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Agent Causation, Realist Metaphysics of Powers, and the Reducibility Objection

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Abstract

To address what I call the “Uniformity”, “Capriciousness”, and “Reducibility” objections, recent agent-causation theories hold that agent-causation is a type of substance causation. Substance causation consists in substances producing effects by exercising or manifesting their powers. Importantly, these versions of agent-causation assume a realist metaphysics of powers, where powers are properties of substances that can exist unmanifested. However, the realist theories of powers that agent-causal theories have relied upon explicitly hold that powers—rather than their substances—are causes. Substances are merely derivative causes, as the bearers of powers. Critics therefore argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers. In this paper, I argue that agent-causation is reducible to causation by the agent’s powers only if powers are self-exemplifying properties. I also offer reasons for why powers—especially agent-causal powers—are non-self-exemplifying properties, in support of the irreducibility of agent-causation.

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Notes

  1. It’s important to note that O’Connor’s views have shifted from the traditional view that agent causation is sui generis type of causation alongside event causation to the view under consideration in this paper that agent causation is a type of substance causation and all causation is substance causation. O’Connor details the shift in Jacobs & O’Connor, 2013.

  2. See also (Brent, 2017: 667). I note that at least one proponent of agent causation who also holds that agent causation is a type of substance causation, Mayr, does not think that there is a uniformity problem to begin with. Mayr posits both substance causation, where substances include conscious agents as well as electrons, as well as event causation. See Mayr, 2011: 230.

  3. See also Lowe, 2008: 164–5, Nelkin, 2011: 88, and Mayr, 2011: 144–5.

  4. See also Marmodoro, 2017: 70.

  5. See also Heil, 2012: 12 and 33.

  6. Some agent causations do offer arguments for why agents—rather than their powers—are causes. I address those in Part 4. Others, however, assume without argument that agents are causes even while holding a realist metaphysics of powers. Notably, Brent specifically cites proponents of these theories of powers in arguing for agent causation without arguing why such accounts that hold that powers—rather than their bearers—are causes are wrong. See (Brent, 2017: 670, footnote 20).

  7. Buckareff gives a similar argument against all substance causal accounts in Buckareff, 2017. In this paper I focus on the argument in Buckareff, 2011, as it targets agent causation specifically. For responses to his argument against all substance causal accounts, see Kuykendall, 2019.

  8. Some understand agent causation as consisting in the agent exerting effort, which consists in exercising or manifesting different powers. What’s important here, however, is that causation by agents involves the manifestations of their powers.

  9. Recall, this is how the proponent of agent causation addresses the capriciousness objection, as reasons are identical to, constitute, or are constituted by the agent’s powers.

  10. Buckareff gives voice to this objection. See (2011): 118.

  11. According to Mayr, “assuming tropes in addition to general properties seems to be a superfluous addition to one’s ontology, for all the work which would be done by tropes could presumably also be done by general properties and events” (2011: 212–13).

  12. I present an additional reason why their argument does not succeed soon.

  13. See, for instance, Whittle, 2016, Lowe, 2008, and Jacobs & O’Connor, 2013.

  14. Garcia addresses the distinction as it applies to tropes while Kuykendall addresses the distinction as it applies to tropes and universals.

  15. Whittle, in a defense of substance causation broadly rather than agent causation specifically, has similarly argued that “properties are what make substances powerful, causally efficacious entities that cause things. But properties are not themselves powerful entities that cause things” (2016: 14).

  16. Marmodoro as well claims that powers are powerful. See (2017): 58 and 70.

  17. I provide some reasons in section 7.

  18. This point is defended in Kuykendall, 2019: 349.

  19. Earlier accounts of agent causation which hold that agent causation is a sui generis type of causation alongside event causation are also committed to agent-causal power being a non-self-exemplifying property. However, in what follows I will focus on accounts of agent causation which hold that agent causation is a type of substance causation.

  20. These examples are found in (Garcia, 2015: 639) and (Kuykendall, 2019: 350).

  21. I note that some of the proponents of the realist metaphysics of powers deny that there are passive powers and so dispositions such as fragility and ductility would not be passive powers. See, for instance, (Heil, 2012: 74), (Martin, 1993: 182), (Mumford & Anjum, 2018: 269).

  22. I note that my argument that lower level properties do not self-exemplify the character they confer on higher level powers applies whether the shape, mass, and rigidity are categorical or dispositional properties themselves. If the shape, mass, and rigidity are categorical properties — that is, properties which unlike dispositional properties or powers are not directed towards manifestations, then they are categorical properties that nonetheless ground a higher level power of an object to roll. If they are dispositional properties themselves, they are not identical to the higher level power to roll. For the remainder of the paper, I will assume that they are dispositional properties themselves. For an argument that they are categorical properties, see Lowe, 2010. For an argument that an object’s shape is identical to its power to roll, see Mumford & Anjum, 2011. For an argument that the pandispositionalist thesis that shape, mass, and rigidity are dispositions that ground the higher level power to roll but are not identical to the higher level power, see Kuykendall, 2019.

  23. See also Steward, 2012: 225–29 and Mayr, 2011: 233–248.

  24. Such as Garcia (2015, 2016) and Kuykendall (2019).

  25. I note that previous defenses of the thesis that powers and dispositions are non-self-exemplifying properties have not argued that type of powers exercised in agent causation—powers grounded in complex arrangements and interactions of the parts of a substance—are non-self-exemplifying properties.

  26. Mumford and Anjum (2017) and Stump (2013) argue that the power to form hydrogen bonds is a strongly emergent power.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Davis Kuykendall

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Kuykendall, D. Agent Causation, Realist Metaphysics of Powers, and the Reducibility Objection. Philosophia 49, 1563–1581 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00299-y

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