In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Russell's contribution to the study of nuclear weapons policy by Douglas P. Lackey Now THAT THE movement against nuclear weapons has so splendidly revived in this country and in Europe, it is interesting and appropriate to take a look back at Russell's writings on nuclear war. In reviewing this material, I have learned from Russell in two ways: I have learned from what he said, and learned from what he did not say. There are, in Russell's writings on this topic, numerous passages relevant to contemporary strategic problems, and Russell made, I shall suggest, at least one enduring contribution to the study of nuclear strategy which has provoked much subsequent research. On the other hand, there are serious lacunae in Russell's treatment of the subject. The lesson to be learned from these lacunae is the lesson ofrecognizing the historical limitations of even the most enlightened mind, a lesson which should induce in readers a certain healthy scepticism regarding the transcendent rightness of their favourite remedies for the nuclear problem. I regard these lapses in Russell's treatment of nuclear war (with one exception) more as intellectual failures than as moral blemishes. They do not compare, for example, with Aristotle's defence of slavery, Hume's remarks on the imbecility of Negroes, Rousseau's condescensions about women, Hegel's rhapsodies about the purifying effects of war, or Heidegger's contemptible endorsements of the Nazi programme. In most cases what Russell recommends concerning nuclear weapons is not morally wrong. He points in the right direction. But he does not go far enough. I shall not, in this paper, attempt to reconstruct in any detail the development ofRussell's thoughts about nuclear war. A general outline will suffice. Russell's ideas about nuclear war, I believe, can be divided into four phases. The first phase'is the discovery phase, exemplified by his speech on nuclear war before the House of Lords on 28 November 243 244 Russell winter 1984-85 1945. The second phase, from roughly 1946 to 1948, is the anti-Soviet phase, centring on Russell's proposals for threatening a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. The third phase, from 1949 to 1962, is the phase of even-handed denunciation of the Cold War-the period, I believe, in which Russell made an enduring contribution both to world peace and to the study ofnuclear strategy. The fourth phase, the anti-American phase, is initiated by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and extends to Russell's death in 1970. I shall not discuss Russell's publications in this last stage, not because I disagree with them-in point offact I am more sympathetic to the claims of these last books than the productions of the other stages-but because it is difficult to determine which essays Russell actually wrote and which were partially or wholly drafted by Ralph Schoenman and others. One important scholarly task to be undertaken by the Russell Archives is the determination of the provenance of Russell's writings in these last years. 1. THE DISCOVERY PHASE In his House of Lords speech,I Russell made the following predictions, all subsequently verified: (I) that atomic weapons would soon become more destructive and cheaper to produce, (2) that a fusion bomb would be constructed in "the somewhat more distant future", and (3) that the secret of atomic bombs could not be kept and that the Russians could be expected to build one "within a few years". The success of these prophecies is remarkable considering (I) that it was generally believed (and it was true until 1950) that atomic bombs would be exceedingly expensive to produce, (2) that many technical experts, J. R. Oppenheimer for example, believed that solving the technical problems of the fusion bomb would require decades of research, and (3) that General Leslie Groves in the United States had made a widely accepted prediction that the Soviets would not have the atomic bomb before 1965, if ever.2 Russell went on to argue that a war with nuclear weapons would destroy civilization, that the choice facing the community ofnations was between mutual destruction and the abolition of war, and that the first...

pdf

Share