne, & M. J. Kisner, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Swinburne, R. (1993). The coherence of theism. Oxford University Press.
Swinburne, R. (2004). The existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Swinburne, R. (2005). Faith and reason. Oxford University Press.
Swinburne, R. (2014). Mind, brain, and free will. Oxford University Press.
Wielenberg, E. (2021). Craig’s contradictory Kalam: Trouble at the moment of creation. TheoLogica, 5(1), 80–88.
Wolterstorff, N. (1976). Reason within the bounds of religion. Eerdmans.
Zagzebski, L. (2000). Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities? Philosophical Perspectives, 14, 231–248.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of Interest
The author declares no competing interests.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix
Appendix
Lemma 1: Suppose \(\mathrm P(\mathrm E\vert\mathrm G)>\mathrm P(\mathrm E\vert\neg\mathrm G)\). In this case, \(\mathrm P(\mathrm G\vert\mathrm E)>\mathrm P(\mathrm G)\).
Proof: \(\mathrm P(\mathrm E\vert\mathrm G)>\mathrm P(\mathrm E\vert\neg\mathrm G)\)
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Kremers, P. Natural Theology and Divine Freedom. SOPHIA 63, 135–150 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00951-6
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00951-6