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Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True: a Case of Transparent Delusion

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue (1) that the contents of some delusions are believed with sufficient confidence; (2) that a delusional subject could have a conscious belief in the content of his delusion (p), and concurrently judge a contradictory content (not-p) – his delusion could be transparent, and (3) that the existence of even one such case reveals a problem with pretty much all existing accounts of lying, since it suggests that one can lie by asserting what one consciously and confidently believes is true, and (4) sincerity, since it suggests that asserting a proposition you believe is true is neither sufficient nor necessary for sincerity. If I am right about (1) and (2), then (3) and (4) follow easily. Therefore, the paper is mainly devoted to an analysis of transparent delusion and defending (1) and (2).

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Notes

  1. Some delusional subjects realize that they are delusional but think that their delusions are nevertheless true. Their delusions are not transparent. I call them Catch-22 delusions.

  2. One-factor theories also exist, but I address the rival views (Krstić, 2020) so repeating the argument would unnecessarily add content to this paper.

  3. According to Carson (2006) and Fallis (2013), for example, the Belief Condition says ‘I do not believe that p’. This variation makes no difference for our purposes. Also, some argue that asserting is not necessary for lying but this is also tangential to this argument.

  4. For more sophisticated analyses of L3, see Chisholm and Feehan (1977) and Krstić (2023b).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank John Bishop, Neil Levy, the Editor and especially the anonymous reviewer of this journal. I would also like to thank everyone who anonymously commented on this paper in good faith.

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  1. Department of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Nazarbayev University, Kabanbay Batyr 53, Astana, Kazakhstan

    Vladimir Krstić

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  1. Vladimir Krstić
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Correspondence to Vladimir Krstić.

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Krstić, V. Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True: a Case of Transparent Delusion. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00700-1

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