Abstract
Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone.
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Notes
I thank an anonymous reviewer for this nice summary of my argument.
An anonymous reviewer suggests that Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska’s analysis fails to deal with a.
known version of the witness (Frankie) example where the witness hopes that the jury will not be convinced, hopes that the jury realises that he is under coercion, so that the jury rules for a verdict of guilt. This comes somewhat close to the tell-tale sign cases, but unlike tell-tale lies, there is no intention to persuade the jury of the opposite of what the witness says, just [a] lack of intention to persuade of the truth of what one says, coupled with a desire that one will not be believed.
While I like this example, I would like to pursue a different line of reasoning. This paper is not simply a reply to Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska. I am much more interested in understanding lying in institutional contexts and the nature of manipulation.
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I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive feedback.
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Krstić, V. Bald-faced lying to institutions: deception or manipulation. Synthese 203, 121 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04547-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04547-6