Abstract
Since the publication of Kripke’s “Outline of a Theory of Truth” in 1975, we have seen a flood of work on the Liar paradox. However, only more recently have there been efforts to extend the results of these investigations to contexts in which structurally similar paradoxes arise. In this paper I aim to contribute to our understanding of paradox by showing how the techniques and ideas of Kripke can throw light on paradoxes associated with the idea of reference. I will presuppose familiarity with the basic ideas of Kripke, 1984; notation will be congruent with that in Kremer, 1988.
This paper is based on parts of chapter 5 of my doctoral dissertation, Logic and Truth, University of Pittsburgh, 1986. The Inspiration for that work was a seminar on the topic of truth given by Nuel; without his encouragement and direction it would never have been completed. In the course of that seminar he also set the problem to which this paper is a direct response. I am privileged to be able to contribute to a volume of papers dedicated to the best teacher of logic I have known, and a good friend.
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Kremer, M. (1990). Paradox and Reference. In: Dunn, J.M., Gupta, A. (eds) Truth or Consequences. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0681-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0681-5_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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