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Open Access Published by De Gruyter June 20, 2007

Rorty and Normativity

  • Alexander Kremer
From the journal Human Affairs

Rorty and Normativity

The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.



References

Brandom, R. B. Rorty and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.Search in Google Scholar

Kremer, A. What is the Origin of Obligation? Human Affairs 13, 34-43, 2003.Search in Google Scholar

Rorty, R. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.Search in Google Scholar

Rorty, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.Search in Google Scholar

Rorty, R. Philosophy and Social Hope. Harmonsworth: Penguin Books, 1999.Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2007-06-20
Published in Print: 2007-06-01

© 2007 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

This content is open access.

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